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THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS.

WHEN the splendid discoveries in astronomical science had become public, and every one, even the least educated, was aware that the millions of bright points with which the heavens appear to be studded were so many suns, each forming a system apart and a unit in the vast and numberless mass of worlds rolling in space, infidels and rationalists tried to press those discoveries into their own science and make them bring their testimony against Christianity, as they had done in all the other branches of human science. Paine, among the English-speaking infidels, formulated the objection from astronomy. "The system of a plurality of worlds renders the Christian faith at once little and ridiculous, and scatters it in the mind like feathers in the air. The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind, and he who thinks he believes in both has thought but little of either." (*Age of Reason*.) By this is meant that if the numberless systems of the universe be made by one and the same God, who has peopled them with rational and moral creatures, it is absurd to suppose that He has had such special regard for us, the inhabitants of this tiny speck called the earth, as Christianity asserts; it is senseless to suppose that He sent His only begotten Son to be made man, to suffer and to die for us, and has absolutely neglected and ignored the myriads of rational beings dwelling in other solar systems, and filling with organized, intelligent life all the points of immeasurable space. We might reply to our over-confident friends, the rational-

ists, that Christianity is preëminently a *fact*, that its main principles have been realized, as it were, and incorporated in real events, such as the mysteries of the Incarnation, of the Atonement, of the perpetual indwelling of the same Incarnate God in the Church, which is His extension and manifestation in time and space, and which is a living, quickening reality, defying the attacks of all its enemies for the last nineteen centuries. Moreover, Christianity has pervaded, more than the air which fills the atmosphere, the whole social system for the last nineteen centuries, and has created modern civilization in all that it can boast of real living, justifying, ennobling elements,—so much so, that we could easily identify the history of civilization with the history of Christianity. Consequently, we are right in saying that Christianity is a fact, in the best sense of the word.

Now, the statement of the plurality of worlds, teeming with rational inhabitants, is an hypothesis, a supposition, a guess. We may, therefore, say to our opponents: Wait till you have demonstrated your opinion to be a fact, your hypothesis to be a thesis, and then it will be time for us Christians to take up your objection and to put fact against fact and discuss upon their agreement or disagreement. But so long as your opinion remains a guess, you will allow us to hold fast to our Christianity. But it is not necessary to resort to such an argument to silence our opponents, as we can lay down and prove the three following propositions, which will form the subject of this article:

I. We think it highly probable that all the solar systems of the universe are inhabited by intelligent spirits informing material organisms.

II. We *know* that Christianity, either as a whole system or in any of its principles, is not opposed to the opinion of the plurality of worlds.

III. We are convinced that they mutually help each other,—Christianity, by rendering that opinion more and more probable; and the plurality of worlds, by setting the grandeur, the magnificence, the comprehensiveness of Christianity in a bolder and more splendid relief.

But before we enter upon the demonstration of these three propositions, we beg to recall a few preliminary notions of astronomy in order that our readers may more easily follow us in our discussion.

Astronomy teaches: 1st. That the fixed stars are self-luminous suns like ours; that some of them are accompanied by one or more self-luminous satellites and others by obscure ones, but the existence of which is sufficiently proven by the phenomena of their various phases and movements.

2d. These may be called systems of primary order, and, like our own planetary system, are governed by the law of gravitation and all the other laws which Kepler discovered to rule over the planets revolving around our sun. If the secondary suns, which officiate as satellites of the principal ones, are themselves surrounded by dark satellites, we shall have the case similar to that which takes place in some of the principal dark stars of our system.

3d. In many cases these simple systems are substituted by others extremely complex, which form groups or globular masses, the laws of whose movement or equilibrium are as yet unknown to us. These groups are formed by separate masses, that is, stars easily distinguishable by means of our instruments, and which, in the centre only, by their great multitude, exhibit a luminous *indistinctness*, which is also of a starry nature, as is easily evinced by their spectrum.

4th. The Milky Way is a belt formed by an enormous accumulation of complicated masses of stars, each of which may be regarded as composed of innumerable systems of superior order. The form of this enormous mass is unknown to us, but in relation to the size of the earth it does not exhibit an equal depth in all directions, and we can look through in certain places beyond its limits,—in others we cannot.

5th. The stars which seem to us the largest are the nearest, and the distance is the principal, though not the only, cause, which makes the others appear smaller. Probably the largest and nearest to us form one of those superior systems of which our sun is a part, many of which united together form the Milky Way.

6th. Besides the stars, there are numberless other masses of matter shining with native light and not as yet concentered in definite bodies, but in the gaseous state, which are called the *nebulae*, some of which are of enormous size.

7th. The distance of some of the stars is immense. The light of some stars of the first magnitude, having the tenth of a second of parallax, would require ten thousand years to reach us, though light travels, as is well known, at the rate of twelve millions of miles a minute.

8th. But though the space which the stars represent be immense, yet it does not constitute the real limits of the creation, because not only the Herschelian instruments cannot penetrate all the galactic stratum in its depth, but not even our own modern instruments, such as Lord Rosse's telescope, that of Lassells, of Washington, of Melbourne, of Paris. Hence the firmament is absolutely unfathomable to us. However, it cannot be said to be infinite, as mathematicians prove that nothing which is composed of distinct

and separate parts or beings can be infinite, because a thing composed of distinct and separate beings can always be expressed either by even or odd numbers, and in neither supposition could it be infinite. Because, suppose that which is claimed by the supposition to be infinite were expressed by an odd or an even number, by simply deducting a unit, from being infinite the thing would become finite, which is absurd.

Having given a résumé of the last results of astronomy, we repeat that we hold it highly probable that the millions of worlds, rolling majestically in immeasurable space, are inhabited by intellectual substances, informing a material organism in the same manner as our souls inform our bodies, but an organism adapted both to the nature of those intellectual substances and to the peculiar conditions—both atmospherical and meteorological—of those regions which they inhabit. Our readers will certainly not expect from us any astronomical arguments in support of our opinion; this we leave to those who follow that sublime science *ex professo*. For us, the fact that one of the greatest of modern astronomers, Secchi, held such opinion,¹ is sufficient warrant that there are no astronomical objections against this opinion of sufficient value to give us any anxiety. Our argument will be both theological and metaphysical, and especially drawn from the most fundamental principles of St. Thomas, several of whose premises, if evolved to their legitimate consequences, will demand the existence in other worlds of incorporated intellectual substances other than man. And now for the proofs.

1st. It is a fundamental principle of St. Thomas that the number of the various creatures of the universe is to be estimated and reckoned in proportion to their perfection and dignity of being in the scale of creation, God having created the higher and nobler in the scale in much larger number than the lower. This principle presides over and pervades the whole cosmology of St. Thomas, and is very frequently alluded to by him. We will give a few instances: "*Cum perfectio universi sit illud quod Deus intendit in creatione rerum, quanto aliqua sunt magis perfecta tanto in majori excessu sunt creata a Deo;*" that is, things are created in much greater number in proportion as they are more perfect, the perfection of the universe being the object which God has principally in view in creating. (*Summa Th. P. P.*, qu. 50, Art. 3, corp.)

Again: The order of the universe seems to demand that those beings which are higher and nobler should exceed in quantity or number those which are lower and less noble, because the less noble and the more lowly seem to have been made for the higher and the nobler. Hence it is necessary that the nobler beings,

¹ The Stars. An Essay on Sidereal Astronomy.

existing almost for themselves, should be multiplied as much as possible.

"Ordo universi exigere videtur ut id quod est in rebus nobilius excedat quantitate vel numero ignobiliora; ignobiliora enim videntur esse propter nobiliora; unde oportet quod nobiliora quasi propter se existentia multiplicentur quantum possibile est." (*C. G.*, Lib. 2, ch. 92.)

It is evident from these texts, which are repeated on other occasions, that St. Thomas holds the principle as a fundamental in cosmology, that God, in determining the number of the different creatures, has been guided by the place they hold in the scale of perfection; the greater and the more perfect having been created in much greater number than the lower. And before we draw from it the conclusion relative to our subject, it will be interesting to inquire into the metaphysical reason which led St. Thomas to adopt such a principle as fundamental. This reason is found in the fact that God is the efficient, typical, and final cause of the universe; a reason which goes to show that Creation not only demands a variety of species, but also a greater number of species of those beings which are higher and nobler in the scale of perfection than of those which are lower. 1st. The efficient cause demands a variety of species. Every agent, says St. Thomas, intends to impress his own similitude on the effect which he produces, as far as the nature of the effect will permit. This the agent realizes more or less perfectly in proportion to his perfection as agent. For instance, it is evident that the greater the caloric power in a body, the greater is the heat which is generated from it; the more skilful an artist, the more perfect will be the forms which he will give to his materials. But God is a most perfect agent. Therefore it behooved Him to impress His own similitude upon His creatures as perfectly as created nature was capable of. But a most perfect similitude of God could not be realized by the creation of one species of creatures. Because, when it is a question of a cause of a nature far superior to the effect, those perfections which are found in the cause in a simple manner, as one, can be represented in the effect only as composite and multiple. If we would, therefore, admit a perfect similitude of God in creation, we must admit a multiplicity and variety of species.

"Quum enim omne agens intendit suam similitudinem in effectum inducere secundem quod effectus capere potest, tanto hoc agit perfectius quanto agens perfectius est; patet enim quod quando aliquid est calidus tanto facit magis calidum et quando est aliquis melior artifex tanto formam artis perfectius inducit in materiam. Deus autem est perfectissimum agens. Suam igitur similitudinem in rebus creatis ad eum pertinebat inducere perfectissime, quan-

tum naturæ creatæ convenit. Sed perfectam Dei similitudinem non possunt consequi res creatæ secundum unam solam speciem creaturæ, quia cum causa excedat effectum quod est in causa simpliciter et unite, in effectu invenitur composite et multipliciter. Oportuit igitur esse multipliciter et varietatem in rebus creatis," etc. (*C. G.*, Lib. 2, ch. 45.)

As to the typical cause: He who acts by means of intelligence represents the form (or the idea) of his own intellect in the effect. Thus the artist expresses something like himself by means of his art. But God created the universe by means of His intellect, and not by necessity of nature, as we have shown (Ch. 23). Wherefore the form (or the idea) of the divine intellect is expressed by the universe made by the same intellect. But the intellect which *intelligences* many things is not sufficiently represented by one thing. Consequently, as the divine intellect intelligences many things, it will represent itself much more perfectly if it creates several species of creatures in the universe, than if it creates a single one.

As to the final cause: A number of finite goods are better than one. But all created goodness is finite, because infinitely short of infinite goodness. Therefore the universe would be more perfect if there were created a number of species than if one only.—St. Thomas, *Ib.*

Again, as to the final cause: The goodness of the species is superior to the goodness of the individual, as the ideal and the formal is inferior to that which is material. Wherefore a multitude of different species adds much more to the perfection of the universe (the object aimed at by God in creating) than a similitude of individuals of the same species. These reasons, which abundantly account for the necessity of creating a multitude of species, explain also why the species of the more perfect ones should be created in much greater number than the lower and the less perfect, because of the aptitude of the former to realize better than the lower species, the requirements of the cause which under the threefold relation of efficient, typical, and final cause, always aims at that which is more perfect and more exalted in the scale of being, and can better exercise its infinite power, better express its infinite ideal, and give better vent to the outpourings of its infinite goodness.

We resume, therefore, the cosmological doctrine of St. Thomas, which is to the effect that the principle which guided the Almighty and Allwise Maker of all things in determining the number of species of creatures to be created, was their place in the scale of beings; those species which stand higher in the scale of perfection having been created in much greater number, and in gradual and ascend-

ing variety. Now, it is upon this principle of St. Thomas that we formulate one of our arguments in favor of the existence of numberless species of intellectual substances united to a material organism, and rising one upon another in the scale of being. Because if such were not the case,—if the common species alone had been created,—if the world, rolling in immeasurable space, so to speak, were void of intellectual life,—then the principle would be reversed; then we should find that in this visible creation those beings which are lower in the scale of perfection, those which are at the foot of the ladder, were created in much greater variety, in much greater number than those which stand higher; therefore we should find that the Almighty and Allwise Creator could draw a greater variety of types and ideals from His infinite and inexhaustible essence for the lowest beings of the visible world; and when he had risen in the gradual variety of beings,—from those enjoying a mere existence, from those living an organic life only, from those living a sensitive life, to the intellectual substance, living in and informing an organism,—he could find only one type, and was forced to be satisfied, and rest there. Let us, for the better development of our argument, cast a glance at the visible creation, and we shall find those beings which are endowed with mere existence, the movements of which are not native internal movements, but are borrowed movements,—such as the mineral world, such as the worlds above us, rolling in space,—and we shall find that their number is incalculable.

We know that the fixed stars,—six thousand as seen by the naked eye, and at least, in number, one hundred millions as seen by the telescope,—may be considered as the suns of other systems whose planets are invisible from their distance.

Now, take a hundred millions of fixed stars as so many suns, each one forming the centre of a system of worlds like our own, and it is highly probable that there are more than ten thousand millions of worlds of matter like those of our solar system, which occupy the space sufficiently near to our sun for the rays of their suns to become interchangeably reciprocated.

These worlds have been claimed by astronomers as belonging to *our cluster* in the heavens. But there is no reason to believe that our solar system constitutes a central point about which are collected these vast clusters of worlds, and that all space beyond our contracted scope of vision is left unoccupied. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that throughout boundless space, in every direction, are sprinkled similar clusters beyond clusters, like glittering dust, diffused throughout space, unlimited by verge or shore. The imagination, in this bold exploring excursion, finds no resting place for bringing to an end its onward flight,

and, like the dove fluttering over the boundless flood of waters, finally droops its weary wings to return to this minute terrestrial orb, that becomes almost lost to it amid the vastness of the extent of space and of countless myriads of the surrounding worlds of matter.

Moreover, by a metaphysical law that God cannot create two beings absolutely equal in every sense, as one of them would represent no type or idea, but would be a senseless repetition, it follows that at least each system of these myriads of clusters must have some specific quality to distinguish it from all others, and that consequently each system of the cluster may be looked upon as a specific and distinct world from all others, though all harmonizing under the Almighty hand of their maker, and obeying the same laws.

Yet these worlds, so prodigiously great in number, these heavenly armies,—as the royal Poet calls them,—when considered as to their place in the scale of being, are seen to hold the *lowest*—the mineral kingdom. They are as inferior to man in the scale of perfection as they are superior to him in the immense proportions of their masses. And yet, though reason teaches us, with St. Thomas, that God created the species of superior creatures in much larger quantity than the lower and the inferior, we must believe that there is and can be no other species of intellectual incorporated substance except the human species; and that God, Almighty and Allwise, who would produce an immense variety of myriads of worlds out of the lowest type of existence, could effect but a single species out of the idea of the highest in His visible creation.

We must believe this, or else we must people those myriads of clusters of worlds with intellectual substances informing an organism, each species differing from the other indefinitely, to give full scope to the typical idea in God's mind.

That portion of the genus animal which comprises the brute creation is not made up of one species, but of a vast number of species. The last results of science show this with the fullest evidence. Every one even slightly acquainted with the natural sciences has heard of that innumerable world of animal life discovered by the microscope, especially of those little animalcules which have been called infusoria, though the term ought to be abandoned, as many of these creatures do not live in infusions, but, on the contrary, inhabit the sea and the fresh-water. The polar ices, the regions of the atmosphere, and the gloomy depths of the oceans are peopled with living organisms, and everywhere their prodigious concentration astonishes as much as the infinite variety of their forms. If the beautiful discoveries of Eurenberg did not prove the fact, who would believe that those tiny creatures, whose

minuteness evades the eye, possess more vital resistance than the most vigorous animal? Where the rigor of the climate kills the most robust of the vegetable world, where a few scattered animals procure but a scanty and precarious existence, the delicate organism of the *microzoa* suffers no injury from the most terrible cold. More than fifty species of animalcules with silicious carapaces were discovered by Sir James Ross on the rounded masses of ice which float on the Polar seas at the 78th degree of south latitude. In the Gulf of Erebus the plummet brought from a depth of more than 500 yards sixty eight species of silicious microzoa, and they have been discovered at the depth of more than 12,000 feet, where they had to support the enormous pressure of 375 atmospheres, a pressure capable of bursting a cannon.

These living corpuscles, which multiply in the transparent regions of the ocean, abound equally in the muddy waters of our rivers and ponds, and, without being aware of it, we daily swallow myriads of them in the fluids which we drink.

That beautiful phenomenon of phosphorescence, which puzzled the sagacity of the learned, is found to be caused by millions upon millions of tiny microzoa floating on the surface of the sea. The red color which the water of certain rivers sometimes assumes is owing to the prodigious number of the same animalcules. M. Morren, a Belgian *savant*, counted twenty-two species of such as are capable of giving water a blood color.

But water is not the sole domain of microscopic animalcules. They are met with in the earth, in masses the capacity of which exceeds all power of calculation. Certain species, the extreme minuteness of which does not equal the 45,000th part of an inch, form in some damp places living beds beneath the soil, which are often several yards in thickness. The city of Berlin is built on one of these beds.

These tiny animals, ten thousand of which could be ranged on the length of an inch, invade not only air, earth, and water, but are found full of vitality in the interior of animals and plants. And we have not, as yet, alluded to the *monad*, the true atom of the animal kingdom. These are so extremely small that they can only be seen by means of microscopes of the greatest magnifying power. They are met with in all kinds of animal and vegetable steepings, and their number is often so prodigious that they all seem to touch each other in the drop of liquid in which they move. A single drop contains more than a thousand millions; that is, almost as many as all the inhabitants of the globe.¹

We return to our argument. If the principle of St. Thomas be true, that the number of species of created beings is greater in pro-

¹ Pouchet, The Universe.

portion to the dignity of being or perfection, which mark their place in the scale of the Universe; and if it be true, also, that God, as we know by scientific observation, has created a large variety of species of that portion of the animal germs, which is restricted to the brute, why should there not be a much larger number of species of intelligent substances informing an organism in the same manner as our soul informs the body? Why should the principle fail in its best and noblest application, whereas, it is maintained and applied in the lower being? We conclude and resume our first argument thus: The nature of the efficient typical and final cause of creation demands the perfection of the universe. But such perfection is better attained by the creation of a number of different species,—therefore, the perfection of the universe demands the existence of a different species; and as among these species of creators the best and the noblest represent their cause in a more perfect manner than the lowest, the number of the former must exceed by far the number of the latter. And as an intellectual substance informing an organism is the highest and noblest representation of God known to us in the visible world, we conclude that the number of such species of intelligent substances informing an organism must by far exceed the number of all inferior species of animals.

But this variety of species of all created beings which God has made to represent His infinite perfections, must exhibit a certain order otherwise; we could never have that single system called the universe. And this order is attained, in the first place, by means of the law of affinity or proportion, which God has established between the different species of His creatures. This law implies that between one species of created beings and another, the distance which necessarily exists, and must exist between them, and which can never be passed over under pain of changing the species,—as the species or natures of things are like number,—you can add to or subtract a unity from a certain number and you will have more or less, but not the same number; be smoothed down, brought somewhat nearer together by a medium species lying between them partaking of the distinctive property of the inferior species in a somewhat higher degree, and of the destructive property of the next superior species in a superior degree.

“Inveniet,” says St. Thomas, “siquis diligenter consideret gradatim rerum diversitatem compleri; nam supra inanimata corpora inveniet plantas et super has irrationabilia animalia et super has intellectuales substantias; et in singulis horum inveniet diversitatem secundum quod quædam sunt aliis perfectiora in tantum quod ea quæ sunt suprema inferioris generis videntur propinqua superiori

generi et e converso sicut animalia immobilia sunt similia plantis." (*Cont. E., Lib., ch. 97.*)

Again St. Thomas: "Ita enim procedit ordo rerum ut similia se invicem subsequantur. Ea vero quæ sunt penitus dissimilia, non subsequantur se invicem in gradibus rerum nisi per *ali quod medium*, sicut videmus quod animal perfectum et planta sunt dissimilia penitus quantum ad duo. Nam animal perfectum est sensitivum et motum motu processivo, planta autem neutrum horum habet. Natura ergo non procedit immediate ab animalibus perfectis ad plantas, sed producit in medio animalia imperfecta quæ sunt sensibilia cum animalibus et immobilia cum plantis." (*De Causis, Lect. 30.*)

Now, admitting this law of affinity or proportion as governing all created species of the universe, and admitting, on the other hand, the existence of an immense variety of pure intellectual substances in no way united to or dependent upon a material organism,—substances, which Revelation calls angels, but whose existence philosophy can demonstrate,—and we find, as a necessary conclusion of the two admissions, that the human species alone would not satisfy that law, and consequently without a variety of intermediate and gradual species of incorporated intellectual substances the order of the universe would not be so apparent, simply because of the immense distance lying between the highest human genius and the angel; of the vast disproportion between their powers, of the enormous superiority of the one over the other; a distance, a disproportion, a superiority which nothing that is known to us to exist could smooth or level. It may not be displeasing to our readers if, for the sake of a fuller development of this part of our subject, we give an abstract of the doctrine of St. Thomas on the nature and properties and attributes of the angels, a doctrine which gained for him the proud title of Angelic Doctor.

St. Thomas, after demonstrating the existence of a countless number of species of pure intellectual substances from the principles that the perfection of the universe, which was intended by God in the creation of the universe, required the existence of such pure intellectual substances, and of the vast number of species in consequence of the noble place they hold in the scale of creation, he passes to the analysis of their nature, properties and attributes, and then writes the following: 1st. The Angelic substance is absolutely independent of all material organism in its existence and its operation. "Ex propria operatione rei percipitur species ejus. Operatio enim demonstrat virtutem quæ indicat essentiam. Propria autem operatio substantiæ separatæ et animæ est intelligere. Est autem omnino alius modus intelligendi substantiæ separatæ et animæ; nam anima intelligit a phantasmatibus accipiendo

non autem substantia separata quum non habeat organa corporea in quibus oportet esse phantasmata." (C. G., Lib. 3, ch. 94.)

2d. As a necessary consequence of this pure spirituality and absolute independence of the angelic nature of all material aid or instrument for its operation, St. Thomas argues that the intellect of the angel, as regards whatever comes within the range of its natural knowledge, is always in the act of intelligencing, and can never be found in the state of potentiality. Also, that the proper and principal object of such intellect is that which, in its nature and substance, is immaterial and intelligible.¹

3d. That though the angelic intellect cannot intelligence all things by means of his own substance, this belonging exclusively to God, whose essence is both the typical and efficient cause of all things, yet it can intelligence its own substance by itself without any aid whatever, because the two requisites wanted to bring about intellectual cognition are at hand; that is to say, subsisting immateriality of the object to be apprehended, and its inherence in the subject which must apprehend. Now, the angelic substance is immaterial, and subsistent, and inherent in its own intellect. Consequently, the angelic intellect can apprehend his own substance in itself and by itself.²

But in regard to other intellectual substances subsisting in themselves and all other objects, both immaterial and corporal, these, not being united with the angelic intellect, cannot be known by it without a means which may bring them together, and this is effected by God having impressed upon the angelic intellect the forms or ideas of all these objects³ in their specific essences and nature, and in their individual subsistence.⁴

Having spoken of the object of the angelic intellect, St. Thomas passes to inquire into the manner in which the angelic intellect is exercised; and he speaks more at length: 1st. Of the special manner according to which that intellect is always in the act of intelligencing those objects which are within the range of their natural knowledge, all having the forms or ideas of such objects, at once complete and perfect, though with regard to things divinely revealed the angelic intellect may be found in the state of potentiality.⁵

2d. That that sublime intellect is able to apprehend any number of objects which can be represented by one or few ideas, and that by intuition and without ratiocination or judgment.⁶

3d. That the intellect of the angel *per se* is exempt from errors and falsehood as regards those objects which come naturally with-

¹ Summa Th., p. 12, 54, art. 4. (Ib. 2, 55, art. 1.)

³ Ib., art. 2.

⁵ Ib., 2, 28, art. 1.

² Ib., 2, 56, art. 2.

⁴ Ib., 2, 57, art. 2.

⁶ Ib., art. 3, 4.

in its range, because error mostly originates in analysing or uniting attributes and subjects, or comparing proportions together. But the intellect of the angel intelligences the essences of things, and has no need of analysis, therefore it is not subject to errors.

From this brief analysis of the essence, faculties and properties of the angels, we conclude the boundless distance which exists between man and the angel,—between the highest genius of mankind and the lowest in the hierarchy of angels,—difference and distance so great as to be altogether incalculable, and which St. Thomas expresses as follows: The angelic intellect is superior to the human intellect by a far higher degree than is the intellect of the greatest philosopher to that of a clown.¹

Now if the law of affinity and proportion is to be found in the system of the universe, surely the gap between the angelic intellect and the human,—be the latter even that of the greatest genius that ever honored the human race,—should be followed up and smoothed over by a numberless species of spiritual substances, informing an organism and dwelling in the various planetary systems of the universe, and affording a chain of links between the human and the angelic nature.

So far we have tried to prove that the existence of myriads of spiritual beings animating an organism, and dwelling in the numberless stars and planets rolling above our heads, is a legitimate consequence of two cosmological laws laid down by the Angelic Doctor.

The first of these laws is concerned about the question, What principle determined the Infinite Creator in the production of the various species of creatures as to their number? And we have answered, That the number of species to be created was determined by the place which each one holds in the scale of being or perfection; those species holding a higher place being created in much larger number than those which occupy a lower grade. From this we have concluded that, as the universe exhibits a large number of species in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdom, if we refuse to admit the existence of numberless species of incorporated spiritual substances living in the starry heavens, the first cosmological law, laid down and demonstrated by St. Thomas, would be reversed.

We have touched also upon the law of affinity or proportion, the requirements of which are that the distance and difference, necessarily intervening between one species and another to mark and to distinguish one from another, should be softened down by means of intermediate species, thus smoothing the roughness resulting from the too strong and too marked contrast, and maintaining the

¹ Summa C. Gentis L. 1, ch. 3.

harmony of the universe; in the same manner as a painter, who is obliged to represent two contrary colors in the roughness of their nature, will shadow and soften down the extremities which join them together, not to offend the eye with the too bold and too great contrast.

From this we think we have drawn the inference that, as there is an immense distance between the highest intellect of mankind and that of the lowest of the pure spiritual substances,¹ the cosmological law of affinity demands that there should be some intermediate species to soften down the immense contrast, and thus to exhibit and represent a most beautiful, harmonious order in the universe.

We will now develop a few more cosmological laws, which point to the same result,—the existence of a plurality of worlds.

The first of these is that, so-called, of the *minimum means*.

God, in the creation of the Universe, is absolutely free in two different senses. He is free to create, or not to create; because He is essentially and absolutely independent and self-sufficient.

Secondly, He is free as to the amount of perfection or being He may choose to create. True, the end of creation, that which inclines Him to create, the manifestation of His infinite excellence and goodness, would seem to demand the very best possible world or the highest possible amount of perfection. But, as the best possible world, understood in an ontological sense, is a contradiction in terms, as it would mean an *infinite finite*, an *absolute relative*, a *necessary contingent*, it follows that the best possible world, in an ontological sense, cannot be conceived, and much less effected. The supposition of a best possible world being eliminated, it follows that God is free to choose any one of the indefinite series of worlds which may be conceived, one more perfect than the other, none of which being able to exhibit any reason or motive why it should be selected in preference to another. For, should any of the series attempt to allege, as motive of preference, its own amount of perfection above all the rest which precede, it would be silenced by pointing out to it an indefinite possible series, much superior in perfection and amount of being.

But, having determined upon the amount of perfection to be created, God was bound to draw from it the greatest possible amount of glory, which it could possibly render to His infinite perfection. In this He was no longer free, but sweetly, though no less strongly, bound by His infinite wisdom; for it would have been foolishness to create a certain amount of being for the mani-

¹ Intellectus Angeli plus excedit intellectum humanum quam intellectus optimi philosophi intellectum *rudissimi idiote*; quia haec distantia inter species humanæ limites continetur quos intellectus Angelicus excedit.—S. Th., Summa C. G., Lib. I, ch. 3.

festation of His own infinite attributes, and not to derive from that amount all the manifestation it could render, all the homage it could pay to His infinite grandeur. It would have been an unreasonable, motiveless manner of acting—an utterly useless waste of forces. To render this theory perfectly clear, we will make use of figures. Suppose the universe created includes a thousand millions of forces which, by the best possible development and combination, can represent and exhibit God's infinite perfection in degrees corresponding to three times the full amount of forces created and employed; and suppose, moreover, that God should prefer to select an arrangement and a combination of those forces, the result of which would be a manifestation of His infinite perfection in degrees merely equal to the number of forces employed; thus, by choosing such a combination in preference to the former, throwing away two thousand millions of degrees of glory, it is evident that such manner of acting would be unreasonable and unwise. It would be a reckless waste of forces—a failing to put the amount of forces created to the best possible advantage; a manner of acting absolutely and utterly unworthy of God's wisdom. It is evident, therefore, that God is not free in this respect. He must, if He would follow the requirements of wisdom, draw from the given forces to be created all the possible good in view of the end; in other words, He must take the shortest route to arrive at the goal, use the least possible means to attain an object, and follow the fundamental law of wisdom laid down by St. Thomas.

“Sapiens operator perficit opus suum brevior via qua potest.”—S. Th., *S. E. P.*, 39: 4, art. 5.

Resuming in a few propositions the full meaning and extent of the law we have slightly developed, we may express it as follows:

1st. No force of the universe should be allowed to go to waste, but should be put to the best possible advantage.

“Contra rationem sapientiæ est ut sit aliquid frustra in operibus sapientis.”—*C. G.*, Lib. 3, art. 69.

2d. All the forces combined should be so drawn out as to realize in the best possible manner the general end of the Universe.

“In his quæ *providentia* debite reguntur non debet esse aliquid frustra.”—St. T., *Ib.*, art. 72.

Now, without the plurality of worlds teeming with myriads of intellectual substances informing an organism, the law of wisdom just demonstrated would utterly fail in both its requirements. As to the first, let us cast a glance at the heavens, and with the eye, aided by the telescope, unknown for over fifty centuries, pierce through the horizon to read immeasurable space. Here are myriads upon myriads of millions of solar systems, each with their planets and satellites, immense in their colossal proportion, bound-

less in the distance which separates one from the other, vying with the very thought of man in the swiftness of their movements, yet all subject to certain laws in their rotations around each other and rhythmical revolutions upon their axes. Pray, what is the physical use of such masses, so grand, so vast, so undeterminable in number and in bulk? Can any one tell the office they discharge in the plan of creation, and the service they are expected to render to physical life? No use whatever can be mentioned, if we suppose them deserted and sterile, and devoid of living inhabitants. Whilst the earth, a tiny speck in the immensity of space, is teeming with inhabitants, one serving for the use of the other, and all for man; the remaining undeterminately and prodigiously vast majority of the universe is totally and utterly useless.

We are aware that this argument has been answered by some philosophers who refer us to geology, and allege that something very like that which forms the foundation of our objection with regard to the solar systems has taken place on earth. They formulate their argument thus: "You are scandalized," they say, "that the great number of solar systems seem to be of no use whatever if we suppose them tenantless of living and intellectual beings; but, pray, of what use was the earth during the many millions of years which it existed before any animate being dwelt upon it, and of the many thousands of millions of years before man, its lord and master, came to take possession of his dominion? If the apparent uselessness of the earth for so many thousands of millions of years does not scandalize you, why should the apparent uselessness of the starry heavens seem to do so?"¹ Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the earth existed for so many centuries without living or intelligent inhabitants, we presume that that long period was necessary in order to render the earth a fit abode for living beings, and especially for man. But we can see no necessity for such a vast number of colossal systems of suns and planets existing for so many centuries without any known advantage, and for no probable reason that can be imagined; and hence, we feel obliged to deny the parallel between the two cases, and conclude that, as far as human science can tell, those immense systems were, and are, of no physical use whatever. The earth could very well exist and support its inhabitants if there were no other sun or solar system except the sun around which it revolves, and upon which it waits as an humble attendant. The law of the minimum means, therefore, fails as to its first requirement, because, in the case with which we are dealing, the vast majority of the forces of the universe, in a physical sense, are allowed to go to a frightful waste.

But would those myriads of worlds, devoid of intelligent sub-

¹ Whewell, *Essay on the Plurality of Worlds*.

stances informing an organism, be of any use in a *moral* sense? None whatever; if the starry heavens are desolate of intellectual creatures, they fail utterly, in a moral sense, to be of any profit in the universe. For surely the end of creation is the glory of God, the manifestation of His infinite perfection. And how is this attained? Does the mere objective existence of the beings of the universe effect this manifestation? Assuredly not. "*Invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.*" The end is attained by means of intelligent creatures contemplating the works of God, and arguing from them the grandeur, the excellence, the magnificence, the majesty of the Creator, and thus acting as *mediator* between God and the inferior creation. Now, the prodigiously vast number of worlds, floating in boundless space, being supposed without intelligent inhabitants, man, alone in this visible universe, would be left to officiate as the high priest between God and His inferior creatures. But this man could not do. First, because it was after so many centuries, upon the invention of the telescope, that man began to suspect the grandeur of the heavens, and to partly have the veil lifted which hid such grand creations from his sight; and secondly, because even in the present stage of astronomical science man knows but little about the heavens. How, then, could he act as the mediator, the high-priest, between God and His starry creatures, and sing for them the hymn of praise and thanksgiving?

The myriad of worlds, then, if supposed void of intelligent inhabitants, would fail to represent their Creator, to manifest His grandeur, to proclaim His glory, as much as they should; and all those numberless wonders which they must be supposed to contain would say nothing more, and preach nothing more, than the little which man knows; and thus immense opportunities for God's glorification would have been wasted and thrown away.

It may be said here that the *Word Incarnate* alone is able to fulfil the office of mediator between God and His works, because He alone can know and appreciate both perfectly, and thus praise and glorify the Creator as much as He deserves. The end of the universe, therefore, would be attained if there were no other intelligent inhabitants in the solar systems except man, as the Incarnate Word alone can officiate as the true, perfect Mediator.

True, the Incarnate Word is absolutely sufficient to fulfil the end of the universe, because He alone can comprehend the infinite nature and grandeur of the Creator, and the boundless perfection He has lavished upon His creation, and in the name of the latter offer to God a worthy tribute of praise fully equivalent in worth and dignity to the deserts of the Creator. But this is true in a comprehensive sense, which means that the attainment of the end

of the universe required such elements, such conditions, such qualifications; and, that they are at hand. But God's purpose in the creation of the universe was *not* to attain the end of manifesting His infinite excellence and perfection only, in a *comprehensive* sense, but to extend that manifestation to an immense number of created personalities, and to receive from each in return the meed of praise, and thus to enhance to an incalculable degree the accidental fulfilment of the end of the universe, leaving to the Incarnate Word the double office, first, of *substantially* fulfilling the end of the universe, and secondly, of rendering the accidental realization of the end by each created personality acceptable and pleasing to God by uniting all those personalities to Him, and by acting in them and through them as the Divine Leader in the most magnificent and vast chorus which may be imagined. That such was God's purpose is evident from the fact of His effecting other works besides the Incarnation. If His object had been merely to attain the end of His creation in a comprehensive sense only, the Incarnation and the Word Incarnate alone would have been absolutely sufficient, because the Incarnate Word fulfils in the most perfect manner all the conditions required. But, instead of that, God creates an immense number of individuals of all the species which form the created nature of the Word, an immense number of individuals in the mineral, vegetable, animal, and intellectual species, all of which add nothing at all to the substantial manifestation of God's excellence as exhibited in the Incarnate Word, or to the substantial glory which He receives from them. It is clear, therefore, that besides the substantial fulfilment of the end of the universe, God proposed to Himself an immense accidental realization of the same by the creation of a vast numberless multitude of individuals, swelling, as it were, the chorus headed by the Incarnate Word, and enlarging to greater numerical proportions the harmony of the music and song raised to the honor of the Creator. This intention of God, therefore, necessitates the creation of myriads of intellectual creatures informing an organism and dwelling in the starry heavens, though we know that the Incarnate Word fulfils to the letter the substantial end of the universe. Of course this end of the universe, the attainment of God's greatest glory, which is merely sketched, as it were, in its accidental part whilst we are in the way of probation, is intended to reach its highest perfection only in bliss. And therefore this principle involves the necessity of the greatest possible number of intelligent creatures, attaining their ultimate perfection in bliss. Because, if God was not satisfied with the substantial fulfilment of the end of the universe, his infinite glorification by the Incarnate Word, but required the greatest possible accidental realization of the end by the greatest possible

number of created personalities, and if this is not attained perfectly except in the final beatitude, it follows that the greatest possible number of intelligent creatures must attain their final perfection in bliss.

We resume and conclude the argument we have made, in favor of a plurality of worlds, with the following passage from Father Secchi's work, *The Stars*: "The creation which the astronomer contemplates is not a mere mass of incandescent matter; it is a marvellous organism, wherein life springs up the moment the incandescence ceases. And though the life be not apparent through our telescopes, yet from the analogy of our own globe we may surmise its existence in others. The atmospheric constitution of the other planets, which, in certain points, is so similar to ours, as that of the stars is similar to that of the sun, convinces us that these bodies are in a stage similar to the present one of our system, or are traversing one of those stages which it already has gone over, or is destined to travel. From the immense variety of creatures which have existed, or do exist, on our planet, we may infer the different variety of those which may exist in others. If, on our planet, the air, the water, the earth are peopled by such variety of beings, which were so often changed on the change of the simple circumstances of climate, how much greater variety should we not admit in the colossal systems where the secondary luminaries are oftentimes lightened, not by one, but by more than one sun alternately, and where the climatic phases of heat and cold succeeding each other must be extreme, owing to the eccentricity of their orbits, and the various absolute intensity of their radiations, from which even our own sun is not free.

"Life fills the universe, and with life is associated intelligence, and as beings inferior to us abound in it, so there may be in other conditions other creatures vastly superior to us. Between the feeble light of that divine ray, which illumines our fragile nature, by means of which light we have been enabled to discover such wonders, and the wisdom of the Creator of all things, there lies an infinite distance which may be traveled, without ever realizing its term, by an infinite number of His creatures, for whom the theorems which are respectively to us the fruit of hard and persevering studies may be *simple intuitions*."

We proceed to the second part of our article.

Does the opinion of the worlds above us being inhabited by intelligences united to a body conflict with any principle of our holy faith? We answer most confidently, no, and this upon the highest authority.

St. Augustine and St. Thomas held that the opinion broached

¹ Secchi, *The Stars*, p. 239.

by some of the ancient philosophers to the effect that the stars were inhabited by some heavenly spirit as their vivifying and quickening principle, in the same manner as man's soul quickens and gives life to the body, was an opinion in no way concerning our holy faith, and which might safely be maintained. The following are St. Augustine's words: "Nec illud quidem certum habeo utrum ad eandem Societatem, scilicet Angelorum, pertineant Sol et Luna, et cuncta sidera; quamvis nonnullis, lucida esse corpora, non cum sensu vel intelligentia, videantur."¹

St. Thomas: "Hoc autem quod dictum est de animatione coeli, non diximus quasi asserendo secundum fidei doctrinam *ad quam nihil pertinet sive sic sive aliter dicatur*."—*C. G.*, Lib. 2, ch. 70.

And in the work *De Pot.*, quest. 6, art. 6, treating of the same question more at length, he says: "Whether certain incorporeal substances be united to the celestial bodies as forms (souls)." St. Augustine leaves it in doubt. But St. Jerome seems to assert it in the explanation of the text: "Lustrans universa per circuitum spiritus."—*Eccl.* 1. Origen is of the same opinion (Lib. 1, Patriarch., ch. 7). This seems to be reprobated by many of the modern theologians, on the ground that the number of the blessed, according to the Scripture, being made of angels and men, these spiritual substances, of which we are speaking, could not be ranked either among men or angels. But this St. Augustine also leaves in doubt. Then the holy Doctor quotes the words of St. Augustine which we have already given.

It is almost unnecessary for us to remark that, if St. Thomas and St. Augustine thought it not contravening any principle of faith, to hold the opinion that angels or spiritual substances should be incorporated in the heavenly bodies as their vivifying and moving principle, with much greater reason would they have admitted as in no possible way conflicting with any principle of revelation the opinion of the plurality of worlds in the sense so many times explained by us.

It is also quite superfluous for us to remark that many modern Catholic theologians and philosophers hold this opinion to be quite in unison with all the principles of the Catholic Faith. Among these we may quote Frayssinous, Gaume, Ventura, Bonnet, and a host of others. We leave, therefore, this part of the subject as being perfectly plain and obvious, and pass to the more important question. Suppose the worlds above us to be inhabited by intelligences incorporated in an organism, in what relation would these new personalities, so to speak, stand with regard to the whole system of our holy religion? What place would they hold in it? Where

¹ Enchiridion,

should they be located, and in what relations would they stand with regard to the essence, the purpose and result of Christianity?

These questions must be answered, for upon them depends the whole controversy between infidelity, with rationalism, and Christianity. Though we have no other principle or help to guide us except the analogy of faith, we think we can safely and satisfactorily answer all the problems resulting from our opinion.

And, first, though in the proofs we have alleged in favor of our opinion, we have already *located* those myriads of incorporated intelligences in the system of the cosmos, yet we call the attention of our readers to it again.

We place those myriads of intelligences between man and the pure spirits; we place them between those two, not as to size or space, but ontologically and hierarchically speaking, that is to say, as to their degree of perfection in intelligence. We heard the opinion of St. Thomas, that, between the lowest angel or pure intelligence and the greatest of human genius there is as much distance as there is between that genius and the intellect of the most ignorant clown. Now, that great distance, existing between the highest human genius and the lowest angel, may imply a great number of grades of intelligence, and every one of those grades may form a distinct species of incorporated intelligences, each comprehending under it an incalculable number of individuals, all those species rising one over the other in the scale of perfection, till the last one of them will almost touch the angel, and thus exhibit one perfect and symmetrical order.

Having located those myriads of inhabitants of the starry heavens, we must answer now a more important question—In what relation do they stand to Christ?

We answer briefly: The first object intended by God in His external action was the adorable person of our Blessed Lord as the only possible means which could attain the end of the Creation, the highest possible manifestation of His own infinite perfections, and the highest appreciation and honor of His infinite excellence.

From this it follows: 1st. That all other creations were effected through and for the sake of Christ, and as an extension of Christ, and received their destiny through Him. 2d. That all these creations, though manifesting each one in its peculiar way, in their being and action, the infinite excellence and perfection of God, were to do this in a manner worthy of God, by their dependence upon and union with Christ. 3d. That, among all these creations, non-intelligent creatures could fulfil their destiny of manifesting God's infinite excellence only objectively, that is, by the very fact of their existence and their actions, developing their being; but intelligent creatures were to do

this morally, that is, by being fully conscious of the manifestation of God's grandeur, of the appreciation of God's perfections expected of them, and by voluntarily and freely realizing this manifestation and appreciation in their own individual person, and bringing it to the highest possible perfection, of course, by their dependence upon and union with Christ.

In a few words : God launches out into existence all these creations to manifest and glorify Him perfectly in Christ, and through Christ, the only one who could attain such an object. All these creations, in returning to God, that is, in their development, to reach ultimate perfection, must do this by the same principle, which gave them existence and scope, that in Christ and through Christ non-intelligent beings do this only objectively, intelligent beings morally.

It follows from these principles that all the myriads of millions of inhabitants in boundless space, as they were created as men and angels through Christ and for the sake of Christ, so they must fulfil their destiny and attain their ultimate perfection through Christ and by their union with Christ. As we all received of His fulness, to speak with the Apostle, so must they receive of His fulness to reach their destiny.

Of course, this is not the place to prove the above statements, or vindicate their truth. We must necessarily take them for granted.

It follows, then, that the inhabitants of the other worlds and the other solar systems stand in the same relation to Christ as men and angels. No angel ever reached his ultimate destiny except through his supernatural union with Christ, no man ever will reach his eternal destiny except through his supernatural union with Christ, and no intelligent person, no matter who or where, can reach its destiny except through the same union. None comes to the Father but by Me (St. John).

It may be said here that, if our theory be true, then the words of the Creed, "*Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de coelis,*" must be false. These words seem to imply that the sole object of the Incarnation was the redemption of mankind ; that man and his salvation were the exclusive aim of the coming of Christ.

But every one can understand that those words must not be understood in an exclusive sense or in a principal sense, as in such a sense they would be false. Because the principal object of the Incarnation was : 1st. The Glory of God. 2d. After the Fall, the reparation of honor due to the outraged majesty of God, the salvation of man being only the secondary object.

The second question allied to the first is, How do those intelligent substances stand to Christ as the Redeemer ? Did they need

any redemption? They did not need any redemption, unless they had committed an original sin of their own. For it is evident that what we call the original sin is confined absolutely within the limits of the human species, affecting only those born of Adam. Other spiritual substances, living and vivifying an organism, but not descended from Adam, have nothing at all to do with his fall. But those species of incorporated intelligences, being finite, may have fallen, and very likely did fall, either as a race, by the fall of the head of each race or species from whom all the individuals of the species came, or personally by their individual transgressions, and in either case the infinite merit of the sacrifice of Calvary was sufficient to redeem them and to give them whatever grace of restoration was needed in their peculiar circumstances.

But, fallen or not, they must be united to Christ to reach their destiny, and must be elevated to the supernatural order, and form part of the Catholic Church. What measures Christ may have used to incorporate them into His Church, we cannot, of course, determine.

Whether after the Ascension He went Himself to manifest to them the whole economy of His Incarnation and Redemption, and the establishment of His Church and of the Sacraments, that is, His sacramental extension in time and space; or, whether He established the same sacramental extension in those boundless realms, varying in their visible expression, but identical in spirit and efficacy, are all questions which cannot be resolved, except on the principle of the necessity of a union with Christ, by whatever means accomplished, and of an incorporation at least in spirit into His Holy Church. As Christ is incorporating into the soul of the Church thousands upon thousands, at every hour of time and upon every point of the earth, of human souls by means unknown to us, so He may unite all the myriads of indwellers of the starry heavens to the soul of the Church, which is His Holy Divine Spirit, who vivifies the Church by means altogether beyond our ken.

How beautifully, then, does this opinion of the plurality of worlds enhance the proportions, as it were, the efficacy, the necessity, the absolute need of the Grand Mediator, who has said, "I am *the way, the truth, and the life!*" What new and magnificent stones, chiseled after the same pattern and by the same artist, are added to the already grand and vast proportions of the sublime structure of the Church, and cemented into the whole by the same vivifying, quickening Spirit, which breathes, sustains, holds together, supports the whole edifice?

And what a glorious, grand, magnificent, sublime concert, in honor of Christ, and in honor of God, who, if He act outside of Himself, wishes to make of the whole universe a grand, sublime

choir of praise to His magnificent grandeur, a choir of myriads upon myriads of millions of intelligent spirits, incorporated in an organism, or pure spirit, led by the great Mediator, Jesus Christ, who, in the quality of a divine person, connects that external praise of God's majesty with the eternal and infinite, which God receives from all eternity in His bosom by means of the eternal generations of the Son, the theoretical acknowledgment of the infinite, and the breathing of the Spirit, the practical recognition of the infinite, theoretical and practical acknowledgment, which terminates the infinite life of the Godhead, and keeps it plunged into infinite bliss! And thus external life and internal life are wedded into one in Christ, and to echo each other for all eternity, shared in according to the different degrees by thousands and tens of thousands of myriads of created spirits.

OF THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

St. Thomas Aquinas. Sum. Theol. I. Pars.

The Metaphysics of the School. By Rev. Thomas Harper, S.J.

MODERN agnosticism does not content itself with denying the existence of God; it also disowns whatever might lead us to the idea of the Infinite Being. It has, consequently, not only done away with everything outside us not patent to experience, but has banished also our spiritual faculties, reason and free will, to the realm of illusions. Nay, our very soul is deemed by it an unreality, upheld by the prejudices of olden times and the superstition of the unlearned. Solid and sweeping, indeed, is this process. Yet a system of such destructive tendency bears, as it were, an antidote in itself. For, whilst it reduces all to matter or to nothingness, it at once arouses us to reaction and shows us the line of argument to be followed in its refutation. From the very foundation of agnosticism we should learn that, to maintain with convincing proofs the existence of God, we must, above all, evince the spiritual nature of our own soul. Were this latter itself but material, were its powers but sensitive, would not all our conceptions of the immaterial be mere dreams? Could we not reach the superior activity of our mind, how should we form an idea of the divine life? The spirituality, therefore, of the soul is fundamental to the truth of our notions and reasonings, is a mirror on

which we see the eternal and supersensible reflected, is the chief source from which we must draw our knowledge of the higher spheres.

It is, on this account, of paramount importance to throw light on the nature of our mind. In proportion as we strive to spread this kind of enlightenment, shall we succeed in dispelling the dismal night of materialism. As the one sided researches into the forces of the material universe have blunted the human intellect, so, on the other hand, will the science concerning our mental faculties again illumine man and correct his ideas; and as matter, exclusively considered, confines us to the narrowest and lowest sphere of nature, so will the study of the soul widen our views and carry us to the contemplation of immaterial beauty, and thence raise us to the cognizance and admiration of the infinite ocean of all being.

But how shall we know the soul? Does not our cognition begin with the sensible? Is not the intuitive perception of merely spiritual objects far above the capacity of our intellect? Certainly; so we are taught by experience, as well as sound philosophy. But, if this be so, is not the immaterial unknowable to us? and is not all that is said about it sheer conjecture? By no means; though we commence with the sensible, our knowledge does not terminate in it. We reach farther; our intellect penetrates the very nature of things presented to it by the senses, and reduces the natures themselves which it attains, by abstraction and division, to the simplest elements common to all entities. From the universal notions thus acquired we form universal principles, and, by again combining these latter, we draw conclusions. By this way of analysis and inference we become acquainted with truths hitherto unknown to us, as they were either hidden under the sensible qualities in the material substances or were above the visible universe as the causes of it. Moreover, once actuated by the cognizance of things without us, we are enabled to reflect on our own operations, and to proceed from them by reasoning into the deepest recess of our interior. A twofold world is thus exhibited to our view, the one within, the other without us, the one opened to us through our senses, the other through our consciousness, both searched into and enlarged by understanding and reason.

Let us now see whether, pursuing this train of thought, we may not only find the human soul, but also realize its nature. However, before we enter upon discussion, it will not be improper to develop the notion of the soul in general as it is common to all living beings. Furnished by this preliminary inquiry with many definitions and axioms, we shall, later on, with less difficulty treat of the human soul in particular.

I. THE SOUL IN GENERAL.

We may define the soul as the principle of life. This definition was given by Aristotle, adopted by St. Thomas and his school, and will not, we hope, meet with any serious difficulty on the part of modern scientists. To form this idea of the soul, not by imagination, but on the solid ground of reality, it is but necessary to observe the phenomena by which we are daily surrounded. Nothing is more striking in nature than the difference everywhere manifested between the animate and inanimate bodies. These two components of the visible universe widely differ from each other in their size, figure, composition, structure, origin, duration, extinction, and, above all, in their operations. The inanimate realm is fixed and unchangeable; in it there is prevailing uniformity, stern necessity, and inertness. In the animate realm, on the contrary, there is boundless variety and activity. There we see numberless beings and species, all following their own way of acting. Each individual being develops itself, according to an intrinsic law, into a perfect organism, a whole wonderfully composed of divers parts. Each species invariably propagates itself, because the individuals, though all will be extinct after a certain period, are fitted for reproduction; whence it is that death and generation, decay and growth, are ever succeeding each other. Besides, if we direct our attention to the higher classes of living beings, to the animals, we see action no more governed by mere necessity, but proceeding spontaneously from cognition. Hence, activity is among them as various as the objects represented by their senses, and operation arises in them not from motion communicated by extrinsic causes, but from an intrinsic tendency, not from an inborn law, but from a perfection or form which they acquire from outward objects. Man, who ranks highest in this world, is capable of universal knowledge; for he dives into the nature of things, reflects upon himself, and transcending the visible universe, grasps the infinite and eternal. For this reason he is universal also in his activity, unbounded in his ways of acting and in his aims, and fit to direct his own will towards certain ends with freedom.¹

As a great power, therefore, does life show itself in nature; life gives her beauty and variety, quickness and spontaneous production; life endows the higher beings with boundless knowledge, and qualifies them for arts, social connections, progress, and liberty; life brings forth ever-new effects, ever-new motion, ever-new works of genius and supreme perfection. And, not only great and wondrous, but also quite peculiar are the phenomena which it daily

¹ St. Thomas, *S. Theol.*, p. I, qu. 18, art. 3.

displays before our eyes. How widely different are they not from those which the inanimate realm produces around us? It will be proper briefly to point out the characteristic properties of vital actions. Life as exercised consists, according to St. Thomas,¹ in self-motion or self-perfection. The inanimate body cannot act on itself, but only on external objects, and hence perfects not itself, but other beings by the effect which it produces. On this account we state it to be capable of only transient activity. Nor can it, consequently, stir itself to action, that is, pass of itself from rest to motion, and *vice versa*; for, to do so, it would be necessary that it could produce in itself the form or perfection in which its act consists or from which it proceeds. Bodies, therefore, devoid of life, are determined to action solely from without. It is this that constitutes their inertia, a property which all scientists predicate of matter as such. Animate bodies, on the contrary, receive the effect of their own actions, and thus perfect themselves; wherefore we maintain that they have immanent activity. Hence it follows that they are also moved to operation by a power or principle intrinsic to them; for though an exterior object may be concurrent and awaken them, as it were, by its influence, still they act more than they are acted on, since they direct their action to themselves and turn the effect which they produce to a perfection of their own, which is not the mere product of the outward object. We may without difficulty substantiate this property of vital operation in all the different classes of living beings. It is traceable in plants. Whoever carefully examines their process of vegetation will discover that their organs do not act severally, but under the sway and for the benefit of the entire organism. Hence in vegetating they act as a whole and perfect themselves as a whole. Much more apparent is immanent activity in the animals. Do they not quite evidently perfect themselves, when from few material impressions they apprehend the concrete qualities of material bodies, retain them in their fancy and their memory, and by composing and decomposing them produce in themselves the richest variety of images? And are they not self-moving, when, in accordance with their cognition, they seek or flee from an object as it is convenient or inconvenient for them, when they pursue it to seize it or to struggle with it, when they display love and hatred and other passions?

Most striking, however, is man's self-activity. He is able to gather the knowledge of the supersensible from the sensible and to aspire to the highest ends with freedom. Undoubtedly he thus perfects himself and acts infinitely more than he is acted upon by the outward objects, and moves with the fullest self-determination. All

¹ St. Theol., p. I, qu., art. I.

living beings, then, move and perfect themselves the more, the higher their vital functions are; whereas, at the same time we call any being that can not stir or act for its preservation, dead or lifeless. From promises as these are, we justly conclude with St. Thomas that vital action consists in self-motion or self-perfection.

Knowing the nature of the phenomena of life, we must further search into their source. Certainly they spring from a proportionate cause. In saying so we do not appeal to imagination, but to the principle of sufficient reason, which all admit on account of its compelling evidence and nobody can deny without self-contradiction. The scientists themselves who reject the existence of the soul acknowledge its truth; for all their theories and reasonings are nothing but a retracing of the natural phenomena to their proper causes. Vital actions, then, must have a source or origin, which, to denote its due proportion to its acts, we call the principle of life; and as, moreover, vital actions essentially differ from the non-vital, which they by far exceed in perfection, we further conclude that the principle of life inherent in the animate bodies is also essentially different from the cause that works in the inanimate. This second inference concerning the distinct nature of the immediate source of the vital activity, is just as certain and necessary as the first concerning its existence. Have we thus not arrived at the very definition of the soul? Above we said it to be the principle of life. Do not the grandest phenomena which we observe in the universe, and our operations of which we are conscious, give us the idea of such a power intrinsic to us and always active in us? True, we cannot see it, just as little as the scientist can perceive with his senses the force of attraction or chemical affinity; but reason tells us that it must exist and is the subject of numberless changes and actions of daily experience. Though not seen directly in its own nature, it manifests itself by its effects. We are, consequently, in admitting the existence of the soul and in defining it as the vital principle, neither imposed on by prejudices nor misled by ignorance; we but assert what evidence forces on us and what objective necessity peremptorily requires.

Yet, convincing as our reasons seem to be, they do not put the materialists to silence. These will perhaps agree that vital actions suppose a sufficient cause, an intrinsic principle in the bodies, but they persistently deny the same to be distinct from matter. In their opinion life is but a higher evolution or more artificial combination of material forces; a difference does not exist or cannot, on solid reasons, be shown to exist between the animate and inanimate bodies; and the vital principle that is thought to produce vital actions is not a reality added to matter, but a power of matter itself, in some corporal beings evolved and apparent, in others yet latent

and undeveloped. To attribute to life a higher perfection or derive it from a source above the material, they tell us, is a fiction, an assumption warranted neither by experience nor by science. We might at present leave this question unanswered, since later on we shall, at full length, prove the immateriality of intellectual life, which concerns us at present. Nevertheless, we shall here advance a general proof for the distinction of all vital principles from matter.

To this end let us once more consider the difference between vital and merely material actions. How did we define the nature of both the one and the other? Vital actions, we said, are essentially immanent, since the agent from which they proceed receives their effect and thus perfects itself. Merely material actions, on the contrary, are transient, because the body does not act by them on itself, but on another bodily subject; and from this we have further deduced that the living being is self-moving and matter is inert. Is it now possible that of two opposites the one arises from the other by evolution or by composition? In the first place, can the inert ever become self-active by developing itself? Development does not change the nature of things, but only unfolds what is latent in them. Yet, to give self-moving power to that which cannot of itself pass from rest to motion and to endow with immanent what of itself has but transient activity, is, indeed, not to educe hidden or implicit faculties from a subject, but to impart to the same a new energy. Were it not so, we should be compelled to admit that the want is the origin of motion, and that transient is the beginning of immanent activity. As to the artificial compositions, to which, in the second place, recourse is had to account for the phenomena of life, we must bear in mind that the whole has no other perfection than that of all the parts combined. Hence, what is in no way precontained in the latter is not at all to be found in the former.¹ But the several molecules of matter, it is agreed, are inert and act transiently; wherefore, also, the whole composed of them must be inert and capable, not of immanent, but of only transient activity. By their union the material elements are joined together, but not reversed in their nature; therefore they have conjointly just as well as singly a tendency to outward action, which, however, will be of greater efficacy, either because they unite their forces directly towards a common object, or because one moves and determines the other in a certain proportion and according to a concerted plan. Thus bodies are formed and aggregated by nature, thus mechanisms are constructed by art. Life, therefore, dormant or dilated in matter is an absurdity, and absurdly are materialists supposing that it has been developed from the bodily substance in its primordial condition, or will be elicited from it by the help of science in future ages. The certainty of this reasoning is not lessened by

the imperfection of the knowledge which we have of the material forces; for we have deduced the impossibility we speak of from the very nature of life and matter, as inferred from the phenomena always and everywhere observed; but nature remains the same under all circumstances.

The principle, then, of any life whatever is undoubtedly distinct from matter, nay, transcends it inasmuch as vital is above physical action, as self-motion ranks higher than inertia, and as vegetation, sensation and intellection exceed in perfection material resistance or attraction, because an operation of a higher quality presupposes a power of a superior order. This being agreed to, we must conclude that the vital principle is planted in the body as in a lower element, which by its union it lifts up to a higher nature, and endows with a new energy.

From the facts thus far stated and the principles laid down, we must now draw several conclusions touching the essence of the soul in general. We infer *first* that the soul is a constituent of the *nature* of living beings. *Nature* is the first intrinsic principle of operations,—that is, such an inward source of activity as is preceded by no other one in the acting subject. In accordance with this definition, the principle of life, distinct as it is from matter, must be considered either as a nature of its own or at least as a component part of a nature. Of animate bodies matter is evidently also a constituent, and hence the vital principle is not their entire nature, but a part of the same. We may likewise call the soul an essential constituent. For nature and essence are one and the self-same thing, considered, however, under different aspects. Nature is the first principle of operation, essence is in a thing the first perfection, in which all others have their root. But it is perfection that enables a thing to action, and consequently these two intrinsic principles, that of operation and that of being, must needs coincide. For this reason, the soul is also a *substantial* constituent. To show this a short explanation will suffice. *Substance* is being in itself; it is, in other terms, the subject that sustains all inherent qualities and modes of being, and itself requires no substratum in which to inhere. It is not the self-existent, for this exists of itself and excludes dependence on an efficient cause, whilst substance exists in itself and excludes but inexistence in another thing. Nevertheless a being may exist in itself completely or incompletely, according as it stands by itself, either in every or only in some regard. The conceptions just exposed are not improperly illustrated by an instance taken from human associations. In a society we may distinguish nature, essence, and substance. Its nature is its tendency to a determinate end common to all its members; its essence is that which constitutes its being an intrinsic organization; its substance is its independence and

self-government, which it has completely or incompletely, according as it is sovereign or subject to the sway of a higher body politic as one of its branches. Has, then, the first principle of life existence in itself? Undoubtedly. An *accident*, which is naturally inherent or in need of a subject of inhesion, may be the proximate, but cannot be the first or ultimate source of perfection and operation; such can be only that reality which is, according to its very conception, unsupported and existing in itself. Accordingly, the soul must be conceived as a substance,—either as a complete one, if it stands by itself and is not a part of a being, or as an incomplete one, if, though in some regard it is in itself, still it belongs as a part to a whole. In the animate bodies, where it is composed with matter, it is of itself incomplete, for complete is but the whole made up of all its components. In some way, however, even there the vital principle must be regarded as existent in itself, inasmuch as it is a constituent part of the whole that subsists in itself, as something of the subject that sustains the accidents, and not an accident that inheres in a subject already constituted.¹ Hence we legitimately conclude the identity of nature, substance, and essence; for as nature cannot be the first principle of action, so essence cannot be the first root of perfection without existing in itself. This holds true and is generally admitted by philosophers with regard to natural, though not with regard to artificial beings, as in the conception of the latter an accidental form may be implied.

We infer *secondly* that the soul is a *substantial form*. *Form* in general is that which as an intrinsic entity determines a thing or stamps on it a peculiar shape; *substantial form* is that which gives specific nature to a substance; it is opposed to the *accidental form*, which comes to a subject already constituted in its substantial being. In composed substances we must distinguish two elements, one that is in itself indifferent and indeterminate, another that is differential and determinant; one that they have in common with other beings, another that is peculiar to them. In this regard nature resembles the works of art. In a statue, too, there is the material, the marble, and the figure; the block of marble is of itself indifferent and may be worked into anything; it is the figure sculptured on it that makes it to be a statue rather than a tombstone, an image of Cæsar rather than of Napoleon. The indeterminate component of a being we call matter; the determinant, form. Matter, therefore, and form, combining their own partial entities, complete each other, in order to constitute one being; matter lends itself to the form as

¹ "That which is the essential constituent of a substance," says Father Harper, S. J., "must itself be a substance, however partial, incomplete, and rudimentary; otherwise, the essence of a substance might be in a part composed of that which is not substance,—a contradiction in terms." *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., Prop. cxlii., n. ii., page 205.

a subject for concrete existence, and the form confers on matter that which makes it an entire nature. Matter and form are thus the natural elements of compound substances. Yet not substance only, but also essence has its material and formal constituents. For if we analyze the things as to their essence, we discover in them something that they have in common, and something that is peculiar to them and constitutive of their properties; and if we attentively reflect on those two components, the common and the particular, the indifferent and the differential, we find them to be distinct from each other, sometimes in nature itself, sometimes only in consequence of our abstraction. In the first case we have the physical essence, the components of which are matter and form in the strict sense; in the second we have the metaphysical essence, the constituents of which are matter and form taken rather in a wider meaning and analogically. With regard to natural compounds it will not be difficult to observe in all particular instances that the components of their physical essence are identical with the constituents of their substance; nor can it be otherwise, since nature and substance coincide, and since we consider in either of them the parts as they are distinguished, not by abstraction, but in themselves outside our mind. But, how shall we explain the constitution of simple beings? If a thing is not composed, its essence is all form, or as some say, a pure form; for as the nature of such a being has its characteristic properties there is certainly a form implied in it, and as it excludes all essential composition, there is no matter in it, but form alone. In this supposition the form is a complete essence or substance, whereas in composites it cannot be conceived but as incomplete.

To apply these definitions to the living beings of this visible universe, the body is that constituent of theirs which they have in common with one another and also with the inanimate, and that not only logically or in our conceptions, but also in reality and independently of our mind; for frequently the very same material elements exist successively in water or air, in the plant, in the animal, and in man. The body, therefore, is indifferent, indeterminate, apt to be a component part of many natures; it is the material constituent. The soul, on the other hand, determines the body to one specific nature, for by its union it effects that the same is no more brute matter, but a living being of a certain species and endowed with a certain activity. The soul, accordingly, concurs in the constitution of animate bodies as the formal element, as their essential or substantial form; for it constitutes the characteristic property of their substance or essence. The soul is, on that account, also itself a substance, yet not a complete one, because it

is not entire of itself, any more than matter is; such they are only if united.

We infer, *thirdly*, that the soul is a *substantial act*. *Act* we take here as opposed to *potentiality*, to passive power. *Potentiality* is receptivity, the capacity in a subject of being perfected. *Act*, on the contrary, is the perfection which fills up the receptivity or capacity of a subject, not by acting upon it, but by uniting itself with it. "As operation or action," writes St. Thomas,¹ "which is the complement of active potentiality, corresponds with active potentiality; so that which corresponds with passive potentiality as its perfection and complement, is called act." Potentiality and act are, therefore, opposed to each other, not only by mutual relation, but also by privation or negation. Still the act does not imply so necessary a relation to potentiality that it cannot exist without it; for a perfection may also subsist in itself and thus be its own act, and not that of a subject distinct from it. If an act of that kind is free from all potentiality, it is called pure; and this pure act must evidently be an infinite perfection, since whatever is finite is yet perfectible and hence potential, and it must be self-existent, since self-existence is included in infinite perfection. Just the contrary is the case with potentiality; it implies a want of perfection, and, therefore, the more potential a being is, the more imperfect is it, so that if at last we conceive a pure potentiality without any act, we may easily understand it to be incapable of existence in nature.

A *substantial act* is that which gives a substance its perfection and completeness, and so likewise we may call an *essential act* that which gives to essence its entireness. Now, is the soul an act? Certainly, by the very fact of its being a form. For every form, as St. Thomas concludes, is an act, because it gives shape to a thing, and if a substantial form, completes matter and determines it to a specific nature, an entire principle of activity. Even if the form be pure and not destined to union with a material element, it still must be conceived as an act, inasmuch as it is its own highest and last perfection. Nay, the soul is a substantial act, for it is an act as far as it is a form, yet it is a substantial form, and, therefore, also a substantial act. The vital principle is, indeed, the main perfection that constitutes a living substance, it gives the same life, and proper action, and peculiar nature. For this reason the Scholastic doctors termed the soul the first act of the living being; for substance and essence are primary perfections in the thing which they

¹ "Sicut potentiae activae respondet operatio vel actio, in qua completur potentia activa, ita etiam illud quod respondet potentiae passivae, quasi perfectio et complementum, actus dicatur. Et propter hoc omnis forma actus dicitur, etiam ipsae formae separatae; et illud quod est principium perfectionis totius, quod est Deus, vocatur actus purus." I. Dist. xlii., qu. 1 art., 1 m.

constitute, since they are the root and foundation of all the others without resting themselves on any other ground.

We infer, *fourthly*, that the soul is but one in each living being. This follows with compelling evidence from what we have said thus far. We conceive every being endowed with life as one; the tree, the horse, the man we meet, each is in our view, one and not several beings. Why do we all think alike in this? Because unity is a necessary attribute of being, so much so that in the opinion of all philosophers one and being are convertible. The reason thereof is plain. Everything is, by its essence that which it is and nothing else. But being that and nothing else excludes plurality and establishes unity. Everything, therefore, has by its essence both being and unity, or, in other words, is one for the same reason for which it is a being.¹ Now, of what does the essence of a thing consist? Chiefly of its form. For if it is simple, the form is its only constituent; if it is composite, the form is, of the two constituents, the principal, because it is the form that completes and determines its specific nature, by which it is distinguished from all other things. Consequently, where there are many forms, there can possibly result only one being. The soul, therefore, as it is the substantial form, cannot be multiplied without destroying man's unity. In this conclusion, drawn from the very conception of essence and form in general, we are greatly confirmed by reflecting on the vital form in particular. The soul is the source of immanent action. Now, if there were in the same body several such principles, of which each one, proceeding to action from itself, produces an effect within itself, would they not severally possess themselves of the bodily elements in their particular interests, and quite necessarily constitute multiplicity in being as well as in operation? As little, then, as we can destroy the oneness of the living being, are we allowed to admit in it a plurality of souls? Nay, from the principles laid down and made use of as premises, we must infer that several substantial forms, of whatever kind they may be, cannot at once exist in one being.²

So much about the soul in general. Is there in the conclusions we have deduced, by aid of the old school, anything unsound? Do they not rest on undeniable facts and observations? Are the principles from which we drew them false, doubtful or not evident? Did we follow a wrong method? Or were the terms we used improper and meaningless? Does the result we arrived at not con-

¹ St. Thom., S. Theol. p. i., qu. 76, art. 3: "Ab eodem res habet quod sit ens et quod sit una."

² St. Thom., Quodl. I., art. 6, c.: "Impossibile est in uno eodemque esse plures formas substantiales, et hoc ideo quia ab eodem res habet esse et unitatem. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam; unde et per formam habet unitatem. Et propter hoc, ubicunque est multitudo formarum, non est unum simpliciter."

vey a clear idea of, or give an insight into the nature of the source of life? If that be so, then all inquiries that have ever been made are absurd, all science, all knowledge, even of the material universe ceases. Never have there been researches more exact and careful than those made by the scholastic philosophers into the nature of the soul.

II. THE SIMPLICITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

From these general observations let us now pass over to the more particular investigation of the human soul. If the phenomena of life presuppose a vital principle, vital actions of a special kind prerrequisite a soul of a special nature; for between the principiant and the principiate, the source and the rivulet that flows from it, there must be a strict proportion. Therefore, where we observe in certain living beings actions not attainable to others, there we must admit a soul of a superior nature. Now, pre-eminent among all beings endowed with life is man; in him we discover an excellence, a kind of activity that makes him the king of all other realms, the gem of the universe. He, consequently, must be quickened also by a soul of pre-eminent perfection. It is into this sanctuary within ourselves, this last and innermost source of man's marvellous operations, that we shall now try to penetrate. Yet how can we reach it? Can we, perhaps, in this inquiry be led by intuition? Can we directly attain what is intrinsic to our mind? By consciousness, undoubtedly, we gain some knowledge of our very substance. For, reflecting on ourselves, we obtain cognizance of our acts as they are in themselves; but they are and must be inherent in a subject, an active principle; hence we perceive our soul as their substratum. We can even distinguish it from its acts. We are fully aware that, while the subject remains in us always the same, the acts are always changing; that acts there are many, but the subject is one; that the acts are accidental, but the subject is essential to and identical with us. However, we thus know only the existence of a permanent active principle within us, yet do not get acquainted with its constitution; we apprehend a substance in ourselves, yet do not attain its nature. Distinction must, therefore, be made between the existence and the essence of the soul; the first is, in fact, the object of immediate cognition of our consciousness, yet the other cannot come to our clear and distinct cognizance but by way of reasoning. So we are taught by the Angelic Doctor¹ and all sound philosophers, and

¹ St. Theol., p. i., qu. 87, art. 1.

so we must judge from our own experience. For had we a direct insight into the nature of the soul, it would be impossible to question its spirituality or to entertain erroneous opinions about it. But whence should we infer the nature of that substance intrinsic to us, yet imperceptible to our direct view? From our actions. From them as from the circumference we must proceed to the soul as to the centre. As from vital operations we have deduced the essential properties of the vital principle in general, so we must from the peculiarity and the excellence of human activity gather the nature and the perfection of the source of human life in particular.

And what operations do we observe in man? He has vegetation and sensation; yet these functions he has in common with the plants and brutes, though in him they are in many regards more perfect. As a peculiar gift he has intellection and free volition; it is by them that he surpasses all other beings of this visible creation. They, consequently, most distinctly exhibit the nature of the human soul. For the highest perfection of a being is, more than any other quality, its proper form, gives a peculiar trait to all other attributes, contains all other endowments as their root, and keeps them subordinate to itself as to their end. Wherefore St. Thomas, with Aristotle, remarks that everybody appears to be what is the best in him.¹ Above all, then, we must inquire into the operations of the human intellect and will. Of course, according to the statement made above, we can at once infer from them that the human soul is the principle of rational life. But this does not content us; we long for a fuller knowledge of the fountain-head of our intellection and volition. And this not in vain. By closer researches we shall bring to light the essential attributes of the soul as considered both in itself and in its relation to the body. The soul considered in itself we shall see to be simple and spiritual.

First, let us speak of its simplicity. To begin our argumentation with an exact definition, simple we call that which is not composite. Now a thing can be composite in many regards, and it can be also composite in one respect and not in another. Accordingly, simplicity, too, which is freedom from composition, may be taken in a manifold sense. In the present question we consider substantial simplicity,—that is, we exclude from the soul any plurality of parts which constitute its substance. This remark is well to be borne in mind, in order not to misunderstand the subject under discussion. There is, indeed, some compositeness in the soul; for there are in it many acts which spring up and pass away, and, according to St. Thomas,² many faculties distinct from it, as

¹ S. Theol., p. i., ii., qu. 3, art. 5.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 77, art. 12.

well as from one another. And not only in the human soul is it so, but even in the purest created spirit, for God alone is absolutely and in every regard simple. Yet this compositeness does not concern us, because it is accidental and exists between the substance and its accidents, or between one accident and another; whereas, we speak of substantial composition—that is, of such as is between the components of a substance. Furthermore, the parts of a substantial whole can be of a twofold kind; they either constitute a thing in its essence, and hence are termed essential parts, or they give it but extension, and are called integrant parts. Here, again, a distinction is to be made. The several parts can be of the same or a different nature; if they are of the same, they are termed homogeneous; if of a different, heterogeneous. To illustrate the theory by examples: Essential parts in man are soul and body; integrant, but heterogeneous parts are the bodily members. An instance of a composition of homogeneous parts is a lake or a river, where all the molecules that make up the watery mass have the same nature,—that of water.

Having premised these definitions, we maintain that the soul is free from any kind of substantial composition. We commence with rejecting composition of integrant parts. First, we shall prove it to be impossible in the soul from the notions which we have of simple objects. Undoubtedly we have conceptions of not complex natures and substances. We have some knowledge of God and of pure spirits; we understand very well what is meant by the terms spirituality and simplicity; again, we apprehend acts and forms so abstract as to admit of no division whatever; as those of being, existence, relation, identity, bounty, beauty, perfection. Now all these conceptions cannot be at all in a composed subject, and, consequently, our soul is a simple substance. This we hope to prove with compelling evidence. If the active principle by which these notions are formed, and in which they inhere as accidents, be composed of several integrant parts, then the cognitive act is also composite; nay, the act and the principle must consist of the same number of components. For integrant parts, giving extension to a thing already constituted in its essence, are informed and therefore active; and integrant parts of a cognitive principle must be cognitive themselves, since they would otherwise not extend a cognitive substance as such. It is of no avail to aver that cognition may be an operation of many parts taken collectively, but not singly; as vegetation seems to be a vital act of the organism as a whole. Cognition is an immanent action produced by the substantial agent within itself, and consists in the expression of the knowable object by and within the knowing subject. That principle, therefore, is strictly cognitive, which is able to elicit such an act;

other causes concurrent to perception, as, for instance, the external object acting on our faculties, are not properly called so. All, then, depends on the manner in which the several parts we have considered coöperate towards cognition. If they are not representative by an immanent action, they are not in reality integrant components of a cognitive subject as such, but are only concurrents external to it; if they, by whatever aid, thus act and represent an object immanently, they do, as we maintain, elicit an act of perception. Something similar takes place in vegetation; all parts of the plant or the animal grow and vegetate, though under the influence of the whole organism. But if each integrant part is cognizant, what does it represent whenever we conceive something simple? Of course, it must represent the whole of such an object, it being absolutely impossible to divide what is simple. But, if that be so, there must be as many conceptions of the same thing and as many substantial principles of cognition within us, as there are parts supposed to exist in our mind, a multiplicity which is contrary to both sound philosophy and experience. We are conscious of but one conception and but one substance underlying our acts as their cause and their subject.

We may reason in the like manner from our conception of unity. Whenever we think of an organic body, or a mechanism, or an association, we conceive several parts united to one whole. Can such an idea be formed by a compound of integrant parts? We deny it absolutely. Integrant components of a cognitive principle, as we said above, must also be cognitive, so that the complete cognition of an object is the sum, as it were, of many partial cognitions. This supposed, let us ask what are the several component parts cognizant of? Does each one perceive the whole object or only a part of it? If each part of the cognitive subject perceives the entire object,—that is, the collection of all its parts, then there are in us as many conceptions of the whole and as many cognitive principles as there are integrant components of our mind admitted. But what could be more inconsistent than such a thought? Consciousness testifies to the oneness of our conception and of our intellectual power. Reason tells us that it is most absurd to conceive one intelligent principle formed of many intelligent components, since different principles of immanent action cannot possibly be united to one living substance, they being of necessity divergent in their tendencies. If, on the contrary, each part of the thinking subject conceives only a part of the object, the whole of the latter is not conceived at all, because its parts are not united, but exist separately, in the cognitive faculty. Of this an illustration will convince us. If of five different persons each one reads the fifth part of a book, they all together read all its parts, and yet the

knowledge of the book as a whole, the entire idea developed in it, is not attained by any one at all. To conceive a whole as such, it is required to comprehend all its parts collected and united, and for this again it is necessary that they all concur in a cognitive principle, which, that they may no more be divided, must itself be free from multiplicity.

Another proof of the freedom of the soul from integral composition we draw from the nature of our judgments and reasonings. We judge when, after comparing two ideas, we pronounce them to be objectively identical or different. To perform this mental operation, it is necessary that both terms be understood by one and the self-same subject. For he that, after due comparison, judges two things to agree or to differ, must undoubtedly know both of them; were he cognizant of one alone, and somebody else of the other, a judgment concerning them would be just as impossible as in a civil controversy, if of the contending parties each one should bring his cause to a different court. Now, if it is assumed that our mind, this judge within ourselves, be composite, how can all its components concur in judging? Do all; or does only one, or none of them, know both the subject and the predicate and pronounce sentence on their identity or difference? If none is cognizant of all these three things together, one perceiving but the subject, and another the predicate, no judgment at all is formed. If each integrant part of the mind has notice of the subject and the predicate and their mutual relation, there are as many judgments and judges within us as there are parts thought to exist in our soul, contrarily to our consciousness and the natural oneness of ourselves. If only one part knows the two terms and affirms or denies their identity, there is in us only one intelligent principle fit to judge, and this one principle, admitting of no composition, is our soul. In a similar way we may deduce our thesis from the act of reasoning. The mind that reasons must know not only the conclusions which it infers, but also the premises from which it makes the inference, and the reason for which the one is inferred from the other. Hence ratiocination is an indivisible act, and must, consequently, be in a cognizant subject that does not consist of many partial agents.

Lastly, we argue from the nature of reflection or consciousness. Reflection is the act by which the mind turns back upon itself and its operations. Inasmuch as the mind turns back upon itself, we come to our substance and person, we being the subject at once and the object of our cognition; inasmuch as it turns back upon its operations or perceives itself actuated by them, we know all our intellections and volitions to spring from the same self. Such being the nature of our consciousness, let us put the question: Is

a composite principle capable of being self-conscious? Again, three suppositions are possible. Either each of the several components, or none, or only one, turns back upon itself. If each one, we must perceive within our mind several selves, and refer our actions to several *mes*. Yet we are conscious of but one self, which we consider as the source and subject of all our doings. If none turns back upon itself, but one upon the other, as, for instance, the eye directs itself to the hand and the brain to the eye, no reflection at all takes place and no self is perceived, because there is nothing that makes itself the object of its own cognitive act. If only one part turns back upon itself, this alone is our mind endowed with consciousness. Thus, again, we conclude with full certainty that the self-conscious mind is not composed of parts.

All acts, then, of our intellect, conception, judgment, and reasoning, if duly analyzed, evince the substantial simplicity of the soul. No less do the acts of the will bear witness to the same truth. For does not the will also love and desire simple objects? Does it not also tend to unity among parts? Does it not likewise return to itself, approving or detesting its own acts and desiring the perfection of its own subject? We must, therefore, infer from the simplicity of the object willed the simplicity also of the volitive act and principle, and from the impossibility of dividing volition the impossibility of dividing into parts its subject. And as, according to the testimony of our consciousness, intellect and will are in the same self, and as the will does not desire but what is proposed to it by the intellect, and the intellect again is under the control of the will, there is but one soul in us, both intellective and volitive, composed of no integrant parts.

Two objections, however, might be raised against our conclusion. It might be said that integrant parts of a cognitive subject, because they are united and act conjointly, do not divide the object known, but rather reduce it to unity in the cognitive faculty. As an example the brute is alleged, which is endowed with extended organs of sensation and still shows harmony in all its acts, and knows and desires the whole of the objects presented to it. Certainly, we grant that the integrant parts of an animal act altogether in accordance and with a certain completeness, just on account of their substantial union, being made by it dependent on one another and enabled to combine their partial actions. For that, indeed, they perceive the whole exterior object, but not its unity. The reason is, first, because, notwithstanding their union and mutual influence, the several parts are, though not separated, still distinct from and outside one another in space; secondly, because each of them becomes cognizant by immanent action,—that is, by a form produced by it and inherent in it. To these two facts it is

consequent that the several integrant parts of a cognitive subject attain also several parts of the object, one outside the other, and that the cognition of one part of the organ remains distinct from that of the other. Experience confirms this theory. If, for instance, in the optic nerve a fibre is deadened, we do not see the corresponding point in the object; the same happens in our tongue and our hand. Thus we think it sufficiently explained why extended or compound principles, in spite of the union of their parts, cannot conceive unity or unite one object with another, or deduce a conclusion from premises.

Another objection is occasioned by the distinction between the soul and its faculties generally taught by the Scholastics.¹ This distinction supposed, is it necessary to deny the substantial composition of the soul, or do the reasons thus far brought forward prove anything more than simplicity of our intellect and our will, which are the immediate principles of all our rational acts? Certainly they do, and for many reasons. The faculties cannot be simple if the substance is composite. They are evolved from it as from their root. But from the composite the simple cannot spring, since the principiate cannot be of a higher nature than the principiant. And since integrant parts are already informed and constituted in a complete essence, each one will develop from itself a partial faculty of its own, all which are distinct from one another no less than their several sources. Hence there is as much distinction and composition in the powers of a being as is supposed to be in its substance. The difficulty proposed will yet more clearly be solved, if we consider the relation between the substance and its forces as taught by the Scholastics. The faculty, they maintain, results with necessity from the substance and is used by it as a natural instrument; it is, therefore, not the principal, but only the instrumental cause of action, not the primary, but the secondary agent. This theory they hold particularly with regard to the living substance, on account of the immanency of its actions. Accordingly, if we suppose in the soul several integrant parts, which are to be conceived as active, we must also grant that any one of them will through a faculty evolved from itself perform its own operation, distinct from that of the others, though in connection and harmony with each and all of them. So the Scholastic doctrine, when it distinguishes substance and faculty, is not opposed to the simplicity of the soul, but rather supports and illustrates it by showing what multiplicity of operation must follow from any integral composition.

After this discussion concerning the integrant parts, it will no longer be difficult to exclude from the soul every composition of

¹ St. Thom., S. Theol., p. i., qu. 77, art. 1 and 2.

essential constituents. Of components that make up an essence, only one can be active, all others are of necessity passive,—that is, incomplete and indeterminate. For activity is consequent to the ultimate substantial perfection, to the essential form; and to admit more than one essential form in the same being is inconsistent. Consequently, no nature is composed of several active elements; and whenever such are discovered in a thing, they must be considered as integrant parts. Should, however, anybody not share this view of essential composition in general, he would be compelled to adopt it with regard to the human soul, if conceived to be essentially composite. For all rational acts, conceptions, judgments, ratiocinations, volitions require a simple active principle, and can impossibly be performed by a compound one. Besides, if there be several active principles in the essence of the soul, they must be in it sources of immanent action; for how could they otherwise constitute the vital principle? But this granted, evidently the unity of our life would be destroyed. If, therefore, a composition is admissible in the substance of our soul, it must be formed of an active and a passive element. Yet is there such a composition really conceivable? Decidedly not. The soul is the source of activity, even of the most perfect; it is the form which confers on us substantial completion, gives us a certain specific nature; whilst matter is the indeterminate, potential, and inactive constituent of our nature. Now, on the ground of these definitions, is it not quite inconsistent again to divide the soul into a material and a formal element, for so the passive and the active must be termed; and is it not most absurd to say that, what is merely passive concurs in constitution with that which is essentially active? This reason St. Thomas develops in the following way. "The soul," says he, "is the form either by its entire entity, or by a part of the same. If by its entire entity, matter, if understood to be a merely potential being, cannot be one of its constituents; for the form as such is an act, but mere potentiality cannot be a constituent of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to the act, being its opposite. If the soul is the form by a part only of its entity, we call that part alone soul, and the other, which it first actuates, the first subject animated by it."¹ We abstain from advancing other reasons taken from the specific nature of the human soul, as its

¹ S. Theol. p. i., qu. 75, art. 5: "Respondeo dicendum quod anima non habet materiam; et hoc potest considerari dupliciter. Primo quidem ex ratione animæ in communi. Est enim de ratione animæ quod sit forma alicujus corporis. Aut igitur est forma secundum se totam, aut secundum aliquam partem sui. Si secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars ejus sit materia, si dicatur materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum; quia forma, in quantum forma, est actus, id autem, quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contractum divisa. Si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem sui, illam partem dicamus esse animam, et illam partem cujus primo est actus, dicemus esse primo animatum."

spirituality, to be proved later on, will be a further and final evidence of the same truth.

Essential composition, then, no less than integral is repugnant to the nature of the soul. This, therefore, is a simple substance, formed of no parts whatsoever. Hence it follows that the soul is not a body. In bodies there is always a substantial composition of essential parts, of matter and form, as the Scholastics taught, and of integrant parts, or of molecules, as all scientists admit. Moreover, the bodily substance, whatever may be its ultimate elements, must act as a compound. But the human soul is neither substantially composed nor can it bring its rational faculties into a compound action. St. Thomas¹ and his school have, on this account, demonstrated the simplicity of the soul by proving it not to be a body. The arguments of which they make use are nearly the same as we have set forth; some, however, they have taken from the specific nature of the bodily substance. Of these latter one deserves our special attention, since it may serve as a most efficient weapon in our warfare against materialism.²

According to the Scholastic system, or rather to the principles of sound reason, cognition in general consists in the expression of the similitude, the object by and within the cognitive principles. For whenever we are cognizant of a thing, we bear it, as it were, within ourselves; yet we have not its very reality in our mind or in our senses, at least if it is in the outer world; hence we possess only its likeness or its similitude gathered from it by our own operation. Beings, therefore, are qualified for the cognition of outward objects inasmuch as they are enabled to reproduce in themselves the forms of things distinct from them, and cognitive faculties expand the more, the wider their capacity is of receiving foreign forms. But bodies are unfit to receive the forms of other things. First, they are on the lowest grade of being, and as such they are not proportioned to the reception of the forms proper to higher grades. Secondly, the substantial forms of bodies themselves are contrary to one another and cannot at once exist in the same bodily subject, as can be seen in all substantial changes. By its impenetrability, moreover, one body excludes from itself the individual entity of the other, though of the same species. Thirdly, also among the bodily qualities there is a special opposition in consequence of their inhering in an extended and impenetrable subject. Thus, it is evident that bodies are contracted and confined to their own being so as to be unable to receive the form of whatever is distinct from them. This is, quite consequently, alleged by St. Thomas as the reason why they are destitute of cognition. He goes even farther and lays it down as a

¹ S. Theol., p. i., qu. 75, art. 1. Sum. c. gent. lib. i. c. 49 and 65.

² S. Theol., p. i., qu. 14, art. 1; qu. 84, art. 2.

principle, that elevation above matter is the foundation of cognitive power, and that a being is the better fitted for cognition the more immaterial it is. Hence he explains why animals have, and plants have not perception. Plants, says he, by vegetation take in the material substances of bodies; yet this being impenetrable to them, they only add it to the animated molecules which they already have. Animals, on the contrary, whilst they admit into their sensitive organs not the matter, but the material qualities of bodies, not only receive the accidental forms of outward objects in their very substance, but also give them a higher, a vital manner of existence. Conversely we must also infer that any being endowed with cognition must be elevated above matter, and that the more perfect its perception is, the farther it must recede from materiality. Now, the human soul is the source of the most extended knowledge; for it not only knows by the senses the material, but by the intellect also every kind of object, the supersensible and the spiritual, substance and accidents, essence and properties, causes and effects, the absolute and the relative. Hence the saying of Aristotle that the soul is as it were all,—that is, capable to receive the form of all things. What else, then, must we conclude but that our mind is by its nature itself completely distinct from all bodily substance, entirely opposed to it, and in some way infinitely raised above it?

Most valuable conclusions have we thus arrived at, all tending effectively to combat materialistic tendency. Anti-Christian science asserts that living bodies, even that of man, most carefully searched into, show no marks of a higher principle and manifest no activity that could not be exercised by the force of matter. And behold, if we compare vital with physical action, we at once find them to differ essentially, the one being immanent, the other transient, the one consisting in self-motion, the other implying inertness. We likewise understand it to be impossible that by any combination, however artificial, material power can be converted into vital, because composition does not change the nature of the elements and does not confer on the whole what was in no way pre-contained in the parts. Thus we discover, not by the senses, but by reason, in living beings, a substantial constituent essentially superior to matter. If we in particular examine into rational life and physical activity, we cannot but notice an irreconcilable opposition between them, and consequently conclude a difference between the principles from which they flow. All rational acts, whether of the intellect or of the will, require an essentially simple subject from which they proceed and in which they inhere, whereas material actions are produced by a compound physical agent; rational activity is unextended and free from multiplicity, material operation is extended and consists of many partial acts, one outside

the other, even as to space. Matter cannot be cognitive, the principle of rational life is the source of the widest cognition; the one, therefore, is most restricted in its nature, another most universal, another most exclusive, another most comprehensive. Can there be a greater opposition and a more glaring distinction between two principles? Indeed, not to perceive the existence of the soul and its superiority over matter, is to shut the eyes of the intellect to the most radiant light.

It is with the knowledge of the principle of life as with the science of this visible universe. At first, we notice in nature only the phenomena that strike our senses. Nor will he who has no desire or no ability to inquire into them see anything beyond them. But he who begins to analyze them finds the source from which they spring, and the forces by which they are produced, and the regularity with which they recur. Searching thus into the causes of what is obvious, the scientist penetrates into the intrinsic constitution of things and the innermost recess of their powers, and becomes cognizant of the wonderful might, greatness, and order of nature. Similarly at first sight we perceive in the starry heavens nothing but a multitude of shining points. But let the astronomer apply his instruments, let him compare star with star, follow their course, and resolve into its elements the light which they reflect. He will soon find new worlds and new systems of boundless extension; he will detect that the points which we scarcely perceive with the naked eye are heavenly bodies many times larger than our earth; he will discover on them seas and continents and with certainty infer the very material of which they are made; he will mark a wondrous harmony in their orbits, a mutual attraction and dependence without the least disturbance in universal motion, the greatest variety in an endless space, with perfect order and unity. So likewise by self-consciousness and experience we are directly cognizant of our acts without reaching our interior. Yet if by sound philosophy and without prejudice we examine such operations, we are led to the soul as their last and innermost principle within us, to a substance as their support, to a constituent of our nature as their efficient cause. Then, if we continue to reflect and inquire seriously, a new sphere is disclosed before our eyes and a new kind of perfection; for we understand the soul not to be composite as all things around us, but simple; not to have its being constituted like other parts of the universe by a simplicity of components, but by consummate oneness and simplicity; not to be restricted to its form, as bodies are, by their impenetrability, but to be all-comprising, apt to receive everything and to represent within itself all that is, all entity, all beauty. A nature, indeed, more widely extended than the heavens, transcending in perfection all visible creation.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS.

Report of the United States Commissioner of Education for 1880 and 1881.

Sadlier's Catholic Almanac. 1884.

The Judges of Faith and Godless Schools. By Rev. Thomas J. Jenkins.
New York. Thomas D. Egan, No. 33 Barclay Street.

Cyclopædia of Education. Kiddle & Schem, New York. Steyer, 1877.

I.

"THE Judges of Faith and Godless Schools" is chiefly a compilation of Catholic authorities in opposition to a godless system of education, and shows great zeal and industry on the part of its reverend composer. He gives us the testimony against godless schools of two hundred and fifty judges of the faith, including "seventeen plenary and provincial councils, two or three diocesan synods, two or three Popes, two sacred congregations of some twenty cardinals and pontifical officials, seven separate cardinals, who with thirty-three archbishops make forty primates and metropolitans, about seventy individual bishops and archbishops, deceased or living, in the United States. All the testimonies are from the past half-century." We may quote, as a specimen of them, the words of one whose character for mildness and prudence, as well as force, is second to no other bishop who has ever ruled in our country; we mean Cardinal John McCloskey. In his pastoral proclaiming the Jubilee in 1875 he says: "Let us, moreover, especially give heed to the words of the Holy Father, wherein he exhorts us to use all diligence in coming, by every means in our power, to the rescue of imperiled youth, knowing, as we do, the many dangers to which they are exposed and the dreadful ruin to which they are liable. But youth cannot be effectually guarded against these dangers without careful religious instruction and moral training. Nor can proper religious instruction and moral training be secured for them without the hearty and generous co-operation, not of parents alone, but of the faithful at large, with their pastors, in aiding to multiply and sustain good Catholic schools. It is true that in order to do this sacrifices have to be made, and these too often by the classes least able to afford them. But what are these sacrifices compared with the vital interests that are at stake! Let us, then, have courage and patience, hoping for

better things in the future. The time may come, sooner, perhaps, than we now have any reason to expect, when the conviction will force itself upon the public mind, not only that a purely secular education is necessarily imperfect and insufficient, but that the popular system which upholds this sort of education is gradually but surely loosening the hold of any form of distinct religious profession or of Christian belief upon the minds of the growing generation, and is training up for the not far distant future a race of free-thinkers and unbelievers, which will soon ripen into a race not so much of anti-Catholics as of anti-Christians."

We are astonished that any body of Christians can hesitate to subscribe to the teaching implied in this grave language. Hesitation in this case is certainly not the result of invincible ignorance. The Protestant sects know that the public-school system of the country is eviscerating the Christianity of our people. A system which throws all the creeds and principles of belief into a common cauldron, as Fra Junipero threw all the provisions into the same pot to save the trouble of cooking them separately, will logically result, as his experiment did, in producing a noxious and disgusting mess unpleasant to the eye and unfit for social digestion. The attempt to veneer this system of compromise of principle and of religious conviction, so as to make it appear Christian when it is practically pagan, by enforcing the reading of parts of the Bible before the opening of the classes in the morning, besides being illegal is simply ridiculous. The principal who reads the Scriptures for the assembled children is frequently an infidel who does not believe in its inspiration nor in its historical truth. He knows that many of his listeners are Jews, and that it is unfair for him to be reading the New Testament for their instruction, since they believe that the authors of it are impostors; and he knows also that the Catholics in his audience refuse to accept the version which he is using as authentic. That Unitarians, who believe not in the divinity of the Christian religion, should be satisfied with a homœopathic infusion of Christianity into the minds of their children is not surprising; but that the so-called orthodox sects, the Methodists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians, should allow it to continue without manly and united protest is inexcusable. These profess to believe in fixed doctrines and in the necessity of training the young in the moral and doctrinal principles of Jesus Christ. Yet they permit a system to continue which logically tends to sap the vitality of Christian conviction, and to substitute for it a limp indifferentism or a broad liberalism without backbone or any other bone to give it force enough to resist skepticism, or the advance of the American religion of the future—Agnosticism.

The Episcopalians, it is true, have some private schools, and occasionally we hear a protest from some stanch sectarian against the general infidelity of our system of public education, but the voice is weak, the cry is timid. The Protestant sects, as a rule, are dumb, and allow the destroying work to go on, apparently not caring enough for Christianity to strive after its preservation in the American Republic. These sects are responsible for the continuance of the irreligious system. They are numerically the majority of voters, and a manly union on their part in behalf of the Christian teaching of the rising generations could not fail of result; for it is the majority with us that controls our legislation and all our public institutions. If, therefore, the American of the future is to be a man without Christianity, we shall have to thank the indifference of the Protestant sects for this misfortune.

The figures given in the reports of the Commissioner of Education show the astonishing indifference of the sects to the religious training of Young America. In the State of New York, for instance, there are over one million children attending the public or godless schools; while only about one hundred and thirty-nine thousand are pupils of private schools and academies where religious instruction is given. Of this number about one-half are Catholic children in the archdiocese of New York; or, according to Sadlier's *Directory*, 46,262. Computing the attendants at Catholic schools and academies in the other dioceses of the State at about fifty thousand, we have nearly three-fourths of the children of the State who receive a religious education in school, members of the Catholic Church; while only a little over thirty thousand children are being educated specifically as Protestants. Thus, then, in a State in which the Protestants are to the Catholics as five to one, Protestant parents care so little about bringing up their children in religious schools that the great majority of them are being brought up infidels or agnostics.

In Pennsylvania it is worse, for the proportion of those attending the public schools is to that of those going to private schools as 931,749 to about 56,710;¹ and as the great majority of the latter are Catholics, the indifference of the sectarians becomes still more striking. In Massachusetts the proportion is 307,211 in the public schools to 26,289 in the private schools, the majority of which is, as usual, Catholic and a small percentage undenominational. This leaves the strictly Protestant schools in so insignifi-

¹ In Pennsylvania, exclusive of Philadelphia, the number attending private schools is given in the official reports as 26,710. In the Archdiocese of Philadelphia the number attending the Catholic schools and academies is given in the *Directory* as about 24,100.

cant a minority as to show clearly the lack of zeal of the sects for the training of children in the tenets of their parents. Yet bigotry exists both in Massachusetts and in Pennsylvania, in spite of the absence of interest in Protestant education; the odor remains after the carcass has been removed.

The general statistics of the Union illustrate this indifference of the sects still more forcibly. The total school population of the United States is 15,661,213, and of the territories 218,293. Of these about two-thirds, or 9,860,333, are enrolled in the public schools; the very small number of 569,595 is the total of all enrolled in all the private schools in the Union. This leaves a very large balance of children who go to no school at all. Now, when it is considered that the Catholics are the only Christian body who make strenuous efforts for the foundation of parochial schools, and who consequently own most of them, what a bitter commentary on Protestant zeal and love of the doctrinal teaching of Christianity do not the above facts furnish? Whence this carelessness on their part in a matter so vital to the Christian religion? Can it be that their hatred of the Catholic Church is stronger than their belief in Christ, and that they are willing to sacrifice the fundamental principles of Christianity rather than unite with the Mother Church in defending them? For there is no mistaking the position of the Catholic Church on this question. She has taken a firm stand, and she will not, because she cannot, recede. She wants religion to be made a part of the child's training. She wants the soul of the child to be saved. She seeks first the kingdom of God and His justice. She cries out, with Christ, to suffer the little children to come to her; to be taught to believe in Him, to love Him, to pray to Him, to be pure, honest and sober; and she wants this education to hold at the least an equal place in the training of the child with its instruction in secular pursuits. She will not consent to have infidel teachers instilling their pernicious principles into the minds of the young; nor will she allow the faith and morals of her children to be endangered by promiscuous intercourse with unbelievers. She wants the American of the future, like the brave and honest American of the Colonial days, to be first of all a good Christian, in order that he may be at the same time a true patriot and an honest citizen. It is because of her convictions on this subject that Catholics cry out against promiscuous, that is, pagan education, and that in the cause of religious education they make sacrifices in building parochial schools, taxing their poverty rather than consent to give up their convictions. That which Catholics feel bound to do, and what they will do, in spite of every difficulty, for Christian education, is best illus-

trated by what they have done in Belgium to found parochial schools. In 1879 the Belgian Government stripped the then existing primary schools of the kingdom of their religious character. Catholic schools for the higher branches of learning (*enseignement supérieur et moyen*), such as the University of Louvain and numerous episcopal colleges and academies, had already been established years before in opposition to the state institutions of the same kind, and were always, as they still are, crowded with students; but lower free schools, specifically ecclesiastical, were very few; because the State primary schools, through an understanding between the clergy and the civil authorities, were essentially religious, and Catholic for Catholic children. The so-called liberal government (which always means on the Continent of Europe a government liberal to atheism and oppressive to Christianity), in 1879, although obtaining power by the ridiculous majority of only one vote in the Senate, carried the law by which all the state schools were to be dereligionized and withdrawn from clerical supervision. At once gallant Catholic Belgium was in arms. The bishops, supported by the priests and the mass of the laity, organized a system of church free schools throughout the land. Millions of francs were offered for their foundation. Buildings went up, as it were, by magic; teachers, either religious or lay, were engaged, and although "the law of misfortune" had been signed as late as July, 1879, yet by the first of October of the same year every city and town of importance had its half dozen or more, and every country parish its church-school, in full operation. The "liberals" had expected to conquer by the high-handed use of power and money, and they had called by anticipation the Catholic effort a "miserable abortion" (*un pitoyable avortement*); but they were amazed that the failure was on their own side. In the large cities, where the government, on account of its many employees, and where French infidelity had made inroads on the faith of the people, the state schools succeeded in keeping about half of the children; but in the smaller towns and cities and in the country, especially in the Flemish part of Belgium, the defeat of the infidel school law was a perfect Waterloo. The Episcopal schools had everywhere from 75 to 95 per cent. of the school children, and many a state schoolmaster who had no family of his own had not a solitary pupil upon whom to bestow the benefit of his erudition.

The Belgian Catholics would not trust the government, although it tried to delude them by saying that nothing was changed in the inner nature of the schools, and by inserting in the law an article granting permission to the ministers of religion to teach catechism in one of the school-rooms, but after school hours. Finding that this concession did not work, the minister of instruction him-

self conceded more. He ordered the crucifix to be retained in the schools, and he had a sum set apart by the treasury to pay one hundred francs a year to every teacher who would agree to teach the catechism to his pupils. This was done to promote schism and thwart the clergy who had prohibited such teaching and had interdicted the state schools. But the people could not be deceived, and they remained faithful to their pastors. It was feared that the people would become tired of supporting their own schools, having to pay at the same time heavy taxes for supporting idle state schoolmasters and empty school-houses. But every year has been strengthening the Catholic cause, and instead of losing, the schools of the bishops have been gaining ground in every direction. They have now over two-thirds of all the school children of the country.

This magnificent result was brought about by the zeal of the clergy. As soon as the godless school law was passed the parish priests at once appointed committees in their respective parishes; subscriptions were at once taken up, buildings erected and church schools established. Teachers were secured either from among the religious communities or from among the schoolmasters who were not willing to sacrifice their conscience for the loaves and fishes of the government. The bishops on their part appointed a diocesan school board and a national committee, whose duty it was to organize the work, to regulate its operations and see to its preservation and growth. The bishops, besides, appointed each a diocesan inspector and under him a sufficient number of district inspectors, generally professors in colleges or parish priests of the canton. Thus, in the diocese of Ghent there is a canon who supervises the Catholic schools of the whole diocese, and under him there are fourteen inspectors, supervising the Episcopal schools, of which there are about two hundred and thirty directed by religious brothers or sisters, and about as many others directed by laymen. There are now but five very small parishes in the diocese without Catholic schools, but these parishes send their children to neighboring districts for their education.

How the zeal and perseverance of these Belgian Catholics should stimulate American Catholics in the same holy cause of resisting a system which is contrary to Christianity, and in the light of this glorious example how gross appears the indifference of the Protestant sects to the decay of Christian convictions which are melting away through the influence of the public schools! This statement needs no proof. It is self-evident to every one who contrasts the state of religion in our Republic at the beginning of the present century with its actual condition in the Prot-

estant sects. Americans in 1775 were Christians. Are they so now?

It is not, however, our purpose to point out the various defects in the public-school system as it exists in most of our States. This has been often and well done. Nor do we care to show how ridiculous is the fetich embodied in the cry of "unsectarian education,"—the shibboleth of the champions of our public-school system. As if a man could not be a true American because he is a stanch Presbyterian, or Methodist, or Catholic; or as if the less belief he had in the doctrines of his creed the better American he would become; as if George Washington and Charles Carroll would have been better patriots if they had been worse Christians, or if they had been Agnostics! This cry of "non-sectarian education" covers something else, and is loudest in the mouths of the bureaucracy that is making its living by it at the expense of the taxpayers. And perhaps sufficient attention has not been called to this side of the question of our system of public education. It is intrenched in the State treasury and identified with a whole organized system of jobbery. The system is sustained by the vanity of politicians, ycleped commissioners and inspectors, who go around the schools making speeches to win the admiration of female teachers who hold their places through political influence; as well as by the patronage which extends all the way up from the janitor who takes care of the school building to the often illiterate trustee who is aspiring to some more lucrative position, or who is already making something by the appointments which he controls; and to the contractors who supply the coal, or the furniture, or who make the necessary repairs, or furnish the books, slates, etc., to the institution. All these and the whole army of teachers, male and female, with their relations and connections, form a strong political party, all interested in extolling the advantages of "non-sectarian education" which brings grist to their mill and dollars to their pockets. Have the American people reflected on the enormous expense and jobbery of their pet system? Perhaps if they had, those of them who care little about the question of principle might be influenced by the potent argument of appeal to their purse. Can it be that the Protestant ministers hesitate to oppose a system out of which so many deacons and vestrymen are making their living?

We spend annually \$85,111,442 for the support of non-sectarian schools; and it is no exaggeration to say that a very large percentage of this amount is—to put it mildly—"jobbery." Our public-school teachers cost us annually \$55,291,022; whereas, a denominational system would not cost half that amount. And all this we endure in order that the State shall do the very un-American

thing of stepping out of its proper sphere to usurp rights properly belonging to parents. The true American idea is to restrict the State's authority to the smallest circle. Education is none of the State's business. It has enough to do to take care of the material welfare of the people, and not to interfere in education, a matter in which it is so easy to oppress the conscience of minorities, and abridge the natural rights of parents. If the State wishes to promote education among the people, it can do so by other means than usurping parental rights. It can enforce attendance at school. It can impose fines on parents who neglect to send their children to school. It can deny the right to vote to those who are not educated; but it need not play the schoolmaster and add to the already too large amount of public plunder by the creation of a new and usurping bureaucracy.

It costs Colorado \$38.03 per capita of its population to support this usurpation of the State in the matter of education. It costs California \$26.32, and Nevada \$23.97, per capita, for the same purpose. These are heavy taxes for sparsely populated States. Massachusetts pays \$21.54 annually for the education of every pupil of her public schools. If education were left to the churches and to the parents, all these taxes could be saved; the work of education would be better done, for it would have educators whose *hearts* would be in their work, and we would not have the spectacle which now greets us in every State in the Union, of large minorities of the people groaning under double taxation, and suffering in conscience from the exercise of a usurped power, in a land of liberty! Where is the spirit of old Protestant "orthodoxy,"—where are the Episcopalians, that so few voices protest against this infidel, dishonest, oppressive, and un-American system of State education?

II.

But all this is only a preface to our purpose, which is to call attention to some matters in which our parochial system of education might be improved. So well do the Catholic clergy and people understand their plain duty as to the necessity of religious education, that they have everywhere erected parochial schools, unless prevented by a physical or a moral impossibility, the only pleas which can justify conscience for delay in this important matter. Now, considering the poverty of many of our parishes; considering the difficulty of private enterprise coping with public institutions, there is reason for congratulation upon the comparative success of the Church schools.¹

¹ The multiplication of Catholic schools in some localities is almost as astonishing as the growth of the Church itself in the United States. Some of the finest school buildings in New York to-day are Catholic; take St. Peter's, St. James's, St. Ann's,

Our Catholic Irish and our Catholic Germans have been emulating the example of their Belgian brethren. Our schools have been gradually growing in importance, and ridding themselves of defects that were inseparable from their beginnings in poverty and debt. The old parish schoolmaster, the aroma of whose short pipe often filled the class-room; a man not very learned, indeed, but untiring in his labors, overtaxed with the care of a large school of unruly boys, whom, though he rudely punished, he dearly loved, and into whose minds he instilled those principles of faith and manliness which he had inherited from his persecuted forefathers, has been gradually disappearing. The basement of the Church, once the school hall of the parish in which the good priest gave his instructions faithfully, adding the daily sanction of priestly authority to the teaching of the master, has been supplanted by the large separate building with airy rooms and fine playgrounds. And yet we remember those rude days of the rattan and the strap, and the old-fashioned teacher, and the old-fashioned school, and the old-fashioned priest, with love and almost with regret. They sent out a race of manly Catholics, of strong faith and strong arms, and it is to be hoped that the new schools, while improved in all their surroundings, appliances, and comforts, will not fall short of the old ones in the zeal and courage of their graduates. The gradual improvement of our parish schools is only a question of time; with the diminution of the Church debt the means for paying Catholic teachers better, for lessening their labors, and putting them on a material equality with the public schools, will increase. In some of the large cities some of our schools have already outstripped the public ones in the character of the buildings and in the capacity of the teachers. This is certainly true of New York; and when this will have become universally so, the objection of some Catholics to the Church schools will be entirely removed. The Catholic teachers who now form so influential a part of the corps of public educators, will then have opportunity for the exercise of their talents in a more congenial atmosphere, and with equal remuneration for their services. Then will the secular be on a par with the religious training of the young in all our parochial schools.

Yet here it is well to call attention to a common error, which consists in depreciating the parish schools for not imitating a seeming excellence, but what is, in reality, a radical vice, in public school

St. Michael's, St. Jerome's, and the Cathedral Schools, for example. This is true of the neighboring cities, also. The old directories compared with the new ones tell the tale of this wonderful growth and improvement. Thirty years ago there was in Jersey City but one Catholic school, in the rickety basement of old St. Peter's Church. Now the finest school building in the city is a Catholic one; and separate school buildings rise near its half dozen principal churches.

training. We mean the system of cramming. We should be sorry ever to see that "improvement" introduced into Catholic schools. It treats the child's head as the geese are treated in Strasburg, and turns his brain into a *pâté de foie gras*.

We do not mean "cramming" in the sense in which it is used in colleges, where lazy students who had neglected their studies during the year endeavor to make up for lost time by stuffing their memory with a lot of undigested material which may carry them across the ass's bridge of a yearly examination, but which they forget or cast aside as useless luggage when they have passed it. This kind of stuffing is unfortunately more frequent in the parochial than in the public schools. A system of learning rules by rote, either in arithmetic or in grammar, is pernicious in any school, and indicates incompetency in the teacher. The child's intelligence should be trained to understand what he commits to memory, otherwise he is like a parrot repeating meaningless expressions. But by "cramming" we mean the excessive multiplying of studies, so that the child's mind is distracted by too great a variety of matter, and has no leisure for concentration, or for proficiency in any one branch of learning.

The multiplication of studies, some of them merely ornamental, and others entirely unsuited to the tender minds of children, is one of the radical vices of the public-school system. For instance, the study of botany, mineralogy, and of other natural sciences, is useful only when it does not crowd out more important subjects. It becomes injurious when it is taught to the detriment of more elementary matters, and when it takes up the time which could be used to better advantage by children who are chiefly the children of the poor, destined for business or for trades in which a knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic is the essential requirement. To puzzle and confuse their minds is not properly to educate them; and especially to teach them physiology is unnecessary; and when it is exemplified with large pictures of the anatomical subject, is even positively demoralizing. The physical health of the child is influenced by its intellectual training; and it is undeniable that too much study, and especially too much of a certain sort, not only injures the mind but the body. The public-school system, by the overcrowding of studies, is turning out a race of smatterers who can talk superficially about many things without knowing even the elementary branches of common education well. They are giving us a race of precocious youths who know, in their teens, more "physiology" than their parents did in the fullness of their manhood.

Nor do we find fault with the parochial schools for giving more holidays than the public schools. Just as it is a mistake to over-

burden the child's mind with a multiplicity of studies, so is it to overtax it with long periods of uninterrupted study. The physical health of the child is a proper object of the teacher's care; and when mind and body are both tender, play, recreation, and the Church holiday are as necessary as the text-book. Parents, therefore, who complain of the number of holidays in the Catholic system have not reflected enough on their necessity for the repose of the child's soul and body. Why overstrain young children's minds or bodies? Nor can it be said that, on the score of purely elementary education, the parochial system is inferior to its well-paid and State-protected rival. Whatever may be said of the higher branches, children learn to spell, read, and write as well in the Catholic as in the public schools.

But, having said this much regarding the superiority of parochial to public schools, on the score of religion, of care of the health of the children, and of purely elementary training, we must stop to consider some points in which many of the parochial schools manifestly need improvement.

Their greatest defect is that in many of them there is no system. Parishes make separate systems unto themselves. Our schools lack uniformity in discipline, in text-books, in the efficiency of teachers, and in the grading of studies. In these particular matters the parish schools have much to learn from the State institution; and yet the lesson is so easily acquired, and so readily put into application, that we fail to see a reason for further delaying it.

It is true that the one thousand Christian Brothers, engaged in teaching in the United States, are doing their best to improve the parochial schools. These teachers, for the most part, pass through the Brothers' "Training School," in which youths, under sixteen years of age, are taught the branches that go to make fair English scholars; and if, after spending two or more years in this school, they are found fit, they enter the Novitiate proper, in which, besides studying the religious life, they are instructed in the method of teaching. After the Novitiate, they enter the "Normal School," where they remain two years, if possible. Thus far, however, it has been difficult to permit the Brothers to receive this thorough training, owing to the urgent demand for them all over the country.

It is a noteworthy fact that the boasted system of grading in use in the public schools is based on that of the Brothers, as Henry Kiddle, in his work on *Pedagogy*, plainly indicates.

The two thousand female teachers, known as "Sisters of Charity," are also daily improving the character of the female parish schools. These ladies are carefully trained during their Novitiate in secular learning. They have a training-school at Mt. St. Vin-

cent, on the Hudson, one of the largest and finest educational establishments in the world.

Wherever the Sisters have full control of the school, and are able to afford a complete corps of teachers, as in the free school near Mt. St. Vincent, for instance, a system of grading is carried out, almost identical with that of the public schools. It is a fact worth recording, that when the two parochial schools in Poughkeepsie passed under the Public School Board, no change was required by the School Trustees in the teaching staff of the Sisters, who were, nevertheless, no way superior to those employed in other schools of the diocese. In 1878, when Hon. Matthew H. Ellis, President of the Board of Education of Yonkers, accompanied by the members of the School Board of Poughkeepsie, visited the schools there, he reported that "the Sisters' schools were the best in Poughkeepsie." Yet the Sisters there were no brighter nor better trained than the average elsewhere. In 1877, Henry Kiddle, Superintendent of Schools in New York City, said that it would be suicidal to give Catholics their share of the school fund, "for they have matured teachers, whereas the public schools had only half-fledged birds, who looked on teaching as only a stepping-stone to something else; for, by the time they knew how to subdue themselves and keep order, they got married, and left the ranks."

When we consider that in every community of Sisters or Brothers continual training is going on, and that the evening, after school hours, is spent in prayer and study as preparations for the following day's work, and contrast this system with the usual employments of the male and female public-school teachers, after their day's work is done,—many of the young ladies preparing for the dissipation of the ball or the party, and the gentlemen for a night at billiards in the saloon or cards in the private residence of a neighbor,—it is not astonishing that so many of the parochial should surpass the public schools in discipline and progress. If it were not for the poverty which oppresses the parochial system, the State-paid institution would be completely distanced here, as it has been in Belgium, by its religious competitor.

The Belgian system of grading is well worth imitating by our Catholic educators. In each primary school in Belgium there are from three to five classes, ranged according to the capacity and progress of the pupils. They learn to read and write Flemish or French, according to the language of their locality. They learn the elements of arithmetic, history, and geography, besides the fundamental truths of the Catholic Religion. If, after passing through the higher class, they wish to continue their studies, they can go to the Episcopal academies and colleges, where they will be fitted

for professional careers, or for the higher studies of the universities. The teachers of these inferior schools, both men and women, have been trained in normal schools, and their methods are those most approved by modern progress. The masters have the confidence of the parents and the religious sympathy of their pupils, and they have no trouble in forming the whole man, mind and heart, soul as well as body. No longer trammelled by state supervision and restriction, Catholic instruction in Belgium will undoubtedly produce a new generation of Catholics, much better grounded in their religion and more devoted to the Church than those trained under the semi-Catholic official system of education which held sway from 1842 to 1879.

If our parochial schools were wealthy corporations, able to pay teachers; if the Sisters and the Brothers and the lay-teachers had adequate means of effecting it, no doubt all our schools, in the matter of grading as well as in the equipment of the teachers, would be up to the highest standard. Now, could not a general system for their government be even now organized and extended wherever it is feasible?

Of course the discipline of the parish school in the last analysis must depend on the pastor. He is supervisor and school inspector; and no matter what rules may be made for the general government of the schools, their enforcement will depend finally on him. But is there any pastor who does not desire to see a set of rules laid down by some central authority which will be his guide? And is it not a fact that no such set of rules exists? Where is our "Catholic School Manual," serving as guide to the teachers in their treatment of the children, as the "Public School Manuals" regulate the discipline in them? Is it not urgent to supply this deficiency?

Although even in the well-regulated public-school system there is no absolute uniformity of text-books, yet there is always a great similarity among them. Absolute uniformity in this respect may not be attainable, at least for the present, in our Catholic schools, but a little reflection will show the advantages of it. Take, for instance, the catechism. We know that it is important for children to learn its definitions, which, remaining well-grounded in the memory, will serve in after life as sign-posts when developing reason begins to reflect on the meaning of words. "Keep the form of sound words." But if the child learns one definition in one class and a different one—although the difference may be only nominal—in another, will not this beget confusion? In a country like ours, where the people float about from parish to parish, and from diocese to diocese, what are the children to do if every new parish or new diocese into which they may emigrate has a new

catechism worded differently from the one they had been studying in their former home? Will not this lack of uniformity disturb the child; and this collision of definitions, although only verbally different, break up the certainty of its knowledge and destroy the fruit of its application? And that which is true as a consequence of lack of uniformity in the matter of catechisms, is also true, though in a less important sense, in regard to secular text-books. May we suggest, then, that an authorized *national* catechism might be a legitimate theme for consideration by the competent church authorities? And while the bishops in council, or each prelate in his own diocese was considering the question of uniformity in the catechism, they would be likely to consider also the question of uniformity of text-books and discipline, and to insist on improvement in these important matters. Will any one who has looked at this subject carefully deny that improvement is very desirable in these respects? The slovenly form of the text-book, with its daubs of cheap illustrations—the catchpenny of the publisher who has grown rich on the sale of his ill-composed, badly selected, and cheaply printed publications—often brings discredit on the parochial school. We have certainly some good text-books, and there is so much elegant Catholic literature from which to select in the composition of school readers, that it is a shame to see the rubbish which we find enterprising publishers sometimes palming off on our school children as models of style and of system.

To establish a system of training schools for teachers, to enforce uniformity as to their competency and efficiency, is a more delicate and a more difficult matter. We know that the public schools boast—and legitimately do so—of their corps of skilled teachers who have had to get diplomas before presuming to undertake the important duty of training the young. We know that it is charged that many of our parochial school teachers are not properly equipped for their work. Whether this charge be true or not, it deserves attention. Considering, however, that most of those who are engaged in the holy work of Christian education are men and women bound by vows of obedience, it ought not to be difficult for ecclesiastical authority to enforce reformation, if any be needed in this matter, or to help the teaching communities to carry out their rule. The honor and the success of Catholic schools require that their teachers should be second to none in ability or in training for their work. The “hedge” schoolmaster is no longer necessary; certainly not in this free Republic.

But it is in the lack of system in grading the classes that some of our parochial schools need the greatest reformation. We have to deal chiefly with the children of the poor. For them time is peculiarly precious, and school labor should be specially spared.

The child is in a hurry to leave school and go to work. The average child's intelligence is dull. It learns slowly and forgets easily. Anything, therefore, that steals its time or increases its labor without necessity should be eliminated. Now, this defect of system in grading is a great thief of time and a despotic task-master. For instance, the matter studied in the first class in one parochial school is that which forms the grade of the third class in another. In the second class in one school higher arithmetic is taught; while in another it is reserved for the first class. There is neither uniformity of matter nor of quantity; and so, when the child goes from one parish to another, expecting to continue his studies where he left off, he finds a complete change in the new school, and he must either go down and lose his time or go up and overtax his brain. This defect is not in the public schools. When a child passes from one to another of them, he has only to tell the teacher where he left off in the old school to be properly placed with congenial studies, to be followed in logical order, in the new one. Thus time and labor are saved in the public schools because of this universal system of grading. The lack of it in many of our parish schools is a crying want, and yet it is the one most easily supplied.

How? We do not wish to enter into the question of details. That is matter for the proper authorities. We only suggest; and Church authority, which is always intelligent, is ever ready to listen to a suggestion prompted by a good motive and put in a respectful manner. Perhaps it would be asking too much to insist on a national *systematization* of our parish schools. This could be most effectually done by the consent of all our prelates in council assembled. But a diocesan *systematization* is easily accomplished. A diocesan school-board appointed by the bishop, as in Belgium, consisting of skilled Catholic lay teachers, as well as of priests, having authority to impose a uniform system of discipline and grading, with the duty of frequent inspection and reporting to the bishop, would at once solve the problem. This might not interfere at all with the respective systems of the teaching orders. Since the object of such a board would be to elevate the tone of our parish schools, and make them in every respect superior to their rivals, so that all excuse of Catholics for not patronizing their own institutions might be taken away, its work would be unimpeded by any obstruction that could not easily be removed, and its mission would be a fruitful one, as it has been in other countries, in the cause of Catholic education. The teaching orders would become its strongest advocates. It would help them to found normal schools and carry out to the letter their written rules.

Much has recently been said and written about the establishment of a Catholic University. It is, undoubtedly, a desideratum, and would have, as a consequence, the improvement of the higher education of Catholics, a lifting up of the standard of Catholic colleges, and would tend to give Catholics what a distinguished foreign ecclesiastic among us has told us that we needed—"social standing." But while agitating for this noble object, let us not forget to begin at the bottom. We want the poor to remain faithful to our Church. We have neither kings nor aristocrats here for whose influence we need particularly care. But we must be true to God's poor, who are the bone and sinew of our Holy Church. Their schools should be our first care; their elevation, our first love. Let us, then, begin by cleaning out the basement before embellishing the edifice with a French roof, and let us concentrate our forces in the endeavor to improve the tone and character of our parochial schools by a uniform system of grading, by promoting the efficiency of our teachers, and by purging the style of our text-books.

THE WANING INFLUENCE OF THE ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES.

THE English universities no longer take the lead in religious thought. The reason is twofold. First, the constitution of the universities—that is, of Oxford and Cambridge—has been radically changed during the last thirty years; and next, religious thought has reached its ultimate development, so that no more "schools," no more "movements," are even possible. So long as the Anglican religion was in a state of transition, expanding towards Catholicity or towards skepticism, the country turned its eyes towards the two old universities to see how such expansion was received by them. When Ritualism brought development to a dead-stand in the one extreme, and agnosticism brought it to a dead-stand in the other extreme, the universities were in precisely the same plight as was the country, and therefore the universities ceased to lead.

More than this, since the universities have un-churched their constitutions, by the abolition of religious tests and of clerical monopolies, they can no longer be the nurseries for either High

Churchism or Low Churchism, as they had been from the time of the Reformation. Obviously the first requisite of a Church of England university would be that the governing tutors should be Anglican; they should not only be Anglican, they should be clerical (since the universities are nurseries for clergymen); but now that laymen may be governing tutors, and Dissenters may be governing tutors, and even agnostics, so called, may be governing tutors, the atmosphere of the universities is no more primarily Anglican than it is primarily Nonconformist or agnostic. Hence it is needless to try to prove that the old English universities no longer take the lead in religious thought, because, by the very changes in their constitution, it has become simply impossible that they should do so.

A short time ago two elections were made at Oxford which sharply emphasized the spirit of the times. Professor Jowett became Vice-Chancellor of the University, and Mr. Monro became Provost of Oriel. Both these elections "told their tale." In regard to Mr. Monro, perhaps the utmost significance that could be attached to the fact of his election was that other Fellows of more pronounced Anglican orthodoxy were set aside as not being "men of their times." But in regard to Professor Jowett, it is not a little remarkable that a man who, a few years ago, was prohibited from preaching in what is known as the university pulpit, was elected to the supreme leadership of the university; that the chief contributor to the famous *Essays and Reviews* was absolved and was throned as the Vice-Chancellor. To persons "down in the country," as the Oxford undergraduates used at one time to call the world outside Oxford, it may not now seem to be of much public importance who may be elected to this chair or to that. Forty years ago such elections made a stir. The reason of the present coldness of the national interest is so obvious that it needs scarcely to be stated. The difference between the Oxford of to-day and the Oxford of some thirty or forty years ago, is that the Oxford of to-day may *represent* English ideas, but the Oxford of forty years ago helped to *form* them. Indeed, the constitutional changes which have come over Oxford, in all governing and academical senses, are not greater than the changes which have made Oxford little more than one of the first "finishing schools" for young Englishmen. The chief nursery of religious thought, which Oxford was at one time, is now a magnificent public school for young men. With but slight distinction, the same must be said of Cambridge. Whereas, forty years ago it was customary with all Anglicans, when any new religious movement was gaining favor, to ask: "How is it received at the universities?" no one in these days would think of asking such a question, because the universities no

longer lead. Oxford and Cambridge being simply representative, in the same sense as is a German university, may catch the spirit which is sent up to them from the country, but do not in any sense shape it or modify it.

Such being the fact, we must naturally ask the question: Is such change a national loss or a national gain? Unquestionably it is a grave national loss. It proves, to begin with, that the old Anglican intensity, which used to crave for a sort of focusing of religious movement, has given place to the conviction that, Anglican developments being "used up," there can be no interest because there can be no development. "Movement" is inconsistent with finality. Ritualism and agnosticism are the two ends. And since, between them, every conceivable compromise, equally in theory and in experiment, has been exhausted by innumerable parties, there is nothing more to be looked for, no further possibility, which the most ingenious of theorists could devise. Was not this fact the reason why the once Anglican universities threw open their gates wide to non-Anglicans? Was it not that, in despair of being teachers, they acquiesced in doing away with (orthodox) teaching? Half consciously, both the universities and the country, so soon as development became impossible and a sort of cold-blooded agnosticism had taken its place, decided to put an end to the nurseries of religious thought by de-Anglicanizing both the universities.

In a university, above all places in the world, if there be religious movement at all, it must necessarily be associated with great names. More than this, the individuality of the "movers" must impress itself on the minds of the undergraduates. But when the atmosphere which was essentially clerical, which made all rivalries in movement to be clerical, became Germanized, rationalized, or primarily secular, there could not well be that honor felt for great men, who were great even among a crowd of clerical magnates. So that personal homage for the leaders of clerical thought became difficult when clerical thought was not in rivalry. Movements, like movers, lost their charm. It is not too much to say that almost all the religious movements which have perplexed Oxford and perplexed the country in the last fifty years (like the great names which were associated with them) have died out of Oxford, even if they have not died out of the country, and are now but memories of the elderly and the few. Where is the "school" of Bishop Wilberforce, the suave patron of High Churchism, or of his brother, the archdeacon, who used to preach to the undergraduates about the intolerable inconsistencies of Anglicanism? Their names scarcely remain, still less their schools. The names of Whately, of Froude, of Thomas Arnold still linger about the mem-

ories of Oriel College, where also the two Wilberforces, Cardinal Newman, and John Keble passed most of their academical careers. But it is the names chiefly that linger. The schools which they founded or represented have become clouded with new conceits of agnosticism. It is true that John Keble, the gifted author of the *Christian Year*, the one man who supplied the elements of poetry and doctrinal tenderness which were wanting to the dry teaching of the Tractarians, has been immortalized by a college built to his memory; yet the spirit of John Keble is not the spirit of modern Oxford any more than is the spirit of Cardinal Newman. The same must be said of Dr. Pusey. The old-fashioned Puseyism is probably quite as dead at Oxford as is the old-fashioned Simeonism at Cambridge. Dr. Pusey outlived his own influence. But that his name was first given to the new Tractarianism, it is probable that his individuality, great at one time as it was, could never have succeeded in coalescing the incongruous elements which were generated by what was known as *the* Oxford movement. Indeed we may say more: If John Henry Newman had not infused his individuality into all the interests and all the sentiments of Tractarianism, it is probable that *the* Oxford movement would have been almost limited to Oxford; it would not have taken hold upon the nation. The reason why, as Mr. Disraeli once expressed it, "the secession of Dr. Newman dealt a blow to the Establishment from which it still reels," was the same reason which made the Fellow of Oriel, the vicar of the village of Littlemore, the venerated preacher at St. Mary's, to be regarded as the father of modern Oxford, the friend and trusted guide of undergraduates. Individuality, *with* personal intercourse, were the essentials, and without them could be no mover, no movement. But the mover, the guide, being gone into another sphere, there is now no one to rally undergraduates. And the consequence of such a loneliness (to undergraduates) is that a reaction, which was perfectly natural or unavoidable, has come over the spirit of their yearnings. As the *London Standard* recently observed, when speaking of the vexed question whether Catholics might send their sons to the university: "The agnostic influences of Oxford were too penetrating" (thirty years ago) "to justify the faithful in sending their sons into so pernicious an atmosphere." Those influences are more penetrating now than they were then. Disheartening as was the evidence of the Oxford Commission upon the subject of the infidel tendencies of modern Oxford, it is certain that there are more easy thinkers (we will not use the offensive word freethinkers) in each of the Oxford colleges of the present day than there were in all the colleges put together twenty years ago.

Now, there can be no question that the Church of England suffers

corporately from the absence of *any* influential body which can guide it. True, the word "guide" is too strong a word to use critically when speaking of the past influence of the universities; but if for "guide" we say "move," or "profoundly interest," we express the same idea with more accuracy. The Church of England being, as Lord Macaulay expressed it, "a hundred sects battling within one church," naturally looks to learning—since it cannot look to authority—for its apology for the favored theories of the hour. It not only looks to learning, it looks to earnestness; it looks to any body of men who ought to be earnest; it looks to this teacher or to that teacher for the more well-weighed exposition of such ideas as are supposed to be Anglican. Above all, it *used* to look to the universities; because the professors and resident-fellows were assumed to devote their lives to what was called the study of "Divinity," being free from parochial cares, with no congregations to worry them, and with the intention of being "dons" all their lives. But now that the professors and the fellows may be laymen, and may be of almost any kind of religion that they prefer; and now that the undergraduates are equally unattached, and are not even conscious of the existence of the Thirty-nine Articles; the whole of the old spirit of an Anglican university has given place to a Germanized ideal. Hence, the Church of England neither looks to the universities for the calm, digested learning which they used to foster; nor does it look on the undergraduates as the future pastors and preachers who are being deeply imbued with the learned spirit of theologians.

Obviously, a university must have three kinds of influence besides that of its academical prestige; namely, the social, the political, the theological. This is specially true in regard to a university where the best class of future clergy are being prepared. Socially, the position of the Anglican clergy is really of incomparable importance. It is the more so in these days than in past times, because most gentlemen are as well educated as are the clergy. At one time the mere fact that a man could read had raised a presumption that he was in orders. This was the case in the reign of Henry VIII. But toward the end of the seventeenth century the rural clergy, though not the town clergy, had sunk equally in learning and in social caste. Even in Queen Elizabeth's time so low was their social caste that Her Majesty issued an order that no clergyman should espouse a servant-girl without the consent of the master or the mistress. The lady's waiting-woman was thought too good for the parson. In the comedies of the seventeenth century we always find that the country parson thinks himself well mated with the cook. Even in the time of George II.

Dean Swift has assured us that a lady's maid who married a chaplain "aroused suspicion that her character had been blown upon, and that she had no longer hopes of catching the steward." Yet this proves nothing against the character of the clergy. It was the poverty of the rural clergy which kept them servile, just as it was their want of social position which destroyed their influence. In the great towns, and especially in the capital, the clergy were "gentlemen" and university men; but in the country they were, for the most part, humble persons, who had little learning and little conventional good breeding. In the time of George III. a far higher respectability came to be attached to the position of the rural clergy; and in the time of William IV., and in the early part of the present reign, "to be a clergyman was the mark of being a gentleman." It was only when, some thirty or forty years ago, "literates" were warmly welcomed by the Anglican bishops, who ceased to require degrees from their candidates, that the social caste of the Anglican clergy began to descend rapidly; so much so as to affect their relations to "good society." Most Anglicans like a clergyman to be a university man, and if he be not so, they run away with the idea that he has got into holy orders by some back-door.

Politically, the influence of the universities has been little felt since the time of James II., because the principles of the monarchy and of the Church establishment have never been brought into grave conflict. In the early part of the reign of James the Second Oxford was the stronghold of loyalty; and it was just at that period that both Oxford and Cambridge reached the summit of their power and reputation. No neighboring country could boast of such seats of learning; to which all that was intellectual in England looked up with respect and even pride. The schools of Leyden and Utrecht, of Padua and Bologna, of Leipsic and Louvain, could not be compared with those two grand institutions, at which the most eminent of the clergy, the lawyers, the orators, the physicians, the men of literature, the poets, were educated as much in sentiment as in scholarship. The undergraduates, as a body, might not be superior to the undergraduates of our own day or of the last two hundred years; but in the fact that Oxford and Cambridge were the only two provincial towns in which there could be found large numbers of cultured men; and also in the fact that during all the recent struggles between the Royalist and the Puritan factions both universities had been intensely loyal, there was a dignity, both scholarly and political, which the whole country gladly recognized and applauded. Now just as Oxford and Cambridge had sided with the Sovereign against the Puritans, against the Whig factions, against Monmouth; so did they side

with the Church of England against the Sovereign and against his religion, when he tried to force them to become Catholic against their will. Nor can any Catholic blame them for so doing. James the Second had no more right to force Catholicity on the universities than William of Orange would have had to force them to accept Calvinism. And when James the Second put Catholic deans into Anglican colleges, turned out Anglican clergymen to make room for Catholic priests, and converted Christ Church and University College into Catholic seminaries, he abused his royal prerogative as much as would Queen Victoria if she were to force Anglicanism upon Beaumont College or upon Stonyhurst. When, in the year 1687, the fellows of Magdalen College refused to elect a Catholic for their president, and were cited before the High Commission for such disloyalty, a storm was raised in England which would have taught any monarch but King James the utter folly and fatuity of such tyranny. Oxford and Cambridge were as proudly hostile to the High Commission as they were to the king's abuse of his royal prerogative; and it is not too much to say that to the example of the universities was due a good deal of that courageous resistance which drove James the Second from his throne.

But from that time to this no great political conflict between the royal and the ecclesiastical provinces has engaged the attention of the universities. The fatal example of King James has taught prudence to his successors, who, however, have had no will to pick quarrels. It is in the domain of theology, or what passes for that science, that both the universities have been dominant. And, as was said at the beginning, the constitution of the universities, as well as the whole temper of the English mind, has become so changed during the last thirty or forty years that there is no longer either the same capacity in the universities to teach or the same motive for wishing to listen in the country. We must put a number of causes together if we would apprehend the whole reason why the country does not "look up to" the universities. Socially, they have lost something of their former caste, from the fact that they have been compelled to enlarge their boundaries so as to admit a larger number of poor students, and from the fact that fewer students of distinction seek to accept holy orders as a profession. Politically, the growth of Liberalism affects their influence; and politically, also, the general tendency of the times is in the direction of independence of all societies. Theologically, no one cares a pin for the example of the universities, as to High Churchism, or Low Churchism, or Broad Churchism; because the constitution of the universities is no longer essentially Anglican, if, indeed, it be any longer essentially Christian; and also, be-

cause the country is in full possession of all controversies, which are condensed for it in magazines and even in newspapers. The very spirit of the times being "*not* to be taught," by any society, localized church, or reverend champion, the country is as indifferent to the "views" of Oxford and Cambridge as are the undergraduates to the views of their dons.

Fifty years ago there were two distinct bodies in the two great English universities, the dons, who were a class by themselves, and the undergraduates, who were taught by the dons. There is now no distinct "body" of dons, in the didactic or view-teaching sense; the undergraduates, perhaps, admiring this don or that don, but not ascribing to the class-don a collective weight. It needs to be insisted on, when discussing this question,—why have the universities lost influence?—that the chief reason of their former influence in religious matters was that *all* the dons formed a council of religious thinkers. One school derived force from another school, in the fact that *all* opposing schools had splendid foemen. At the time of the Oxford movement the earnest intellects and earnest characters which resisted the new tendencies towards Catholicity derived proportionate importance from their resistance to leaders who were recognized as the very cream of the university. Froude, or Thomas Arnold, together with other gifted "schoolmen," who used to talk about the Oxford "malignants," attracted more attention, and possibly more respect, from the fact that they were in strife with the great Tractarians. To be in conflict with Newman or with Keble, or to disesteem the courteous compromises of Bishop Wilberforce, was to attract disciples who valued their guides all the more in the proportion of the grandeur of their opponents. But, in these days, there being no Oxford council of all professors, all clerics, all fellows—every don doing that which is right in his own eyes—there is little rivalry, little religious competition, little interest in the isolated disputations. This fact creates regret that the constitution of the universities has ceased to be, primarily, clerico-Anglican. We all know that the vigorous wills of young men demand a recognized superiority in their teachers. When those teachers say, "Pray, do not swear to the Thirty-nine Articles; attach yourselves to any religion or to no religion; *we*, as you see, sit so lightly to all such subjects that we do not require *you* to be churchmen; the university atmosphere is not dogmatic, it is not even didactic in a doctrinal sense; it is latitudinarian, which means that the two extremes are equally comprehended within orthodoxy; therefore, as a body we dons do not teach you, we do not profess even to hold council for your benefit; we only tutor you in this subject or in that subject, and make our final schools more Rationalist than Christian; therefore, we pray you to regard relig-

ion as you regard philosophy or antiquity—in such aspects as we place them before you—rather in an amiable spirit of criticism than with profound obeisance to the truths of Revelation.”

Was it not better to pretend to have unity than to affirm that no unity is requisite? A unity of altitude, of profession, of even tone, used to symbolize the teaching of *a* belief. It was at least a decorous apology for the absence of real authority, with a sort of confession that such authority must be longed for. The answer that “universities are meant for everybody” does not meet the particular loss of which we speak. “To mould into shape and symmetry the intellectual and moral faculties of men” does not appear to be possible in a university where the teachers are all cast in different “moulds.” At least, there can be no unity of design. A Christian Athens, perhaps, Oxford never was; yet it is obvious that it aimed at becoming one in the days, say, of Chichele or Wykeham. What it was between Elizabeth and Victoria was the paralysis of its earlier time. Still, as long as there was the pretension of aggregate authority, there was the dogmatic teaching of the necessity of authority. The sentiment, if not the fact, of authority was kept before the eyes of the students. Without that sentiment where could have been the groundwork of the Oxford movement? (Such a movement would be now almost impossible.) What would have been the use of summoning St. Gregory, or St. Thomas, or Tertullian, or St. Prudentius, or St. Paulinus, as witnesses for the beauty of the Early Church, unless religious sentiment were keenly alive to the appreciation of all that was involved in the *idea*, authority? When, in one of the earlier Tracts for the Times, Tertullian was quoted as saying: “The early Christians in all their travels and movements, in all their comings in and goings out, in putting on their shoes, in the bath, at the table, in lighting the candles, in lying down, in sitting down, whatever occupation engaged them, were wont to mark their foreheads with the sign of the cross,” the reader, almost unconsciously, looked away from the *devotion* to the *authority*, of which he retained only the sentiment. That sentiment used to be supreme in the universities. That it is so no longer is the result of the new system which has eliminated orthodoxy out of religion.

In considering the whole question of university influence, we are met by this difficulty at starting; that it would be futile to compare the “ideal” of a non-Catholic university with the “ideal” of a Catholic university. Yet the “ideal” is the root of the whole matter. A Catholic would argue that since theology is *one* of the sciences, it cannot be excluded from a university; and further, that since theology is the *most* important of the sciences, its chair ought to take precedence of all other chairs. He would argue justly

that, all sciences being in some way connected, or having some degree of relative bearing, the omission of the most important of the sciences must mar the "ideal" of a university. He would argue that, as a matter of fact, theology *must* be privately controverted, even if it be not taught as a system; and that the teachers of other sciences, and therefore also their pupils, will make use of some of its principles for their own inferences. Even in Natural Religion it is impossible to completely separate personal opinions from personal knowledge of some of the sciences; while in Supernatural Religion the whole domain of divine truth must, in large measure, *tone* secular studies. No one would argue that a student of physical science need consult with a theologian as to his processes; that an astronomer, a chemist, or a linguist must, to begin with, know something of theology; but every Catholic is aware that, without the knowledge of the highest truth the knowledge of the lesser truths must be imperfect; not in regard to the particular compass of a particular truth, but in regard to its relative place among all truths. In a Catholic university every student has brought up with him certain "truths" about God's Nature and about Redemption; which truths govern his conduct through his conscience, and fix the attitude of his intellect towards all studies. He does not pursue particular studies with a view to getting hints as to the probable truth or probable fiction of "religious truths;" but he accepts, to begin with, certain broad Catholic verities which are his guide in the precise measurement of relative values. In a non-Catholic university every student is at liberty to think what he will about all verities; nor is it too much to say that there is not one "religious truth" which he may not subject to the scrutiny of his own opinions. Hence this attitude of his intellect towards the highest (or divine) truths is the same as towards the truths of natural sciences. There may be a touch of pious sentiment in the intellectual attitude; but the attitude is rationalistic towards *all* truths. And since the "ideal" of a university is the training of the intellect to measure the relative values of known truths, quite as much as to increase the knowledge of truths, or to sharpen the wits to apprehend them, it seems impossible that, in a non-Catholic university, the intellectual attitude should be balanced. The moral side of the intellect must be immoral. The conceits of theological disputation, the prejudiced misleadings of history, the perverted estimate of ecclesiastical facts, the habit of privately interpreting Scripture, the hazy views as to the authority of traditions, together with the total absence of recognized authority on the first principles of belief or of unbelief, and the total absence of those channels of spiritual fortitude which are at the service of every Catholic student, must demoralize the intellect in its capacity of

justly measuring the relative values of the assured and the speculative. Intellectually, the studies at a non-Catholic university must suffer in efficiency as well as grasp, because the impossibility of beginning with the science of divine truths puts the studies of all other truths into wrong places.

It will be said: "But this has always been the case at Oxford and Cambridge, since the time when they ceased to be Catholic; and therefore their waning influence at the present time is not accounted for on any such grounds." The objection has already been partly met. Let it be added that the system called Natural Theology is only of quite modern introduction; and that so long as Scriptural Religion was the professed orthodoxy of the universities, followed by what was called Primitive or Patristic Religion, and finally developing into Anglican Catholicism (counterpoised, however, by agnosticism), there was always sufficient ground for the claim of the universities to take the lead in national religious opinion. The country may have gained something by the spirit of candor, which now obliges the universities to give up "leading;" just as it has gained something by the plain speaking of *most* Englishmen who no longer make pretence of being orthodox. Religious affectation is wholly dead, equally in the country and in the universities. And this is unquestionably a far more healthy condition than that of secret skepticism with hypocrisy. It is even to be preferred to the state of Catholic universities, in the days of the Cæsar Frederick the Second, when the most subtle and fatal forms of unbelief were cherished in at least three great universities, those of Paris, Tuscany, and Lombardy; when the English King John, of evil memory, meditated the profession of Mahometanism; and when secret societies for the propagation of unbelief were organized in the most Catholic universities, bound by oath to send their missionaries among the people, in the disguise of tramping peddlers or travelling showmen. It is true that out of this great evil came great good; that the conspiracy of traitors inspired the faithful with an earnestness which begat the most splendid Catholic conquests. The great St. Thomas came out of that very university which Frederick the Second had established at Naples expressly to corrupt the faith of Italian students. The plague of secret apostasy was soon uprooted. And though from that time to this it has never infected Catholic universities, save in that mild form which is almost inherent in vast societies, it has shown itself sporadically in every age and in every country, and must necessarily do so till the end of the world.

Is, then, the loss of influence in both the old universities partly counterpoised by the frankness with which both institutions proclaim all that they do think and do not think? Hardly so, since a

university, in its "reason of being," is a sort of high protecting power of the *truth*, because it affects that office towards *knowledge*. The ideal of a university is to fix the boundaries of research, as much as to advance knowledge in each province; to act as a sort of umpire for other societies; to adjust the claims of all studies, historical or metaphysical, and therefore to include theology in its grasp. It is at least advocative, if not judicial, as to the selection of all subjects which are argued by what is supposed to be pure intellect. To cherish the fitting mood or disposition of the mind, in its contemplation of *all* the "subjects of education," is as much its purpose as to teach how to compose Latin verses, or to acquire logical accuracy in reasoning. So that when a university abandons even the pretension to lead the country in a learned estimate of the just claims of religious system, and even goes so far as to affirm: "We are not Anglican; we are anything which you like except orthodox," it seems to abandon the *ideal* (it had long ago abandoned the *fact*) of being a university in the full sense of the word. It is true that this abandonment was no fault of the universities; the revolution was forced on them from without, or rather, the outer world said, "Since you cannot teach theology, leave it alone, and attend to what you understand." We all know that, as a matter of fact, theology, in any real sense of the word, was never taught in the (Protestant) universities. A student who was ambitious of taking orders was required to attend a course of divinity lectures, at the end of his academical career, and to take notes (if he so pleased) of dry lists of dry books, recommended for his perusal by the professor. In the examination in arts, a knowledge of Bible history was all that was demanded of the candidate. Theology was left to private disputation. But though this was the case, there was the *fact* that the governing bodies were primarily clerical and Anglican. True, it was a subject for broad jesting, when the divinity lectures were even mentioned; just as it was usually esteemed troublesome to have to attend a college lecture—before breakfast, and in a somewhat chilly hall—upon the four Gospels, or rather upon their "harmony;" but the obligation of the recognition of religious teaching was in itself the dogmatic teaching of *some* authority. The present principle, if principle it can be called, is to pile up secular studies as a sort of bulwark against orthodoxy; to represent them as being so valuable in themselves that mere theology, mere religion, is accidental; to *use* history, or physics, or even politics,—to use chemistry, anatomy, economics,—to use the visible, the sensible, the immediate, so as to shut out the invisible and the future; or so as to imply that all theology being speculative, it can only be used as we use the affections or emotions. Undoubtedly it would be better to banish theology altogether than to teach what

is false to God and false to man ; but the present " principle " is not to ostracise theology, but to teach its insignificance through higher studies. In the middle ages, with the exception of metaphysics, there was no weapon in the armory of the unbeliever with which he could assail the Christian faith ; in these days physical science has made such huge strides that it can be made to dogmatize in a " religious " world of its own. Superb as are the discoveries of modern scientists, they dazzle all the more for their finiteness ; and because they cannot touch the confines of the unseen, they are assumed to prove the unseen to be doubtful. The Catholic Church profoundly honors all sciences, within the sphere of their legitimate provinces ; but non-Catholics want the sciences to usurp the place of theology, which has no more resemblance to them than have the stars to the electric light. Theology is a divine, not a human science ; it concerns the relations of a man's soul with his Creator ; and to try to extinguish the divine claims of spiritual knowledge by the counter-claims of all other sciences put together, is like trying to eclipse the sun by lighting candles in the daytime, or trying to prove that the existence of brain-waves shows that thought must be material as is the body ; or trying to prove that any fact in the spiritual order must be negated by the material action in the material order. It is the most irrational usurpation that was ever known—this seizing on a divine province by human provinces ; for it is a wilful, proclaimed usurpation. Let the scientists keep to their own sciences, in which they may be honored for their successes ; but just as Galileo would insist on interpreting Scripture, instead of keeping within the limits of his own province, so modern scientists insist on dogmatizing where the church has not dogmatized, or on trying to disprove spiritual dogmas by physical science. Their example has infected almost all classes, who argue in the loosest possible way. Because mesmerism may reveal secrets, it is assumed that the Gospel mysteries may be explained by some (not yet developed) method. Because Darwin strains some odd physical analogies, it is assumed that man's origin must be doubtful. Because geography does not always tally with the Mosaic record, or because geology presents some difficulties as to the world's age, it is assumed that the revelations from Mount Sinai, or the story of the six periods of creation, were rather poetical than matter-of-fact statements. And so mere speculation usurps the place of authority, *equally* in regard to the revealed and the unrevealed. This temper is now the temper of the universities. And since the country has at its command the same sources of information which are open to any society, or to any academy, the universities acquiesce in the claim of the country to usurp the chair (or rather, the arm-chair) of theology.

The country does so. The country is of opinion that its knowledge of sacred history, as much as its knowledge of secular history, is on a par with the knowledge of the universities. Yet the country—that is, the crowds who compose it—knows as little of the origin of the Scripture canon, of what the Holy See has done for learning and science, or of the origin or true courses of various schisms, as it knows of canon law, of the distinctive objects of religious orders, or of the correlative prerogatives of Popes and kings. The country has only a hazy idea that there *is* a difference between religious science and natural science; but it no more troubles itself to define the difference than it would trouble itself to tell why Aristotle was a master of what is called human philosophy, while Plato got into trouble by mixing up human philosophy with the supernatural relations of man to God. The universities having recognized that such confusedness is unavoidable,—or, at least, that it is not *their* province to clear it up,—the country sits down calmly in the arm-chair of its new theology, and ceases to look to “academies” for enlightenment.

That, as a matter of fact, this new school of Natural Religionists has failed to come to even one definite conclusion,—has been forced to proclaim that religion is *not* a science, and that, therefore skepticism is the only true philosophy; and still further, has confessed, spite of its strong wishes to the contrary, that if there be any “religious system” it must be that of the “old theology,”—of the Catholic Roman Church of the Holy See, are stern truths, which, in the arm-chair of its own professorship, the country can contemplate without dismay. The universities cannot chide the country for “taking it easy.” The universities know the rationale of the position. The universities know that what is called natural theology is in the same case now as it was centuries ago. It is in the same case as when Socrates confuted Aristodemus, or as when (but the other day) Bacon constructed an argument from design. The discoveries of modern science have not thrown one single ray of light on the kingdom of the supernatural or on the future life. The Bible is now precisely where it was; private judgment has no new methods for its interpretation. But, indeed, the old theory of private interpretation has been laughed to scorn by every logician, every man of sense. The modern world finds itself face to face with this certainty. That there must either be an infallible interpreter of Bible doctrines, or those doctrines must remain doctrines which are *not* of faith. Nothing can be of faith that cannot be stated—cannot be “defined” as to the limits of its obligations; for no man can be bound to believe in the Holy Trinity unless it can be stated, “There are Three Persons in one God,” nor can any man be bound to believe in Baptism, unless it can be stated, “In

Baptism is Regeneration." But the very school that sets up a claim to *teach* Natural Religion has proved that it cannot "state" one positive doctrine; that it must flounder about in this or that speculation, but cannot dogmatize on one point of its own creed. It has no creed. Yet it affects to oust Theology from its "philosophy," on the very ground that it *has* a creed, and can *state* it. This seems a usurpation which is feeble. It has more the look of wrong temper than of earnestness. It most certainly has no philosophy but that of egotism. If a man say, "I know this subject better than you do," we must ask him, "Well, what do you know about it?" If he reply, "Nothing at all," we are not impressed by his credentials to usurp the chair of eighteen centuries of theologians. Yet this is exactly the spirit of modern thought. That spirit having forced itself on the universities, the universities are now auxiliary to paganism.

We might go on to notice one more mood of this modern spirit, which, while it is really the very root of English "popular" skepticism, is also common to almost all English "scientists." The mood may be perhaps formulated in this way: That, "as there are certain things which *cannot* be understood, *cannot* be reconciled in theology, therefore it is better to take only the *certain* things in theology (such things as natural principles can justify), and leave the rest as disputation-ground for all thinkers, be they so-called theologians or men of science." At the universities this mood is perhaps dominant; and *therefore* the country, knowing that the universities agree with it, cares nothing for the "leading" of the universities. Briefly, it might be replied, both to the country and to the universities, that, as in the natural sciences there are things certain, things contradictory, yet the natural sciences are not abandoned on that ground, so in theology, which is the most mystery-full of all sciences, this abandonment is without reason, without apology. In the mathematical science there are apparent contrarieties, which no mathematician will ever reconcile; even in regard to time and space there exist insolvable difficulties, which the human reason cannot so much as try to fathom; nor is there any science in which some inconsistencies do not puzzle the theorist as well as the most astute, practical investigator; why, then, should Revelation and Nature be divorced as to their "scientific" harmony, simply because hitches, obscurities, antagonisms, meet the sense of both theologians and naturalists? Why cannot historians, geologists, physiologists, pursue their investigations in their own lines, content with their own confessed difficulties and inconsistencies, instead of arguing that, because theology has its difficulties, therefore it must be abandoned as a true science? The universities *do* take the lead in telling the country that because astronomy, chro-

nology, geology, present some difficulties to the acceptor of Catholic dogma, therefore Catholic dogma is not "scientific;" they *do* take the lead in telling the country that if a Catholic dogma cannot be proved, or cannot be shown *not* to be contradictory, it must be relegated to the sphere of the speculative; they *do* take the lead in muddling historical facts,—such, for example, as the real attitude of the Holy See in regard to the first teaching of the Copernican system; but they do *not* take the lead—which, as universities, they should do—in telling the country how it ought to reason on pure methods of reasoning, how it ought to distinguish between principles and incidents, and to distinguish between the science which is revealed by God and the sciences which are gradually built up by men. If the universities have any duty at all towards the country, it must be to try to teach it to reason purely. They should say to the country: "Either give up altogether your habit of reasoning about Revelation, or learn the first principles on which its compass and interpretation can be logically assured to your intelligence." Instead of which, they say to the country: "All sciences, save one, must be pursued on a pure method; their alphabet must precede their construction, and their difficulties must be met scientifically. Theology alone must have no alphabet, no construction, while its difficulties must prove it to be no science."

To sum up what has been said, we may attribute the waning influence of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge to some such general causes as the following: The present (developed) extremes of Ritualism and Agnosticism, which leave no further room for development; and the abandonment of a purely Anglican orthodoxy, which is the abandonment of a purely Anglican chair; the Germanizing of the constitution of the universities, which has made them to "represent" popular ideas, rather than to "lead" religious opinion; the absence of great men, great "movers"—who can hardly be found in societies where there is no earnestness and no recognized clerical rivalry; the absence (therefore) of "individual" influence on the students, who reasonably wish for some guide; the spread of downright skepticism or infidelity; the (consequent) loss of national respect for the candidates for Anglican holy orders; the growth of Radicalism, both in the universities and in the country, which tends to lessen all respect for all societies; the loss of political power in the universities from the spread of such radical ideas, and also from the fact that the present lethargy in national religion does not admit of much clashing of Church and State; the admission of a large number of poor students to the universities, which, though unquestionably a move in the right direction, tends to lessen the old idea of "prestige;" the absence of the class-don, as a sort of council

of wise men, which used to be assumed to be didactic; the easy attitude of the fellows, tutors, and professors towards the easy-thinking or free-thinking undergraduates; the consequent dormancy of the *principle* of authority as well as the *sentiment* of authority; the getting further and further away from the Catholic ideal of a university, which would be to make theology the dominant spirit (though not the dominant study) of students who were (mostly) "preparing" for holy orders; the worn-outness of the old theories of Scriptural Religion, Primitive Religion, Anglican-Catholic Religion; the very frankness of the profession of Natural Religion, which is in itself the abdication of the claim to lead in whatever appertains to national "orthodoxy;" the (unconfessed) habit of making theology insignificant, by proclaiming the vast importance of other studies; the (at the same time) usurping more than the authority of the Catholic Church by dogmatizing where the Church has not dogmatized, both in theology and in its relation to other sciences; the (at the same time) proclaiming that it is impossible to dogmatize upon what is subjected to dogma by every disputant; the arguing that difficulties or apparent conflicts are fatal to the Divine authority of the Catholic Church, to the building-up of any science of theology, to the certainty of the truths of Revelation,—nay, even to the belief in Divine Providence.

Having, therefore, abdicated the position of leaders,—by having abandoned the essentials of their position,—it is impossible that the universities should recover the position through any movement, either from within or from without. Unless, indeed, the universities were to become Catholic,—which would imply that the country had become so first,—they could never again lead in "religious thought;" that is, lead in the sense of "learned opinions." No Catholic university could possibly influence Catholic faith; but, in regard to the relation of various sciences to revealed truth they could teach with much authority and precision. Truth being the ally of the Catholic Church, no matter in what grooves it be found; reason and knowledge being ministers to faith, provided they be exercised in the way of truth; it is at once the interest and the mission of the Catholic Church to foster the pursuit of *all* truth. The Holy See cherishes talent, and every kind of acquirement, less for their own sake than with a view to spiritual profit; knowing well that her sons will be better members of professions because better men, better Christians from their knowledge of the relative value of *all* truths. But this is just exactly what Natural Religion can *not* teach. It knows nothing of the relations of natural sciences to that one science which is commonly entitled "the supernatural." It knows nothing of starting with certain definite verities, which imbue and perpetually guide the whole intellect.

It even resents any mention of "infallible" dogmas, while affecting to dogmatize *against* truths; and scorns the science which alone can guide the soul, while affecting to believe that men have souls. Out of such chaos can there come symmetry? "Son of man, shall these dry bones live?" It is totally impossible that the universities should recover influence, unless they should first become Catholic. And there is no human probability of their doing so. Imagine anything so astounding as that the majority of undergraduates should, on a sudden, become converted to Catholicity, or that their dons, inspired with like fervor, should, on a sudden, try their hardest to convert their pupils! But, apart from such unlikely combination, there is no hope even of a minority becoming Catholic. The minority, like the majority, have other things to think about, their heads being full of tough examinations. As to the country, it is normally anti-Catholic. It is not anti-Catholic in the old-fashioned doctrinal sense (doctrines are now relegated to clerical spheres), but in the sense that it is in hostility to any state of mental disturbance, which should prevent its enjoying social and personal ease. The recent sympathy shown in England towards the German Lutheran movement proves that, *if* the national mind be polemical, it is in the direction of stubborn protest against authority. It is most improbable, then, that the country should aid Oxford and Cambridge in seeking to get back to Catholic authority. The country is more likely to aid them in becoming Rationalist. "Christian Rationalism" is now the "fashionable" English tone; that is, Rationalism *plus* a sentiment of Christianity is the sort of tone which pervades all classes of the community. Nine men out of ten *reason* religion like Rationalists, while they profess tender sympathy with Christian sentiment. How can "conversion" come out of such a tone as this? Or, how can Oxford and Cambridge have any influence over a country which has but little interest either in dogma or in tradition? If religious influence exist at all in this country, it is that of private friends or favorite preachers, together with the influence of the *fact* of the Catholic Religion, which is like the sun seen through mist or through fog. The influence of societies is incompatible with the modern spirit of religious and political Radicalism. In the very fact that the universities are societies, and therefore claim a corporate superiority, there is strong ground for jealousy on the part of a community which does not recognize "corporate superiority." "You may profess Latin and Greek, and what you are pleased to call philosophy," is the attitude of the popular mind towards the universities; "but as to the principles of religious belief, or of what you call divine authority, you know no more about such things than we do, and we do not want your opinions, nor

anybody's else." Radicalism has no homage for any "seat of collective wisdom," whether it be a university or a House of Commons. Its homage is all kept for what it has itself helped to create and its contempt for what it has itself helped to pull down. It would like to pull down Monarchy, the House of Lords, the Constitution; it would like to pull down the National Church, the landed gentry, even the City Guilds; it would like to pull down the universities,—should they so much as hint at a pretension to teach anything more patriotic than good grammar. The waning influence of the universities is a result of that Radicalism which, having first dethroned authority from religion, seeks to dethrone it from every sphere of intelligence.

THE MORMON QUESTION AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

AN eminent writer of our own times, referring to the overthrow of the old Roman civilization by the barbarians of the north, remarks that modern society is rearing within its own cities hordes of fiercer enemies than Goths or Huns could be. The diffusion of knowledge, the development of industry on a gigantic scale, and the discoveries of modern science, have in our times given to civilized nations an overwhelming material superiority over the uncivilized races which still occupy the greater part of the earth. As far back as history reaches, the civilized portion of the human race has been engaged in conflict with the tribes who preferred barbarian freedom to the restraints of settled and organized society. Success has alternately followed each side. If at certain periods the wealth, the knowledge, and the discipline of the more cultured races have driven back the frontiers of barbarism, at others the flood of barbarians has swept away the land-marks of many an old civilization. Rome planted her laws, her literature, and her cities amid the forests of Gaul and Germany, and in the oases of the Sahara, but at a later date new hordes of barbarians drove civilization again from its colonies, and once more restored the dominion of barbarism in many a land. As we have said, there seems little likelihood that modern society should be overthrown by outside barbarians. Everywhere civilized man is advancing as a

conqueror on the domain still occupied by the barbarian tribes. The Indians have all but disappeared as a serious foe from the North American continent, three-fourths of which was their undisputed territory a hundred years back. The great region of upper Asia, the "hive of nations" of the ancient world, has passed in our days under the sway of Russia, and France and England are fast pushing their dominions into the still uncivilized portions of Africa. Nowhere in the world to-day does there appear a barbarous population capable of seriously threatening the safety of the civilized world or renewing the work of Attila or Timur. But observers like Macaulay have already seen the germs of a new and equally formidable barbarism in the very midst of our most civilized populations. The *Sans-culottes* of the first French Revolution, the Communards of 1870, and the Russian Nihilists of to-day are examples of the hostile forces which modern civilization has to reckon with among her own children. Irreconcilable hatred to the existing social system is the spirit which inspires them all, as hatred of the Roman yoke inspired the old barbarians to sweep down on the civilized Empire. Nor is this spirit of hostility only found among the men who mount the barricades or blow up palaces in the frenzy of a life and death struggle. It exists sullenly among millions of more sluggish and more ignorant natures in all the centres of modern life. Among the operatives of England and Germany it exists as really as among the hot-blooded nations of the south, even though its outbreaks are for the time suppressed by a sort of mental *vis inertiae*. There are thousands, it may be millions, in each of those countries who would gladly overthrow the whole social fabric regardless of any material loss they might sustain from its fall. Religion and patriotism, as they are presented to them, they wholly reject; aspirations to a higher culture they have none; they are simply hostile to the civilization in which they live, much as gypsies abhor settled pursuits or town life. Were it possible to separate the masses among whom those feelings have sway from the other parts of their respective nations, they would constitute a force as hostile to existing civilization as were the Vandals or Huns of old to the ancients. Its religions, its legal systems, its social restraints, and its culture would be equally distasteful to them, and whatever organization they might adopt would certainly be of a wholly dissimilar character. In other words a large proportion of the civilized world is ready, if the means be given it, to array itself against civilization as it now exists. The choice being open to it, it would prefer what is usually known as a state of barbarism to one of civilization.

That this is no mere supposition, the existence of the Mormon population in the United States is a visible instance. In the

far West, where forty years ago the Indian held undisputed possession of his hunting grounds, the white population of this country finds itself, its laws, and its whole social organization confronted by a population of kindred race, but as alien in sympathies and habits of life as the red men whose place they have taken. Macaulay's words have been verified on our soil. Civilization has produced a population as hostile to itself as the Goths and Vandals of old. Had the Mormon population of Utah sufficient power, they would deal with the United States as the Turks dealt with the Byzantine Empire, or with even harder measure. Like the Turks, they are honest and thrifty among themselves, like them they hold that they are divinely appointed to supremacy over the unbelieving world. To slay the Gentiles who intruded into their territory, was long recognized by them as a meritorious work; and if the practice has been abandoned of late years, it is for the same reason that makes the Turks admit the equal rights of foreigners within their dominions, namely, want of power to prevent it. In social customs, in form of government, and in general feelings the Mormons of Utah are as far removed from the rest of the population of the United States as are the Turks from the rest of Europe or the Mahometans of India from the English. Christianity, and the Christian idea of family life, are wholly repugnant to them; and if, like the Mahometans, they accept some of the material advantages of modern civilization, and build railroads and telegraph lines, they are equally incapable of making any real advance in true civilization. Their intellects are crippled as completely by Joe Smith and the Book of Mormon as are those of the Mahometan world by the Arabian False Prophet and the Koran.

How to deal with this alien people—alien not in blood, but in the leading elements of what is commonly recognized as civilization—is the Mormon Problem of to-day. Were it only a question of territorial supremacy, did the Mormons dispute our title to theirs by force of arms, the problem would be an easy one. We should have either to abandon all pretensions to the disputed territory, if right of possession lay with the Mormons, and leave them to follow their peculiar ways at their own responsibility, or we should make good our claim to it by the sword and rule it accordingly. The latter alternative might involve difficulties of its own, but it is unnecessary to discuss them here. Although the late Brigham Young once made a show of arming a militia to resist the government of the United States in their claim to jurisdiction over Utah, he never seriously carried out the project. The Mormon leaders accepted, however unwillingly, the supreme authority of the Federal Government, and their aim since 1860 has been chiefly to obtain

the admission of Utah as a sovereign State of the Union. To effect this their people conform outwardly to the ordinary routine of a Territory in political affairs. They hold elections for the various territorial and municipal offices in the same form as in other parts of the Union, but it is only in form. All the important offices of the Territory are filled in accordance with the wishes of the Mormon hierarchy or its head. While Brigham Young lived he was practically the absolute monarch of the Territory as far as his own people were concerned. The elections were simply matters of form, mere ratifications of the Prophet's orders. At present the government of the Mormon Church is divided among more hands, though it is still a close oligarchy. The right of succession to the office of High Priest is regulated on some principles which do not seem to be very exactly defined. One thing is certain, that the popular vote has nothing to do with appointing the supreme head of the Mormon people, and that their government is republican only in name, unless where modified by the Federal laws.

How far such a system of government is compatible with the fundamental principles of the American Constitution, is a difficult question to answer. Is self-government fulfilled by a voluntary abdication of its exercise? We think it is not, however the abdication may be concealed. The theory of our political system rests on self-government of the people, and a community which chooses to be governed by an irresponsible monarch or close corporation, is certainly not self-governed in the common acceptance of the term. Voluntary acquiescence in the orders of a monarch or an aristocracy does not constitute self-government. If it did, the subjects of the Chinese Emperor, or the Mahometan population of Turkey would be as well entitled to be regarded as free citizens as any other nation. They bow to a despotic rule without reluctance, and they would not throw it off were the opportunity given them; but for all that they cannot be regarded as politically free, in the sense attached to the words by our usage. So it is with the Mormons. They have chosen for themselves a fixed ruler. They pay the taxes he imposes on them in the shape of tithes, they obey his edicts as laws, and at need they are ready to bear arms at his decree. If they mechanically imitate at his bidding the political action of a free republican community, that gives them no claim to be regarded as free agents in politics. On this ground a very reasonable doubt may be raised whether such a community could be safely admitted to the same rights as other classes of citizens in this Republic.

It is not, however, in their form of government alone that the Mormons show a total divergence from the principles accepted by the other populations of the Union. It is hard enough to see how

monarchy and republican institutions can exist together in our form of government. But the Mormons have isolated themselves still more from the rest of the community by the system of polygamy than even by their form of government. Modern civilization is elastic enough to embrace various forms of government among nations possessing equal claims to the title of civilized. No one would dream of excluding the subjects of the German Emperor or the King of Sweden from the name of civilized men, because their form of government is monarchical. But there are certain points of social life and laws which are accepted as fundamental by all nations which lay claim to Christian civilization. Among those is monogamy, the restriction of every husband to one wife, and every wife to one husband. Wherever the Aryan race has established itself, this law is recognized by public opinion no less than by law, except among the Mormons. They have adopted polygamy, and by so doing have separated their way of life more widely from that of the body of American citizens than they could do by any purely political change. Their politics could only put them outside the pale of republican institutions; their polygamy puts them outside the pale of European civilization.

In writing thus we have no desire of exciting public feeling against the Mormons themselves. Uncivilized men have the rights of human nature as well as their civilized brothers, and we reprobate wrong-doing or injustice to a savage not less than to a member of the most highly cultured community. But it is of the highest importance, in discussing a subject like the present, to call things by their right names. Polygamy is essentially opposed to the principles of our civilization, and a people that adopts it, must therefore be regarded as outside its pale. That they are so, does not deprive them of the natural rights of human beings, but it may make it highly inexpedient to admit them to share in the government of a civilized community.

To form a correct judgment, both on the rights of the Mormons and the policy which justice and public expediency suggest for dealing with them, a knowledge of their history is requisite. It is true they are but of yesterday, comparatively speaking, and the papers have kept their doings a good deal before the public during late years; but nevertheless, the ideas of the average reader respecting the growth of Mormondom are somewhat cloudy. Its beginnings date little more than half a century back. Joseph Smith, the founder of the sect, first set up his claims to divine inspiration about 1827, and published the *Book of Mormon*, the Koran of his followers, about 1830. Personally Smith had little to distinguish him from the numerous other founders of heresies. His imposture was, perhaps, more evident than usual in such cases, though Joanna

Southcote furnishes a close parallel. Indeed, such are the vagaries of the human intellect, when unguided by a higher power, that gross imposture is often allied with a certain amount of self-deceit, and what is commonly recognized as fanaticism. Such may have been the case with Smith, and certain it is that some of his associates appear to have been inspired with a fanatical belief in his mission. In spite of repeated exposures of his pretensions, he gathered disciples, who accepted him as the prophet of a new revelation. At the beginning of his career as the preacher of a new religion, Smith seems to have closely copied the system of Mahomet, and it is curious to find him fifteen years later adopting the distinctively Mahometan institution of polygamy as an outcome of his creed. At first, however, he did not venture so far. He only pretended to have received visions from angels and a book containing the principles of the religion whose prophet he claimed to be. Like Mahomet, he professed a high respect for our Lord, and claimed that his system was only a full development of Christianity. That such pretensions should find believers in the United States in this nineteenth century, is not a pleasant commentary on the boasted growth of intelligence in our days; but they certainly did find them. Finding his own neighborhood in New York State an uncongenial abode, he transferred his residence successively to Kirkland in Ohio, to Missouri, and finally to Illinois, then—1840—the remote West of the Union. In each State his character suffered exposures of various kinds, but his followers steadily grew in numbers. The establishment of a kind of bank, and certain financial dealings of a dubious character, brought him into contact with the law in Ohio, and finally forced him to quit that State. His followers in Missouri speedily became involved in serious quarrels with the rest of the population. The order of Danites, it was affirmed on oath by some of the leading Mormons, had even then bound themselves by the most solemn covenant to obey any order of their Prophet, and he used the most arrogant threats himself towards those who interfered with his following. The State militia had to be called out to repress the disturbances between the Mormons and the citizens of Missouri, and the former in consequence transferred themselves in a body to Illinois. In that State they obtained a settlement at Nauvoo, where they proceeded to establish a community almost independent of outside interference. The Legislature granted the new colony a charter which made Smith practically autocrat of his town. A Mormon legion was organized and drilled, and the Prophet commenced to assume the airs of a sovereign. He had already completed the organization of his followers, and established a priesthood in two degrees, with a college of twelve, whom he styled apostles, as his own im-

mediate assistants in the work of governing. Brigham Young, his successor, was one of the twelve, and by his advice emissaries were dispatched regularly to Europe to attract immigrants to the new settlement, and proselytes to the new creed. Smith's moral character was bad; and to palliate it among his followers, he finally proclaimed a new revelation by which polygamy was declared lawful. The indignation which this step excited among the people of Illinois, and even among some of Smith's own followers, was very great. Against the latter he proceeded to personal violence in Nauvoo, and was in consequence arrested by the State authorities. A mob broke into the prison in which he was confined and ended his lawless career by lawless violence in 1844.

Neither the death of their Prophet nor the growing hostility of the surrounding population was able to break down the religious-political organization of the Mormon sect. Brigham Young managed to have himself installed as its head, though by a remarkable analogy with the early history of Islam, there was a schism in favor of a relative of Smith's. The seceding Mormons abandoned polygamy, and have had since little to distinguish them from numerous other small sects of Protestantism. The large body which recognized Young adopted plurality of wives as a leading point in their religion. Public feeling against them grew stronger. The charter which had been granted to Nauvoo was revoked by the Illinois Legislature in 1845, and the Mormons prepared to seek new settlements in the then unexplored country west of the Rocky Mountains. Prospecting parties were sent out in various directions. One finally established itself in the south of California near San Bernardino, and others for a time occupied various portions of the present State of Nevada. The neighborhood of the Great Salt Lake in the plateau between the Rocky Mountains and the Sierra Nevada, was, however, the place finally selected for the settlement of the Mormons, and Brigham Young took up his abode there in 1847. In the mean time the Mormons had been driven out of Nauvoo by force, a measure which appears to have been inspired by very mixed motives on the part of the assailants. It inspired a bitter hatred of the United States and its people into the minds of the Mormons, who finally took up their abode on the shores of the Great Salt Lake.

The abode chosen for the new nation, which the Mormon leaders hoped to establish, reflects credit on their sagacity. The site of their city was a thousand miles west of Council Bluffs, which was then almost the furthest outpost of civilization in the West, and it was nearly as far from the Spanish settlements in California. Separated from the latter by the Sierras and the mountain tract of Nevada, it was cut off from the Eastern States by the Rocky Mountains and the bad lands of the present Wyoming and Ne-

braska. Thus, there was little danger of any interference with the peculiar practices of the Mormons from civilized neighbors for many years, even at the rapid rate of progress of Western settlement. The land around the Great Lake, though uninviting enough in its natural appearance, is fertile, and can easily be made capable of supporting a large population. To build up such a population of his followers before the waves of immigration from the Eastern States should encroach on his domain, was the policy of Brigham Young, and his measures to attain that end were skilfully devised. Partly through a spirit of fanatical devotion to their creed and leaders, and partly through a dread of further conflicts with the populations of the Western States, several thousand Mormons from Nauvoo undertook the journey across the wilderness. Many of them made it on foot, trundling their effects in wheelbarrows. Others travelled in caravans with ox-wagons and horses. All braved the attacks from the Indians, of famine, and an almost unknown journey of a thousand miles, and risked the uncertainty of finding a suitable abode at the end, in obedience to their leader. But the latter knew that the numbers that thus followed him from Nauvoo were insufficient to form a community capable of resisting interference from without. Accordingly, an important part of the Mormon policy consisted in attracting immigrants from Europe by means of missionaries specially sent for that purpose. The masses of ignorant and poverty-stricken toilers in the crowded cities of Europe furnished an inviting field for the labors of the Mormon missionaries. The motives for adopting Mormonism, which the latter held out to their converts, were of a tangible kind. They promised them an easier life and more abundant reward for labor in the settlements by the shores of Salt Lake, and they held out these temporal advantages as sufficient proofs of the truth of the religious system which they offered them. To many of the classes which have been referred to at the commencement of this article,—men whose lives were a constant struggle for existence, and from whom all higher thoughts had been crushed out by the heartless pressure of wealth on the poorer classes, so common at the present day,—the teachings of the Mormon emissaries proved highly acceptable. A steady stream of immigrants, mostly of the most ignorant class, has been directed from Europe to the shores of Salt Lake, there to become part of the Mormon population, and blindly subject to the rule of its leaders. The numbers brought over between 1860 and 1870 amounted to twenty-five thousand, and the annual immigration has been since growing larger rather than falling off, in spite of the death of Brigham Young and the measures adopted by the Federal Courts for the suppression of polygamy. England and Wales furnish by far the largest portion of the Mormon converts, nearly three-fourths of the whole. Denmark and Sweden furnish the next largest con-

tingent, and the Protestant portion of Germany comes next in order. The opposition offered by the Prussian Government to the work of the Mormon emissaries must be taken into account in giving due importance to the limited number of German Mormons. Scotland seems to have furnished a smaller proportion of recruits than either England or Wales to the new doctrines. Ireland has sent, we believe, absolutely none across the Atlantic. Twenty-two years ago, a Mormon mission was established in Ireland, but after a couple of years' trial the elders reported it a complete failure. There are, or were, a few Irish Mormons, but they had drifted into Utah from various parts of the Union, not come directly there like the great body of the English and Scandinavian immigrants. Except those born in Utah, few of the present Mormon population are natives of the United States. A large portion of the leaders, however, are Americans, and they utilize the ignorant devotion of their followers in a very practical fashion. The masses are recruited from the decivilized classes, which Macaulay has alluded to as the possible future assailants of our society and civilization. The Mormons certainly have no love for either, as they exist in the world outside their own limits.

It would not be safe, however, by any means, to attribute the rise and progress of Mormonism, wholly or mainly, to the ignorance of its professors. Some who have devoted their attention to the subject seem to imagine that the establishment of schools is all that is needed to overthrow the whole system of Mormonism in Utah. They overlook the fact that fanaticism is one of the most powerful motives of human action, and that while it may exist side by side with ignorance and stolidity, it is a thing of an entirely different kind in the calculations of either philosopher or statesman. No general law can be laid down to explain the periodical outbursts of strong religious excitement among the most widely different races, which go under the general name of fanaticism. Within the Catholic Church religious enthusiasm, though valued—as it deserves, where genuine—as a high and noble gift, is always carefully watched over and disciplined by the Head of the Church and his representatives. Outside the Church, when the religious feelings which form a part of every man's nature, however dormant they may at times be, become excited in a large number of individuals, they easily pass into the passion of fanaticism. No class of men, no nation, is exempt from such outbreaks. Nor does it appear, on investigation, that any class is peculiarly liable to them. They may arise from the most serious or from, apparently, the most trifling and absurd causes; among the most ignorant or the most cultivated populations. They may only last for a brief space, or they may continue for years. The outbreak of the Westphalian peasants under John of Leyden, and that of the Huguenot nobles in France dur-

ing the sixteenth century, were equally examples of the fanatic spirit, as Mahometanism had been in its rise and development nine centuries before. In great human movements where mixed motives are involved, fanaticism is often affected where it has no real existence, except for a moment. When Frederick of Prussia stirred up the feelings of his grenadiers at Rosbach with Lutheran hymns, it was an example of that sham fanaticism. It is of importance in studying the Mormon question to properly estimate how much the population is under the influence of real fanaticism, and what part of their peculiar ways ought to be set down to other motives.

That the bulk of the Mormons are believers in their system of religion, including its practice of polygamy, cannot be doubted. They pay tithes, and punctually obey the orders of the heads of the sect without murmuring, though the burthens are by no means light. They are ready, for the most part, to quit their homes and families, and start as missionaries to Europe, at the word of the hierarchy that rules over them. It is estimated that over a hundred and fifty such emissaries are sent out annually for periods of one, two or five years' mission-work. On moral questions, too, the orders of Brigham Young and his successors are still received as infallible guides. The secret order of the Danites murdered without remorse any persons obnoxious to the Mormon Prophet, and in the massacre of the emigrants at Mountain Meadow in the early days of Utah, the greatest part of the Mormon population was implicated, or at least was fully cognizant of the whole affair, yet the secret was jealously kept. It has been found almost impossible to obtain reliable evidence on oath in the courts from Mormon witnesses in cases where the peculiar doctrines of the sect are involved. Ignorance and stolidity will not account for such facts. They attest clearly the existence of self-believing fanaticism among the mass of the population of Utah.

The question to be solved in regard to the Mormons may be thus summed up. A population as alien in habits and customs as a tribe of Mahometans and as fanatical in their religious ideas has grown up on the soil of the Union. Its practice of polygamy is in direct opposition to the almost universally received ideas of public morals. Nevertheless, it is claimed by the Mormons as an essential part of their religion which they will not part with. This population, as it now exists, has never been admitted into the federation of States which compose the Union. Its territory is American, but it has not been allowed to pass beyond the colonial stage of organization usually carried out in new Territories. While individual Mormons may, if they choose, possess all the rights of American citizens in any State of the Union, the Mormon body, which has connected itself with Utah as its home, and which there

carries out all the practices of its religion, has no share in the government of the Union, and is limited within its own bounds to such an amount of self-government as the rest of the country chooses to bestow. This condition of Territorial existence the Mormons of Utah wish to change for the full self-government of a State. The points involved in the problem are, therefore—

1st. Should polygamy be tolerated at all within the bounds of the United States as a matter of principle?

2d. Is it expedient to tolerate it, and if so, within what limits?

3d. Has the Mormon population of Utah a right to admission as a State?

4th. Would it be wise to admit them, supposing they have no absolute rights in the matter?

With regard to the first point very considerable difference of opinion undoubtedly exists. The Mormons claim that under the Constitution of the United States they are entitled to carry out any practices enjoined by their own religion, however distasteful to the public sentiment of the country. Polygamy they regard as a divine institution, and they urge that to prevent them by force from practicing it would be religious persecution and wholly opposed to the spirit of tolerance of the United States. They also add that for over twenty years after their organization as a Territory the Federal authorities gave a tacit approbation to the practice of polygamy, and that Brigham Young, a known polygamist, received a commission as Governor from President Fillmore. The recent attempts on the part of the Federal courts to enforce the ordinary marriage laws of the Union in Utah, the Mormons claim to be the mere outcome of personal ill-will on the part of some officials. They also claim that the hope of driving them out of the Territory which they have reclaimed, and robbing them of the fruits of their industry, is the real motive at the bottom of the hostility towards their peculiar institutions. On the other side, the opponents of polygamy urge that it is a system contrary to public morals, and as such to be suppressed by the law. Monogamy, they declare, is regarded by our laws not only as a religious, but also as a social obligation, and no part of society can claim exemption from it. On these grounds they urge the passage of still more stringent enactments against polygamy by the United States (for the Territorial Legislature is entirely under Mormon control), and their enforcement by all the means at the disposal of government. Both sides are strong in their respective opinions, and though at the present time no very active measures are going on to bring about a final issue, the whole question is a burning one and liable on slight provocation to burst into a conflagration.

As to the theory that full toleration of all religions is required by the spirit of the American Constitution, it is wholly misleading.

It is well settled in the public mind that most of the bodies of religionists known here can subsist together in our society; but it by no means follows that there are not other bodies of religionists who could not be tolerated among us. We shall no doubt be at once confronted with the formula,—as Carlyle would call it,—that every man has a right to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience. Like the majority of such general statements, the formula in question contains a good deal more error than truth; worship involves external as well as internal acts. To say that the thoughts of every man should be free as far as his neighbors are concerned, is about the same as saying that every living man has a right to breath. Thought, so long as it is held within the thinker's mind, is absolutely independent of human laws. It is not that they have no right to interfere with it, but they have no power nor means of interference. When worship, however, involves external acts, it is an entirely different question. Unless we are prepared to say that any act is lawful if done in the name of religion, we cannot say that every man has a right to worship as he pleases. Some of the earlier followers of George Fox regarded it as part of their worship to pray in public naked the Thugs of India looked on indiscriminate murder as an act of worship; but it would be impossible for any society to tolerate such practices under any name. Personally we are in favor of the amplest legal toleration of religious beliefs and forms of worship that can be granted without danger to society. We do not regard the arm of the law as a suitable agent for spreading religious truth, and we have no admiration for forced conversions even to the truth. Nevertheless, we recognize that it is impossible to allow unrestrained freedom to every practice that may take to itself the name of religion. There is no such thing as a general law of toleration in the United States or elsewhere, nor can there be. The abstract right of the Mormons to practice polygamy on the ground of its being part of their religion has, therefore, no existence.

With regard to the rights acquired by the tacit acquiescence in the practice by the United States, the claim of the Mormons has a better foundation, though it does not give them an absolute right. The power which made the laws has the right to unmake them, though the expediency of so doing must be considerably affected by the question of long toleration. On the other hand, expediency has to be consulted before passing laws, which may be found incapable of enforcement. We know that some years ago it was found almost impossible to obtain evidence, even in Nevada or Idaho, sufficient to convict a Mormon of polygamy, even where the practice was notorious. In Utah itself no Mormon jury would return a verdict against a fellow-Mormon on such a charge. The abolition of trial by jury throughout the Territory, or, at least, the

exclusion from the jury-boxes of three-fourths of the present voters, would be absolutely necessary, if polygamy is to be suppressed throughout Utah by law. The experiment would be a dangerous one for the future. It is easy to introduce a dangerous practice into the administration of the law in moments of excitement, but the consequence may be felt for years, and even whole generations afterwards. Of course, if we regard the suppression of Mormon polygamy as the absolute moral duty of the Government, we should be ready to face any risk in suppressing it. We do not, however, believe that there is any abstract right in the matter on the side of either suppression or toleration. Polygamy is repugnant to the moral feelings of Christian civilization, but it is not an evil, like Thuggism, that must be eradicated by force. We yield to none in our abhorrence of the practice, but many abhorrent things have to be endured in politics and in social life. It must be borne in mind that the practice in question prevails throughout the whole Mahometan and Buddhist world, and yet that Mahometans and Buddhists have long been members of various Christian States, or at least of States as Christian as this country in their public policy. The law of France on marriage is far more Christian than that of any State of the Union. Divorce is absolutely unknown to French law, as amongst Frenchmen; yet French law allows the Mahometans of Algeria to follow out the law of their Prophet in all questions of marriage. Algeria contains a larger Christian population than Utah does, yet we have not heard any protest against the toleration assured to the Mahometans there. In like manner, Russia tolerates polygamy among her Tartar subjects, including even those of Kasan and Astrakhan, who have been subject to her laws for three centuries; yet in Russia the marriage bond among Christians is as sacred as it is in this country. When Austria lately annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, the free practice of their religion was guaranteed to all the Mahometan inhabitants, and has since been faithfully carried out. England in India pushes her condescension to the followers of the False Prophet still further. The sanctity of the Tenana is guarded by law, and some years ago a case occurred in which a high European official in India actually professed himself a Mahometan for the purpose of marrying a second wife during the life of his first. It would have been bigamy if he had remained a Christian of any denomination; but being a Mahometan, it was not possible to bring him to justice under the laws of England as they are now administered. Here, too, in the United States we are not aware that it has ever been claimed that the Federal authorities should suppress polygamy among the heathen Indians. It seems to us that the Mormons, in this respect, may be regarded as Indians. Their ways are not our ways; we reprobate their religion and its practices, but we do not believe it is any part of the

Government's duty to suppress either by force within a district where the public sense is not opposed to them. The States can settle appropriate legislation each for itself; and we, certainly, as citizens of any particular State which now makes polygamy a legal offence, would oppose a change in the law. But we cannot regard a Territory like Utah, peopled for the greatest part by Mormons, and in great measure isolated from the rest of the country, as on the same footing with States which have always retained in this respect the traditions of the Christian law of marriage.

While avoiding interference with the "peculiar institution" of the Mormons within certain limits, it seems to us that it would be wholly inexpedient to admit them to the rights of a sovereign State. Their social system is wholly alien to ours. We may tolerate it within certain limits, but we can never conscientiously indorse it. We cannot regard a polygamous people as fitting associates in the government of the Union. The difference between us is too great to admit of an equal partnership without serious deterioration to our whole social system. Mormonism has been frequently described as constituting with slavery "twin relics of barbarism." The expression, like many others made up for immediate use by men who value fluency before fact, is singularly inaccurate, though it contains a certain portion of truth. Polygamy is not a "relic" of anything in our institutions. It is a new development of private judgment in religious matters among us. As to its barbarism, however, there can be no question. It is in direct hostility to the groundwork of our society, and, in the full sense of the word, to our civilization. Accordingly, we would deal with those who practice it, in the name of a religious system, as we would with other barbarians. We would deny them no general right of humanity; we would not drive them from the soil under our jurisdiction, nor would we strain the action of the central Government to deprive them of such personal rights in the administration of the law as are usually accorded to settlers on our soil, regardless of citizenship. More than this, we are not bound by either justice or humanity to concede, while every principle of true political expediency forbids our conceding more. We are not bound to admit any Territory to become an integral part of the Union as a sovereign State, unless we believe its admission will be beneficial to the rest of the Union. The admission of a State in such a condition of barbarism as the prevalence of polygamy in it implies, would be a shock to the moral feelings of the rest of the country, and therefore should be steadily rejected. It rests with each Territory to put itself in accordance with the general public feeling on this point, a feeling which is no passing caprice, but based on the fundamental moral principles of our civilization. So long as Utah, or any other Ter-

ritory, refuses to do this ; so long as its people prefer the usages of barbarism to those of Christian civilization, they should be allowed no part in our Government. We should grant them the rights of men, not the privileges of citizens. Such, it appears to us, is the only fitting solution of the Mormon problem as it exists among us to-day.

THE PROPAGANDA QUESTION AND OUR DUTY.

TO the citizens of the United States—indeed, to any person living within the wide limits of the English-speaking world, breathing the air of religious and civil liberty and familiar with the working of free institutions—it is a strange phenomenon to see ancient Christian countries, like France and Italy, waging so destructive a warfare on Religion, on everything, in fact, which could help to keep alive the belief in a living God and His Providence. One is amazed that a people so enlightened and withal so practical as the French, should destroy or render antagonistic, at a time when they are battling for the rights of a perfect freedom, struggling even for their existence as a great nation in the face of most powerful enemies, the mightiest of all vital forces, Religion,—the Religious Faith of the immense majority. Still, inconsistent as must appear their foreign policy when compared with their legislation and administrative acts at home, they protect abroad as missionaries and educators among the heathen the very men whom they persecute and oppress at home, refusing them even the rights and immunities due to all other classes of citizens.

The Piedmontese statesmen, on the other hand, after having secured for their country a temporary independence and a seeming political unity, appear to be bent on blotting out from her soil every institution which recalls her religious supremacy during the last fifteen hundred years, which made Rome the centre of Catholicity, of Christianity, and caused her religious influence to be so powerfully, so beneficently, so universally felt among uncivilized and pagan nations, as in every portion of Christendom. One would think that Italy, in her very legitimate ambition to assert herself as a first-rate European power, would be ambitious as well to make her moral influence at least strongly felt on every point of both hemispheres, where Christian nations and Christian

civilization are endeavoring to push their way and maintain their preëminence.

The flag of Savoy is but little known and wields but little power beyond the shores of the Mediterranean. But there is a mighty, an incomparable moral force which a confederated Italy could wield for the highest purposes of civilization, for the glorification of her political power even, on every shore bathed by the tides of the Atlantic and the Pacific, among every people known to the traveller, the trader, the ethnologist. This incalculable, this far-reaching, this all-pervading force Italy could wield through the Papacy, without detriment to her political unity, without any weakening of her national strength, and to the immense increase of her prestige among the nations. If the men who at present govern the Peninsula could only open their eyes to see the true interests of their country, and be inspired to take the only sure path toward securing them, how easy it would be, in accord with that Papacy which they persist in calumniating and persecuting, to attain and to popularize all over the world that "moral supremacy" so long the day-dream of her patriots!

They are at this moment travestyng justice, and falsifying history to excuse their inconceivably blind attacks on one of the mightiest agencies of civilization devised by the genius of Christian piety,—that far-famed department of Church administration and missionary training known as the PROPAGANDA.

Let us endeavor to make the readers of the REVIEW, the great mass of our people, understand what a wonderful means of influencing, for the best, the divinest ends, a truly Catholic and united Italy might have in that great Institution, by supposing a similar centre of education and apostolic enterprise to be situated in London, and used by England to spread her own fame, as well as to encourage the spread of the Gospel in all pagan countries.

Suppose, then, that Protestant nations and all Protestant sects in both hemispheres should agree to concentrate, in the metropolis of the British Empire, all the resources for missionary enterprise now divided among the numerous organizations on both sides of the Atlantic. Suppose that there they had created a great central school or university, endowed with funds contributed by every religious denomination calling itself Protestant; a school possessing the most famous professors whom money or zeal could tempt to teach there, professors of every science needed by the most accomplished missionaries, of every language most useful in the countries to be evangelized. Give them a library composed of works in every known tongue, living or dead; printing presses, with type and skilled printers, capable of reproducing for the use of professors, missionaries, and the peoples destined to be enlightened

by them, all the works in these same languages best adapted to help in their labors the ministers of the Gospel among the heathen, or to be to their converts the most powerful aids toward instruction. To library and printing presses add a museum filled with all the ethnological treasures collected from every land under the sun, and fitted to illustrate the manners and superstitions of their peoples.

To this Cosmopolitan University, so constituted and so equipped, call selected students from every clime, of every race and color. Form and train them there, and let them go forth thus trained, and carried in the ships of England to their native shores, bringing home with them the fruits of the ripest European culture, the seeds of our civilization and manifold progress, to be cast into the furrows along with the seeds of the Gospel truth and morality.

Follow me still further, and suppose that the name of England were only known on these same shores, and in the interior of these continents, by the peaceful and beneficent results of such an apostleship, and that her flag never covered other expeditions than such as brought to the Barbarian the light of Christian truth, or even a part thereof, with its hundred humanizing influences; considering not so much the religious and moral results thereby achieved as the mere glory and prestige derived by England from the working of this great Missionary Establishment, should we not deem it madness to assail, imperil, weaken, or destroy it in the very height of its success and usefulness?

What would be the consternation of all true Englishmen, the astonishment of all Christendom, to learn that the Supreme Court of Judicature, urged on by the Ministry, had declared all the property of this admired and most admirable institution to be the property of the state; commanding it to be sold to the highest bidder, and the funds thus obtained to be converted into government stock,—utterly ignoring the wishes, the intentions, the rights, of the original benefactors, donors, and founders; utterly defying the intervention, and repelling the remonstrances of the governments and peoples interested in this Cosmopolitan school of Christian civilization?

Would the English people tamely, silently, submit to have this great light extinguished, when its radiance was brightest, when the eyes of all Protestant nations were fixed upon it? Would no foreign government interfere to prevent the consummation of what would be justly considered to be both an international wrong and a national act of madness verging on something like suicide?

We are stating the case in its relation to the incomprehensible blindness of the Depretis Government. The statement may enable even a child to perceive what madness urges men, who call

themselves statesmen, to deprive their country of the most potent moral agencies ever known throughout the whole course of history.

We need not stop to answer the question, Why such a phenomenon in the once-leading countries of Christendom, as to see Catholics, or men either calling themselves so or at least born of Catholic parents, foremost in urging the destruction of all distinctively Catholic institutions, bent, in fact, on subverting the Catholic Church herself?

Signor Depretis and his associates do not even pretend to be Catholics. They were Mazzinians, Garibaldians, conspirators all their life against the order of things established by Christianity. MM. Freycinet, Jules Ferry, and Paul Bert, in France, are far from making a profession of Catholicity. Freycinet, it is well known, is a Protestant, who fancied, perhaps, that, in expelling from his country the religious orders of men and women, he could prepare the way for the speedy triumph there of his own form of Protestantism. Have we not seen, and do we not still see, the men, sent by our own Bible and Missionary Societies, helping on with main and might the anti-Christian work of demolition done by the Secret Societies, by the Radical Revolutionists, by Socialists and Anarchists, even both in France and in Italy? There are plenty of men in our midst who applaud every effort of the Revolution to blot out all Christian ideas from the minds of the European populations, all Christian virtues and sentiments from their hearts, provided that in so doing "the Church of Rome" is destroyed, root and branch. The mighty conspiracy against Revealed Religion, which was so successful in the last century, and which assumed new and more destructive forms in this, was not directed against Protestantism, but against the Catholic Church. She was the common enemy to be slandered, ridiculed, vilified, despoiled, and blotted out of existence.

We are to remember that the conspirators, disguised under a hundred names, or now openly avowing their aims and their principles, were, and are, no Catholics. The Illuminati, the European Masonic Societies, the Carbonari, Young Italy and Young Europe, the International Society of Workingmen, and all those organizations which bear on their banners NO GOD, NO MASTER, have been, from the beginning, one and all, denounced and condemned by the Catholic Church,—the condemnation always proceeding from the Roman See, from him who holds Christ's place on earth.

Hence the united and uncompromising warfare made by all these enemies of the ancient social order established by Christianity against the only living authority professing to speak in the

name of Christ, and challenging the obedience of all Christ's flock to his solemn utterances.

MM. Depretis and Mancini are willing enough that Protestant churches should be founded and flourish in Italy, that within Rome herself Protestant schools should spring up on every side, and that a Protestant press and pulpit should denounce the Roman church within hearing of the Vatican. But Protestant observers, who see beneath the surface of things, and are capable of rising above the narrow prejudices of the meeting-house or the Sunday-school, have openly proclaimed their conviction that the France and Italy of the nineteenth century are not a field in which contradictory Protestant opinions can take root, grow up, and flourish in the place of the grand and vigorous unity of Catholic faith, together with all the sublime and self-sacrificing charities which that Faith inspires.

Italian and French statesmen are convinced of this. Therefore, if they give to Protestant Propagandism full freedom to labor, publish, and build, while systematically weakening and ruining the PROPAGANDA, it is because they believe Protestants are helping them to do the work of demolition.

But it is our firm belief that American Protestants, once they are clearly shown the true nature of the Depretis-Mancini policy, and once they understand the cosmopolitan character of the great institution it seeks to destroy, will not fail to denounce and stigmatize, as it deserves, the conduct of the Italian Government.

The PROPAGANDA, then, as its name implies, was organized for the purpose of propagating the Christian faith in non-Catholic and Pagan countries. The title officially belongs to the Congregation or Board of Cardinals charged with superintending, directing and guarding this most important and complicated work of missionary enterprise over four-fifths of the globe. Then there is the College of the Propaganda, which educates and trains missionaries of all nationalities, to labor in their respective countries, together with the far-famed Propaganda Press, the splendid and choice library, and the rich Ethnological Museum.

The College is, and ever has been since its foundation, a nursery of good men and true; enlightened, large-minded, great-hearted and self-sacrificing. There is scarcely one people, on either hemisphere, who does not bear witness to their learning, zeal and virtues. Our own America, North and South, acknowledges a debt of gratitude it can never pay, for the many illustrious archbishops and bishops who have gloried in being the pupils of the Propaganda, for the numbers of the distinguished priests, whose zeal has so powerfully contributed to the spread of religion, and the

establishment of most prosperous educational and beneficent institutions in the field of their respective labors.

No people better than the American are disposed to acknowledge and praise true merit everywhere, to encourage or cheer on everything which promotes learning, religion, morality, civilization, progress. It is not that they are indifferent to religious forms or creeds which are antagonistic to their own belief and worship, or that they, in general, look favorably upon Catholicity as such; they are, on the contrary, ill disposed toward all that belongs to the Papacy. The old sectarian prejudices, watch-words and cries about Papistry and Papists, still survive among the masses and among those who guide the masses.

But American Protestants have forgotten or unlearned very many things, which still, like barnacles and sea-weed on the hull of an antiquated ship, cling to the Protestant mind in England, Scotland, and Ireland. In spite of the occasional outburst of ignorant fanaticism, or of interested and well-calculated bigotry, which disgrace the American pulpit, and amuse the immense majority of readers,—the Protestant reading public in America are in no dread of the Papal power, in no apprehension of a Papal invasion, or of any Papal utterance which may interfere with our civil institutions.

Intercourse here with enlightened Catholics and their religious guides, and intercourse in Rome with the highest officials of the Roman Church, and with the reigning pontiff himself, have long ago convinced American travelers, statesmen and scholars, that to no class more than Catholics is our free constitution, with all its manifold and precious guarantees, dear and sacred. Our leading men have learned that no living ruler or statesman, even though a Protestant of the Protestants, entertains so great an admiration for our system of government as Leo XIII., or views with so deep and fatherly an interest the progress among us of all the elements of national greatness, or the development of those other elements of license, lawlessness, and irreligiousness which threaten liberty itself.

How often have we not heard of Protestant Americans, even distinguished ministers of Protestant denominations, expressing their satisfaction when a Catholic Cathedral or Parish Church of remarkable beauty arose in city or country town, or when some noble school sprang up beneath the shadow of the Church, or some of these great homes for the orphan, the outcast, the infirm was erected with the alms of our laboring men, of our hard-working girls in the factories, or the exhaustless generosity of our servant-maids. Americans have learned by experience that the Catholic Church, in city or country, is a centre of the most powerful of

moralizing agencies, and that all the great educational and charitable institutions which spring up near it form the minds and hearts of a free Christian people to the knowledge and practice of the sublimest civic virtues.

Americans love freedom, progress, munificence, religion, as they love the light and heat of the sun. And, just as they do not grudge to others the genial radiance and vital warmth of our great central planet, even so do they not grudge other nations the fullest enjoyment of religious truth, intellectual culture, civil liberty, and national greatness. Indeed, we love for others as we do for ourselves the most generous and abundant share of political and religious freedom, the possession of the most liberal institutions, together with that order-loving, reverential, and law-abiding spirit which alone can secure the long enjoyment of liberty, and the progress of a true civilization.

Americans, therefore, take a genuine and a generous pleasure in encouraging and patronizing the great schools in which are trained the men destined to be the religious teachers of the people, the men who, in their day and generation, will be called to use the Church, the School, the Asylum, the Hospital, as the instruments of their apostleship, the scenes of their beneficent labors and influence. In reality, the most ancient and celebrated of our American Universities began by being theological seminaries. The teaching of the elements of profane science came afterward.

Were the Propaganda, with its College, its Library, Printing Presses, and Museum, situated in New York, instead of being in Rome,—the fact of its being the mightiest institution employed by the Catholic Church for the spread of the Faith would make it an object of deep and general interest to the country. Its cosmopolitan character,—the assemblage within its College Halls of students belonging to so many different races, and speaking most of the living languages known to scholars, would increase that interest tenfold. When our people, those among them at least who boast the largest and most liberal culture, were given the opportunity of being present at some of the solemn academical sessions held yearly, and could hear these youths, representing so many different nationalities, delivering each in his own native tongue a composition in prose or poetry,—they could appreciate the fact that the institution was one without its like in the world. They could understand the influence wielded in the past, over all tribes of men, by the Church,—the Great Parent of civilization, the generous foster-mother of Letters, Sciences, and Art. They would feel—because they could see it with their own eyes—that in *HER* Schools, as in her Sanctuary, men of every race, and color, and language meet, as beneath the roof and around the board of a com-

mon Parent, in that perfect equality which tolerates no castes, no exclusiveness, no narrow prejudices; in the enjoyment of the same advantages, of the same liberal and loving nurture, all cherishing each as a most dear brother, all issuing from that blessed School of Fraternity, armed with the same priestly powers and adorned with the same graces of culture, to bear to their brethren in Africa, Asia, Australia, and Polynesia, as well as to the uncounted tribes of our own native Indians, the knowledge of the Gospel, the sanctifying energy of its morality, the immortal hopes which it inspires.

You would go from the Academic Halls where these young men of every race and color are educated gratuitously, fed, clothed, housed, cared for with a generosity which is at once fatherly and princely,—to the Propaganda Presses, where books in all the known languages are printed for the use of the Missionaries, as well as for the instruction and education of their countrymen. No young Priest goes forth from these Halls to his life-work in his native land without being well provided with this intellectual armor, with these potent means of enlightening, elevating, civilizing.

Protestant Missionary and Bible Societies have come into the field long after the Propaganda, and have only imitated, each in its own sphere, the labors, the results, the generous patronage of science, culture, and evangelical zeal here imperfectly described. Even as patrons of intellectual progress, as brothers helping to bring to their disinherited brothers among the civilized Heathen, and the lowest Barbarians, the regenerating Faith in a common Father and Saviour,—these Protestant Associations justly claim the sympathy and support of their co-religionists. Modern Science, in every one of its departments, has confessed the debt it owes to these Missionary bodies.

Catholics do not doubt the sincerity of the men who go yearly, from the shores of England and America, to bring the Gospel truths within reach of Mohammedan or Pagan, any more than they question the piety which prompts rich Protestants to contribute so bountifully to the support of these Bible Societies and missionary enterprises.

And just here, as an instance of the fair-mindedness we may expect from American publicists the least favorable to the Church, from the most enlightened and influential Protestant laymen as distinguished from their religious teachers, we quote the following editorial of the *New York Times* of March 31, 1884:

“The virtual confiscation of the property of the Roman Propaganda, and the suppression of the institution, will hardly prove to be a judicious measure on the part of the Italian Government. The Propaganda is a sort of combined theological seminary and missionary society. It educates young men and sends them as missionaries to the ends of the earth. Although the Court of Cassation has decided that the Propaganda

is, technically, a religious corporation, and, as such, is liable to suppression under the law passed for the suppression of monasteries and convents, the wide difference between the Propaganda and a community of religious recluses is self-evident.

"Zeal for the destruction of the power of the Roman Catholic Church will induce extreme Protestants to applaud the attack on the Propaganda. What would be said were our Government to suppress the Bible Society or the General Theological Seminary in this city, or to seize the property of both? Yet this would be precisely analogous to the recent act of the Italian Government. It was difficult to class the seizure of the property of the monastic communities as an honest act. But the Italian Government could plead in extenuation that the monasteries were an injury to the property of the country, and that, at the time of the confiscation, the Government was in the utmost need of money. Now, however, there is no such pressing need for money, since the budget shows an annual surplus, and no one pretends that the Propaganda takes able-bodied men and women out of the paths of productive industry to enable them to lead lives of complete indolence."

This will be the common-sense view which the American public will surely take of this matter. Even while rejoicing at the weakening and, as they think, the prospective downfall of the Papacy, they will condemn injustice and hypocrisy in the men who seek its ruin, while pretending to benefit it.

We cannot expect rival non-Catholic societies to be ready to admit that our missionaries succeed where theirs are said to fail, that we reap an abundant harvest on lands where their labors, according to some Protestant writers, are like ploughing and sowing the lands of the Sahara. Still, the most magnificent praise ever given to Catholic missions in every part of the globe has been bestowed by Protestant writers,—historians, scientists, or travellers.

There are men who rise above the prejudices of creed and education, and value educational, literary and scientific institutions according to the intellectual fruits they bear, according to the influence the men who go forth from them have on the welfare of their kind; these enlightened observers and impartial judges would not hesitate to pronounce the Propaganda, considered as a whole and in its recorded results, as the greatest and most successful cosmopolitan institution known to history.

This, therefore, is the proper place to give a brief account of the foundation of this "vital organ of the Papacy," as an American publicist has called it.

The idea of creating in Rome a special department of the Papal Administration for directing and fostering missionary enterprise, was first conceived by one of the most enlightened popes of any age, Ugo Boncompagni (Gregory XIII.), a native of Bologna, whose pontificate lasted from 1572 to 1585. His memory ought to be especially dear to Irishmen, for he took a deep and active interest in their struggles, and sent them in money the funds with which he had purposed to build a college for Irish students in Rome. Gregory XIII. saw that the Reform of Luther had de-

tached from Catholic unity a great portion of Western Europe; it was necessary to have for them in Rome itself special schools in which should be trained missionaries belonging to the disaffected nationalities. Moreover, the vast regions in India and America opened up to the spread of Gospel truth were not sufficiently provided for by the great Religious Orders. It was needful to establish in Rome itself a central nursery for secular priests, who, under the immediate direction of the Holy See, would fill up the gaps in the great army of missionaries already at work in the New World, as in India, China, and Japan.

What the misfortunes of the time prevented Gregory XIII. from achieving, another Bolognese Pope, Gregory XV., was happy enough to carry out in 1622. Not only did he, through his brother, Cardinal Ludovisi, found and endow the Irish college contemplated by his predecessor; but he laid the foundations of the Propaganda, which Urban VIII., succeeding, in 1623, to the Papal chair, organized in all its parts. To the Congregation of Cardinals charged with the administration of the department of missions he handed over the present College of the Propaganda (ever since called after him *Collegio Urbano*). It is, in reality, such a school as we have been hitherto describing, where students from every land under the sun are thoroughly educated and trained for missionary work in their respective countries. The polyglot presses, the rich library, the ethnological museum mentioned in the beginning of this article, have been there since the time of the Eighth Urban, successive popes and cardinals, with other generous benefactors, adding continually to the resources of the establishment and its varied intellectual stores. The Propaganda press has rendered to Letters and Science the most splendid services. Its typographical excellence has never been surpassed. No student ever leaves this cherished *Alma Mater* without bearing with him a selection of books printed there. They are in his own native tongue,—a treasury above all price for him amid the labors of his apostleship.

This establishment, created when the Papacy was an independent sovereignty, placed under the safeguard of all Christian nations; its existence, its resources, its freedom guaranteed by the international law of Christendom,—is, then, cosmopolitan like the Papacy itself, like the Catholic Church of which the Papacy is the organic head and governing power.

Other educational institutions, destined to train missionaries for countries which had cast off, wholly or in part, their allegiance to the Holy See, existed or were created in Rome, and placed under the Congregation *De Propaganda Fide*. We have mentioned the Irish College. There were also the English College, the Scotch,

the German-Hungarian, the Greco-Ruthenian, without naming others. These stood in the relation of Halls to the great Central Schools, to which the students resorted for the public courses in Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences. All were auxiliary establishments to the Propaganda, sharing in the same generous methods of culture, and supported by the same unstinted system of munificence.

Among the most modern of the colleges thus established in Rome to aid the educational labors of the Propaganda, is the AMERICAN COLLEGE. It was called into existence by Pius IX., who always maintained a predilection for the Church in the United States. The first Provincial Council of New York was held on October 1st, 1854, Archbishop Hughes presiding. The decrees and minutes of the proceedings having been duly submitted to the Holy See, Pius IX., in answer to the Archbishops and Bishops, among other things, proposed the establishment of a College in Rome, in which students from all parts of the Union should be educated under the direction of the Propaganda. "By this means," the Holy Father says to the Prelates, "young men of your choice, and sent hither for the purpose of devoting themselves to the Church, will be reared like choice plants in a conservatory. They will be here imbued with both piety and learning, drawing Christian doctrine from its purest springs, being instructed in rites and ceremonies by that Church which is the Mother and Teacher of all Churches. They will be moulded on the best forms of discipline; and thus trained, they will go back to their native land, to fill with success the functions of pastors, preachers, and guides; to edify by an exemplary life, to instruct the ignorant, recall the erring to the paths of truth and righteousness; and, with the aid of solid learning, to refute the fallacies and baffle the designs of their adversaries."

Archbishop Hughes, if he had not suggested the thought of such a foundation to the Holy Father, at least entered warmly into the design. He threw the whole weight of his great influence into favoring the project, and was heartily seconded by his suffragans. The other archbishops and bishops throughout the country were no less hearty in their coöperation. Acting on this support, the Pope purchased, in 1857, the former Convent of the Umiltà, in the street of that name, at the foot of the Quirinal, and presented it to the American Hierarchy. The 42,000 Roman scudi, equal to the same sum in our dollars, was the Pope's donation to the American Church. Our prelates spent about as much more in repairs, alterations, and in furnishing all that was necessary to make the new college ready for its inmates. These expenses were met by collections made in all the dioceses of the Union.

The property thus handed over to the prelates of the United States was to be managed, and is still held and managed, by a board composed of all our Archbishops. They send to the Holy Father a list with three names, out of which he selects the Rector, who is paid by the Archbishops. Since its foundation, collections have been made annually in each diocese for the current expenses of the College; besides which, and to meet the increasing demands rendered necessary by an increase in the number of students, and by the requirements of a progressive establishment, extraordinary appeals were made in favor of the American College to our clergy and their flocks. In 1877-78, special collections were made for it all through the country, Monseigneur Doane, of Newark, devoting himself in a special manner to the unpleasant work of begging and collecting.

Thanks to all this zeal and generosity, the American College was enabled to purchase a villa or country house at Grotta Ferrata, whither, in the hot and unhealthy summer months, the students can retire from the dangerous atmosphere of Rome.

Such is the American College. Like all similar educational establishments in Rome, it is under the superintendence of the Congregation *De Propaganda Fide*, whose members derive not one dollar from the revenues of the College itself. They are donors and benefactors, rather than receivers and beneficiaries.

The College building and ground, donated by the then Sovereign of the Roman States, increased and improved by the moneys collected in the United States, as well as the villa at Grotta Ferrata, is the legitimate property of the Catholic Church in the United States. It was placed, from the beginning, under the double protection of the existing laws of the country and of the American Government.

No special precautions were taken, after the occupation of Rome, in 1870, by the armies of Piedmont, to secure the American College from occupation or confiscation, and for two good reasons:

The first, because the officers and students of the College, like the Archbishops and Bishops in the United States, who were its foster-parents, like all Americans, in fact, of whatever creed, deemed their home inviolable, because covered by the American Flag. We all felt sure that the same protection, which would, in case of need, be extended by our Government to any American citizen living in Rome, in a house purchased and owned by himself, would never be refused to Catholic Americans for the sole reason that they were Catholics.

Thank God, the College is now saved, and the American Government has nobly and promptly done its duty.

The second is that no one in Rome, or here in America, had,

after the Piedmontese occupation of Rome, any thought of possible danger to the Propaganda, to the property under its care, or to the Colleges directed by it. When the projects of 1866 and 1867, suppressing Religious Orders (or "Religious Associations," as the legislators termed them), became laws, it was expressly and solemnly declared by the King that these laws were not aimed at the Propaganda.

IT IS THE PROPAGANDA ITSELF WHICH WE MUST NOW SAVE!

It is not a "Religious Association," in the sense understood by the two laws of the Italian Parliament. The Congregation, or Board of Cardinals, charged, during more than two centuries and a half, with superintending and directing all the vast missionary enterprise of the Catholic Church, with guarding and promoting the interests of the Missions themselves, and with securing the training of a sufficient and competent number of laborers, is simply a Board or Committee. It would be absurd to liken, in legal phrase or for judicial purposes, the entire body of Cardinals to any one of the Religious Orders or Congregations of the Church, and whose suppression was aimed at by the Italian laws invoked by the Italian Court of Cassation, and on which it rests its sentence. This distinction is clearly stated in the *Times* editorial. The College of Cardinals is the Pope's Supreme Council, composed of men of all nationalities, helping him to govern the Universal Church, and representing in his council the interests of their respective countries. This College can no more be called a Religious Association than the Cabinet of our President, than the Senate and House of Representatives can be called Political Associations. They hold, in the Government of our country, with the Supreme Magistrate, the same place that the Cardinals hold with the Sovereign Pontiff in the government of the Catholic Church, in the administration of the spiritual concerns of 200,000,000 of Christians scattered all over the globe.

The Committees of Congress on "Foreign Affairs," on "Trade and Industry," etc., offer a closer analogy to the *Congregations* of Cardinals, which are only committees or boards, charged, each, with some one department of the vast administration of the Church. It is preposterous, on the face of it, to liken such a board to a Religious or Monastic Order, and to confound, by an unworthy and disingenuous construction of technical terms, the property used for the purposes of such administration with the property of Monastic Associations. Our Treasury Buildings in Washington, our War Office, our General Post Office, our Home Department, our State Department, are all "Federal" property, belonging to the Government,—the property of the entire people of the United States, not that of the State of Maryland, or of the city of Wash-

ington. Would our courts of law ever dream of considering or calling them the property of the respective Ministers with their staffs?

We can reason from this, on a ground of striking, if not perfect, analogy, to the organism we call Papacy, which is the Supreme Government in the Universal Church. Just as you could not confiscate, or alienate, or "convert" into scrip, the Executive Mansion and Department, the State Department, etc., *unless you suppress the Federal Government and Constitution by revolution*, so cannot the property, left to the Pope and to his Cardinals, for the absolute and indispensable necessities of their existence and administration, be confiscated, alienated, "converted," or in any way dealt with as the property of another, save only by the sheer force of revolution subverting the Papacy itself, and declaring its existence in Rome incompatible with the new state of things. But brute force cannot subvert the eternal foundations of right and justice.

The Italian Court of Cassation, in formulating its strange decision, and the Italian Government in justifying and explaining it through Minister Mancini, knew perfectly that they were doing the very thing which would most please their Revolutionary masters; all those, indeed, who, under various names, and for various reasons of their own, desire above all things the obliteration of the Papacy from Italy, and the downfall of the Catholic Church.

That this is the result directly aimed at, no one, who is acquainted with the antecedents of MM. Depretis and Mancini, as well as with those of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Cassation, will be disposed to deny. The professions of utter and irreconcilable hatred towards the Papacy and the great educational establishments it still controls in Rome, made time and again by the Prime Minister, and heartily reëchoed by Signor Mancini, leave no room to doubt that they will not rest satisfied with crippling the Pope and the Church by destroying or neutralizing the efficiency of the Propaganda. The next blow will be to throw aside the Law of Guarantees, and to declare the Vatican itself national property, convertible at any moment into Government scrip. This is what the "Anti-Clerical Circles" of Rome have been so long clamoring for, and what will most assuredly happen, unless the Powers step in and interpose their veto on the consummation of this supreme iniquity.

Fortunately, at this moment Catholics are not left alone to protest against the gratuitous, uncalled-for, and unjustifiable proceedings of the Italian Government. Eloquent voices in the non-Catholic Press of Europe and America denounce and condemn the verdict rendered. We need only quote a few to show clearly how

unprejudiced minds outside of the Church see the wrong done to civilization, as well as the injustice committed against the Propaganda and the great international interests represented by the latter.

"The functions of the Propaganda," says a foremost New York daily paper, "cannot be trammelled or enfeebled, without proportionably crippling the vital powers of the Church. That the Italian Government shrinks from avowedly contemplating such a result is clear, as also that it seeks, by ignoring the international character of the institution assailed, to avert interference on the part of Catholic Powers, and of those Protestant Powers, like Prussia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which number millions of Catholics among their citizens. As a matter of fact, the international character of the Papacy itself is not more demonstrable than is that of the Propaganda. Besides being an inseparable organ of the Roman Church, and therefore entitled to share its guarantees, the Congregation in question can draw impressive arguments for inviolability from the history of its endowments. Its resources have been created, not by Italian donors for national objects, but by cosmopolitan contributors for ecumenical ends.

"The essentially cosmopolitan origin of the property which the Italian tribunal has declared itself competent to partly confiscate, may be exemplified by the grievous predicament in which the American College at Rome, like all other adjuncts and outgrowths of the Propaganda, is now placed. The building occupied by this seminary, which at present gives instruction to some fifty students, and by which some of the most eminent Catholic ecclesiastics in the United States were educated, was purchased by the Propaganda thirty years ago, and the use of it granted in perpetuity to the American Bishops. The latter, on their part, contributed some \$50,000 for alterations and equipments, and of course these improvements will be disposed of with the building which is ordered to be sold. But would not our Government, which recognizes the duty of protecting Catholics and Protestants alike, be justified in protesting against the arbitrary conversion of property belonging to American citizens? Would it not have been prompt and loud in remonstrance had an American Protestant church or chapel in Rome been similarly menaced with partial confiscation?"

These last words point out the plain and urgent duty, the execution of which the entire Catholic body in the United States must now press upon Congress and the Executive.

"When we examine"—the article goes on to say—"the considerations on which the Court of Cassation bases its decision, and the exculpatory plea of M. Mancini set forth in his letter to the diplomatic representatives of the Italian Government, we see that

the Court gave judgment on the purely technical and disingenuous ground, that the Propaganda Congregation had not been specifically excepted by statute from the operation of the laws of 1866 and 1867, leveled at religious associations. We say 'disingenuous,' because it has been shown by official admission of Italian Ministers, and by the declaration of VICTOR EMMANUEL himself, that the laws named were never meant to strike at the mainstay and paralyze the vital organ of the Papacy, and because for ten years after the occupation of Rome the civil power, respecting the moral guarantee possessed by this institution, refrained from any attempt to harm it by an application of these proscriptive statutes."¹

From the Capital of the State of New York another influential Protestant journal thus vents its honest indignation.

"The act of the judicial branch of the Italian Government, in partially confiscating the property of the Propaganda at Rome, is robbery under the forms and to the shame of law. The Propaganda is the immense missionary and educational establishment of the Holy See. It is a University of Religion on the largest scale. It has been established and maintained at Rome by the contributions of Catholics in all parts of the earth. It has not been made or carried on by Italian money. It has incurred no obligations to the Italian State. It is as international as Catholicism itself. It does not exist for Italian objects, but for purposes as large and embracing as the work of the historical order of Christianity around the world.

"If the Italian Government undertook to confiscate the American Protestant chapel, or the doubtful Mr. Van Meter's 'ragged schools' in Rome, both built and maintained by American Protestants, a cry would go up from the Rio Grande to either Portland, *which the American Government would be swift to heed*. Great Britain, France, Spain, Germany, and Australia have far greater interests in the Propaganda than the United States have. Not the magnitude, but the reality of any interest, however, is that which kernels the principle of the thing.

"We have examined the technical excuses put forth by the Italian Government. They are unworthy of serious attention. They are devoid both of honor and honesty. The act is one of sheer spoliation. It is a political looting of the property of citizens of all parts of the earth, located at Rome, and dedicated to the cause of religion and learning. It is one of those malign acts which stamp the Italian Government as a concern inspired by an essentially piratical spirit. Even the most bigoted opponent of Catholicism

¹ New York Sun, March 13th, 1884.

will hardly insist that robbery is rendered honest, or stealing holy, by making Catholic Christians the victims of it."

This is strong language. Surely governments and statesmen, who still cling to the name of Catholic, and who are intrusted with the welfare of peoples an immense majority of whom are Catholics, must be surprised that Protestant publicists, in a free Protestant country, should thus energetically stigmatize acts for which there is, and can be, neither a sufficient motive nor a decent excuse. But the press of Europe has condemned, with a surprising animosity, both the judicial decision obtained by MM. Depretis and Mancini, and the flimsy apology sent forth to cover the judicial iniquity.

"The Court of Cassation of Rome," says the *Germania*, "which has decreed the liquidation of the property of the Propaganda, *has not found in the whole European press a serious journal to defend it*. The verdict is generally declared unsustainable in a legal point of view." Even the journals devoted to Italy "seek to extenuate the error by the false allegation, that in a financial point of view the conversion is an advantage to the Propaganda. But the question does not merely concern the effect produced by the judicial verdict, although the fate of the institution depends upon it; the question regards the legal value of the decision. That cannot be sustained, and the sentence is, therefore, of itself null and void."

In accordance with this comes to us the opinion of the official organ of the Court of Saxony, the *Dresden Journal*. "The property of the Propaganda belongs to the Universal Church, and as such, it is not only under the safeguard of the Catholic States, but also that of the right of nations. It is beyond doubt that the Catholic Church has an international existence, related to the rights of nations. This existence, as well as the unfailing maintenance of the resources disposed of by the Church, has a general interest for all Christendom."

The leading Italian newspaper, *La Gazzetta d'Italia*, although devoted to the new order of things introduced by the Revolution, has too much sagacity not to perceive that the Court of Cassation is wrong, and the government policy a terrible blunder. It urges on the Ministers the immediate and imperative necessity of having a law passed by the Chambers to exempt from conversion the Propaganda property; and that, for the twofold purpose of preventing serious international complications, and the universal odium sure to fall on both Government and Judiciary, as the result of an unwarranted and unwise act of spoliation. Such is also the advice given by another leading Italian journal, *La Nazione*.

¹ Albany Argus, March 16th, 1884.

We do not insist here on the ruinous effect of the "conversion" on all the property of the Propaganda. It is calculated that it would reduce its nominal value by one-third, besides placing all that great department of the Papal administration entirely at the mercy of the Government. It is the PRINCIPLE itself on which both the Government and the Supreme Court of Appeals proceed, that Catholics cannot admit, and that all true jurists must reject.

The Propaganda is not a religious association, a monastic order. We now come to what is for all American Catholics—indeed, for Catholics in every land—the DUTY OF THE HOUR, sacred, most urgent and imperative. To save both the Propaganda and the Pope's liberty. And, at the outset, let us express our grateful sense of the prompt action taken by President Arthur, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Astor in Rome.

Signor Mancini, in his circular to the representatives abroad of the Italian Government, turns aside from his direct path to the Government of the United States, that it must not interfere in a matter which does not concern it; as if the astute Minister of Foreign Relations had a presentiment that both our Executive and our Congress were sure to extend to American property, and the most sacred interests of American citizens imperilled in Rome, the protection never yet withheld in such cases.

There are around the Italian Ministers and their complaint judges, far-seeing Americans, who must have told them that the Catholic community in the United States, as well as all that is truly liberal and large-minded in the press and the public, would raise such a storm of indignant remonstrance as to compel, if need were, our Government to take, at length, at the eleventh hour, the firm and generous stand which should have been taken before the Piedmontese flag ever appeared under the walls of Rome.

At any rate, M. Mancini's arrogant words, meaning "we make our laws as we please, and you make yours as it suits you,"—remind us of a duty we owe ourselves, and which it is imperative that we do now, and do promptly and thoroughly. Clergy and laity owe it to themselves, to the Holy See outraged in its most vital prerogatives, and threatened, not only in its freedom of action, but in the very essential conditions of its existence in Rome, to take immediate and concerted action. There should be no delay. The Cardinal-Archbishop of New York, on the first intimation of the iniquity consummated, at once issued his eloquent pastoral. His voice has found a no less eloquent echo in the Archbishop of Baltimore and the Bishop of Albany. Doubtless, ere these lines are in print and the April number of the REVIEW is given to the public, all our Archbishops and Bishops will have protested with equal eloquence and solemnity against the baneful

measures of the Piedmontese Government in Rome,—against the wrong inflicted on Catholicity, on the Christian religion itself, on the best interests of civilization, by the virtual confiscation of the Propaganda property.

It is not by any means enough that our prelates should thus lift up their voices. The laity should at once use their own right of assembling and protesting. There should be meetings in every city, in every town, in every parish, and resolutions passed and transmitted to our representatives in both Houses of Congress, explaining the injury done to an institution which is not local, not Roman, not national or Italian, but international, cosmopolitan, Catholic. It belongs to all humanity; for the very aim of its founders and benefactors, the very nature of the education there given, the very character of its teaching, and its pupils, all point to a primary object,—the civilization and Christianization of the heathen, as well as the maintenance of a high intellectual and moral standard among Christian peoples themselves.

As we have seen, Protestants themselves consider that the crippling of the Propaganda means the crippling of the Church herself, the disabling her for the fulfilment of her mission,—to *teach all nations*.

Surely the duty of the hour is a most sacred and a most pressing one.

The best thing, in our judgment, the only telling thing, in fact,—the only one worthy of the emergency, and in any way fitted to meet its requirements, is to prepare for Congress, for our Government, a MEMORIAL signed by our Hierarchy, clergy, and people, diocese by diocese, simultaneously and at once!

We doubt not but the Catholics of British North America will be up and doing. Let us take care that they do not anticipate us. We owe this to the entire body of our non-Catholic fellow-citizens, who expect us to speak up for our dearest religious interests, our most sacred rights violated in Rome, and threatened with still further violation. Let our Holy Father and those who with him in Rome fight the battles of Christianity against unbelief, the battles of Christian society against Socialism and the Revolution, see that here, at least, in free America, we shall give him our utmost moral support, our practical aid as well as our heartfelt sympathy.

And we count with reason on the joint coöperation with us of Congress and the Executive. They will not fail us, unless we lamentably fail ourselves and the expectation of all Christendom.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK THE SECOND.

THE EMPERORS.

ONE of the first acts of Frederick Barbarossa, as emperor-elect, was to send his ambassador to the Pope to announce his election, but not to seek any Papal confirmation of it. He made his young cousin, Henry the Lion,¹ Duke of Bavaria as well as of Saxony, compensating the thereby deposed Duke of Bavaria, Henry, Margrave of Austria,² by erecting Austria into a separate duchy, hereditary in the female as well as in the male line, and by bestowing it jointly on himself and his Greek wife, Theodora.³ Austria was also enlarged by the addition of the lands between the Inn and the Ens, and the Duke and Duchess made Vienna the capital⁴ of their thus-enlarged duchy.

The Emperor received the homage of Sweyn, King of Denmark, who applied for his recognition as lawful king. He carried the sword of state before his lord, the Emperor, and was confirmed in his kingdom.

In 1154 Barbarossa proceeded to Italy, whither he had received a threefold application for his presence. He had been called by the Pope to support him against Arnold of Brescia⁵ and Roger of Sicily⁶; he had been invited by the Romans themselves, and also by the Lombard cities, then groaning under the overbearing tyranny of Milan.

The Emperor held his first Italian diet at Roncaglia, at which the Marquis of Montferrat⁷ complained of aggression on the part of the towns of Chieri and Asti, while Como, Cremona, Pavia, and Lodi accused Milan of injustice and oppression. At this diet, also, Henry the Lion resigned his ancestral Italian possessions to the Marquis of Este, the representative of the younger line of their common family.⁸

¹ As to him, see *ante*, p. 32. He had been engaged in a dispute with the Archbishop of Bremen, who denied to any new duke the right of investing his suffragans with their temporalities. The dispute was settled by the Emperor, who constituted Duke Henry his representative in such action performed within the ducal domain.

² As to him, see *ante*, p. 32.

³ See *ante*, p. 34.

⁴ Subsequently Henry the Lion, Duke of Bavaria, founded Munich.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 20.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 32.

⁷ He was the husband of an aunt of the Emperor, and also a descendant of Otho III.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 27.

Milan was rash enough to offend the Emperor grievously by not only refusing to furnish him with the nourishment it was legally bound to furnish him with, but also refusing even to sell him food. He therefore destroyed various Milanese castles, and besieged and took Tortona (Milan's confederate city), and subdued Chieri and Asti. At the siege of Tortona, a young man greatly distinguished himself, whose descendants still reign in Europe. This was Otho of Wittelsbach, Palsgrave of Bavaria, and a descendant of the former Dukes of Bavaria, the last of whom, Otho, was deposed by Henry IV., as before mentioned.¹ The city of Pavia was always strongly Imperialist and the great enemy of Milan; and to it Frederick proceeded, and was crowned there after the reduction of Tortona. This done, he proceeded towards Rome in order to meet Pope Hadrian IV.,—the Englishman,—who was harassed by the rebellious Romans and by his conflict with William of Sicily, son of King Roger, whose death took place in 1154. It was these Italian dissensions which rendered fruitless the coming of the aged Patriarch of Jerusalem, who with other prelates came to petition the Pope and others to succor the Holy City, sore-pressed by the encroaching Moslems.

The Pope was forced to leave Rome by its revolutionary inhabitants, who, however, were pretty readily amenable to the influences of religion; for no sooner was their city laid under an interdict than its alarmed citizens gave up Arnold of Brescia. He escaped, but was soon recaptured—falling into the Pope's hands, a convicted heretic and rebel. This compliance on the part of his subjects induced the Sovereign Pontiff to return to Rome, whence he twice visited the Emperor's camp at Sutri. On his first meeting with the Emperor there, he declined to give him the kiss of peace, on account of his neglect of certain formalities; but at his second visit—Frederick having dismounted first and duly held the Papal stirrup while the Holy Father descended from his horse—they became close allies and friends. A pompous and absurd address from the so-called "Roman Republic" having received a proper rebuke from the Emperor, and the Imperial troops having been introduced by night into the Leonine city, Arnold of Brescia was executed, and the next day (June 18th, 1155) Frederick was crowned by the Pope in St. Peter's, and thus for the first time a Hohenstaufen was formally installed with all due circumstances Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire! The Romans themselves, however, exasperated at this coronation performed in their despite, rose tumultuously, and lost one thousand of their number in a revolt. The Pope remained at the Vatican while Frederick Barbarossa advanced upon and destroyed Spoleto, which was rebellious

¹ See *ante*, p. 27.

to him, and then proceeded to Ancona, where envoys from the Emperor of the East waited upon him, seeking to engage him in joint action against William of Sicily. The desire of his German followers to return home forced him, however, to decline such coöperation, and to depart without rendering the Pope any further assistance, and leaving the Papal principality of Beneventum exposed to the action of the last-mentioned William. On his road back to Germany, the Emperor was almost caught in a trap at Verona. It had been planned that a bridge over the Adige should be destroyed as if by accident, when one-half the Imperial force had passed over it, while a Veronese noble, whose castle lay high up in the pass leading to Trent, should obstruct the Emperor's passage. The plan would have been successful but for the gallantry of Otho of Wittelsbach, who, with some adventurous followers, climbed up a summit above the castle so steep that it had been deemed inaccessible, and was left unguarded. Thence descending upon the castle unawares, it was easily captured, and all its garrison put to the sword except its lord and a dozen of his followers, who were hanged after its capture.

One of the matters which hastened the return northwards of Barbarossa was a revolt of the Slavonians—the last they made to obtain absolute independence. This revolt was suppressed by the Margrave Albert the Bear,¹ assisted by the Archbishop of Magdeburg.

Albert's son-in-law, Vladislas of Poland, supported by his namesake the Duke of Bohemia, craved help from the emperor against Boleslas IV. of Poland. Help was given, though with but an imperfectly successful result; Barbarossa received, however, the homage of Poland, and changed the Duke of Bohemia into its king. Other sovereigns also bowed before the Emperor's throne. Thus Waldemar I. of Denmark, having defeated and slain King Sweyn, sought and obtained an imperial recognition of his royalty. It was he who conquered the island of Rugen—the head-quarters of Northern idolatry.

An appeal also reached the Emperor from Hungary, made by Prince Stephen against King Geisa, who was made to do homage as well as Waldemar of Denmark, and Boleslas of Poland, who thus all became the Emperor's men.²

Various territorial changes were also effected by the Emperor at this time. Thus the Palatinate of the Rhine having become vacant,³ the Emperor added to it the county of Stahleck and certain

¹ As to him, see *ante*, pp. 28 and 32.

² The general recognition in Europe of the supremacy of the Emperor is shown by the letter which King Henry II. of England wrote to him.

³ By the death of the childless Palsgrave Herman, the Palatinate of the Rhine included Franconia west of the Rhine and also this part between the Rhine and the

Franconian fiefs, and then bestowed it on his half-brother Conrad (the son of his father's second marriage with Agnes of Saarbruck), and the Rhine Palsgrave was henceforth first Prince of the Empire and President of the Diet in the Emperor's absence.

Barbarossa also granted to Welf,¹ in consideration of his renouncing all pretence to Bavaria, certain lands belonging to the Great Countess,² who had formerly married his uncle. He was made Prince of Sardinia, Duke of Spoleto, and Marquis of Tuscany. In making this grant the Emperor transgressed the terms previously agreed upon by the Pope and the Emperor Lothar.³ He also was guilty of violation of the Calixtine Concordat,⁴ for he directly interfered in episcopal elections and invested Bishops with their temporalities without waiting for Papal sanction.

The Emperor, at Whitsuntide in 1156, married Beatrice,⁵ Countess of Burgundy,⁶ and was afterwards crowned king at Arles, where he received the homage of his feudatories.

He afterwards held a great diet at Besançon, where he received the homage of the Count of Provence and the Archbishop of Lyons; whither also came two legates from Pope Hadrian to complain of an outrage on the Archbishop of Lund. They, however, gave verbal offence, as in reminding the Emperor of the benefits he had received from the Holy See they spoke of those benefits by the equivocal word *beneficia*, which was also used to denote "fiefs." Certain nobles present understanding the word in this latter sense (as if it had been asserted that the Pope had conferred upon the Emperor his domains as Papal fiefs), dissension arose, when the legate, Cardinal Rolando, made matters worse by asking what but the Papacy was the root of the imperial power? On hearing this, Otho of Wittelsbach attempted to slay the Cardinal, and after quieting the tumult the Emperor sent the legates straight back to Rome.

The German prelates were inclined to range themselves, in this dispute, on the side of the Emperor, but Hadrian sent two more

Neckar. It was separated from the Mosel by a strip belonging to the Archbishopric of Treves.

¹ As to him see *ante*, pp. 27, 28, and 34.

² See *ante*, p. 20.

³ See *ante*, p. 30.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 20.

⁵ She died in 1185, and was buried at Speyer.

⁶ This county of Burgundy was part of the Kingdom. That Kingdom, though re-annexed to the Empire by Conrad II., was not successfully held by Lothar against the claimants—Renault of Chalons and the Duke of Zähringen—to the inheritance of the childless Count William, who had established himself as Lord of Franche Comté, when Conrad II. obtained the Kingdom. Renault had retained possession, and Beatrice was his daughter. To the Duke of Zähringen Frederick granted the greater part of Transjurane Burgundy (the northeastern part of the Kingdom), and the mesne suzerainty over the Bishopric of Geneva and some others, in compensation for his claim. The county of Burgundy nearly coincided with the Franche Comté of to-day.

legates to explain inoffensively the offending word, whereupon peace was restored, and the Emperor at the head of his chivalry again crossed the Alps (in 1158) to subdue the rebellious Italian cities. Verona was no longer one of these, having submitted and promised to give her aid against Milan. Such aid was by no means to be despised, the power of the great city of St. Ambrose being very great. During the Emperor's absence in the north, she had not only rebuilt Tortona, but had waged war with the Emperor's allies—with the Marquis of Montferrat, with various cities, Novara and Cremona being amongst the number,—and had destroyed Lodi.

Two Imperial commissioners preceded Barbarossa. One was the Palsgrave of Bavaria, Otho von Wittelsbach, the other was the Imperial chancellor, Reginald, Bishop of Köln. They visited the now loyal Verona, and also Ravenna, Rimini and Ancona. At the last-named city they found the Greek general Paleologus in the act of raising troops to serve against the King of Sicily, and intriguing to bring about the reannexation of that littoral region once more to the Eastern Empire. He was, however, expelled from the port of Ancona by the two commissioners.

Meanwhile the Emperor himself crossed the Alps, and, after receiving hostages from Brescia, besieged and took Milan, whose inhabitants—coming forth to meet him as suppliants, barefoot and with swords or halters suspended about their necks—were spared by him this time, as well as their city. He then proceeded to Monza (where he was crowned King of Italy with the Iron crown), and afterwards held a diet at Roncaglia.

This diet is very memorable as presenting one of the earliest instances of that advance towards classical Cæsarism and that recession from Teutonic common law, which were amongst the greatest banes of the approaching Renaissance. At Roncaglia certain Bolognese doctors of civil law laid down as authoritative some legal principles of ancient Imperial jurisprudence, but opposed to feudal freedom. Thus these legists asserted that the Emperor alone had the right to nominate the magistrates of cities, tax their revenues and levy tolls, and that, therefore, he ought to take back to himself the various franchises which had been granted from time to time by his predecessors. These principles were sanctioned and adopted by the diet, and thus the legists, who had for some time been trying to advance their own importance and the imperial power at the expense of Christian liberty, obtained for the first time a public approbation of their revived Cæsarism. In return for such support, the Emperor raised the school of Bologna to the rank of a university.

Frederick was now at the height of his power, and even Genoa,

which had begun to resist him, took the oath of allegiance, and sent him aid and tribute. His decline now began through certain unjustifiable, anti-Papal acts which involved him in trouble of all kinds. To a Christian letter from the Pontiff cautioning him against undue self-exaltation, he replied by affirming that the Popes owed their greatness to the emperors, and by disputing the Papal claim to the Matilda inheritance, especially to the islands of Sardinia and Corsica,¹ which the Pope maintained to be fiefs of the Holy See. The Emperor also strongly objected to a peace made by Hadrian with the King of Sicily and to an investiture given to that king of domains to be held by the Holy See. But in this Hadrian only followed the example of his predecessors.² Meanwhile the decrees of the diet of Roncaglia, in forms of ancient pagan law, were preparing fresh troubles in Northern Italy. Milan was boiling with indignation at the prospect of the loss of her ancient liberties, and when the Emperor's commissioners came there to carry out the decrees of the diet and to install new and imperially-appointed magistrates, a revolt broke out and the commissioners had to fly for their lives. This revolt was followed up by the attack and capture of the Imperial castle of Trezzo, the Italians found within it being slaughtered. Frederick advanced to punish the revolted citizens—on his way attacking and taking the city of Crema, which had abandoned the Imperialist Cremona, with which it was before allied, in order to join with Milan. The siege lasted seven months, with terrible cruelties on both sides. Crema yielded in 1160, when it was sacked and burned, its inhabitants, however, being allowed to depart.

A few months before this event Pope Hadrian died. The majority of the cardinals quickly elected in his place Cardinal Rolando Baudinelli, who took the title of Alexander III. A minority of the cardinals, however, subsequently elected Cardinal Ottaviano, who styled himself Victor IV. This gave Barbarossa an excellent opportunity to assume a virtual supremacy over the Church as well as the state, by adjudicating between the rival Pontiffs, re-assuming the position of the imperial Othos.

Pope Alexander, however, strenuously guarded himself against such action, asserting unequivocally that his place was to judge, not to be judged. Frederick, nevertheless, did not fail to make an attempt to seize the opportunity. He called a general council at Pavia to decide the question, which council, however, consisted but of some seventy bishops of Germany and Italy, who could not

¹ In 1092 the Pope had given Corsica to Pisa as a fief of the Holy See. In the eleventh century Sardinia was conquered by Pisa and Genoa. These states disputed as to its possession, Pisa, however, remaining mistress.

² Leo IX. and Innocent II. See *ante*, pp. 19 and 31.

but have been aware of the Emperor's mind from the very terms of the summons which each received, in which Victor was styled "Bishop" of Rome, and Alexander "Chancellor" only.

A certain hostility to Alexander on the part of the Emperor is after all only what might have been anticipated, seeing that he was the very Cardinal who had given such offence at the Diet of Besançon. As might also have been anticipated, the Antipope Victor was ready to court imperial power. He answered the summons, appeared at Pavia, and proffered obedience to its decision, which was naturally given in his favor. The decision having been pronounced, Barbarossa received him with all due formalities—holding his stirrup, and kissing his slipper. Then Victor sang High Mass, and excommunicated Alexander, by whom he was also excommunicated, and both claimants sent legates to the various European powers.

From the summer of 1161 till early in 1162 the Emperor blockaded Milan. It then surrendered for a second time, its citizens again coming forth with halters and swords about their necks, hoping for mercy. Their lives, indeed, were again spared, but not their city. This, with the exception of certain churches, was now, by the Emperor's order, destroyed, the citizens of Lodi, Como and Novara zealously aiding in the work of destruction. It was this destruction which occasioned the acquisition by Köln of its celebrated relic of the so-called Three Kings. These relics had before reposed in Milan, but now Frederick Barbarossa gave them to his Chancellor, Archbishop Reginald, who removed them to his city on the Rhine, where they still repose. Meantime, the Archbishop of Mainz had been murdered by his citizens, and Conrad Von Witeltsbach (brother of the gallant Otho) had been appointed in his place by the Antipope Victor. Germany also retained the Emperor himself, after granting freedom of election of their own magistrates to the three above-named cities, who had aided him against Milan, and also to ever-faithful Pavia, while feudal rights over Tuscan towns were bestowed on trusty Pavia.

Meanwhile Alexander, driven from Rome by the disorders of its citizens, had retreated by way of Sicily to Genoa, whence (after the fall of Milan and the thereby-increased power of the Emperor) imperial hostility compelled him to return to France. Then a council of French, Burgundian and English bishops assembled at Toulouse, and hailed him as the true Pope.

After some coquetting with the Emperor and his Antipope, the King of France, Louis VII., finally acknowledged Alexander. Thereupon Reginald, Archbishop of Köln, plainly observed the Erastianism of Frederick's supporters by declaring that the Emperor had as exclusive a right to decide a disputed Papal election

as had the King of France in the case of a French bishop, and that the Emperor's appeal to a council was a mere act of courtesy and not the recognition of any right on the part of a council as inferior to his own right.

In the year 1163 Barbarossa proceeded to Mainz, where he punished its Archbishop's murderers, and bestowed on the nephew (son of Prince Vladislav of Poland) the Papal Duchy of Silesia, which then was already beginning to be rather German than Polish, to the great¹ contentment of the Margrave of Brandenburg, who was ever competing with the Polish Sovereign for dominion over Pomerania, and who, therefore, delighted in whatever diminished the power of Poland. Another tract of Slavonian country also now finally became German. This was the country of the Obotrites,² which is now Mecklenburg. It was annexed to Saxony by Henry the Lion, after a war undertaken to repress a rebellion³ of the heathen Slavonians.

Disputes in Lombardy, excited by the tyranny and profligacy of the Imperial officers, caused the Emperor to return to Italy before the expiration of the year, and there he was detained by the death of his Antipope and by a contention respecting the island of Sardinia.⁴ The Antipope Victor died in April, 1164, but the opportunity for peace thus afforded was lost by the action of two schismatical Cardinals, who elected a fresh Antipope called Pascal III. He was as rashly as perversely acknowledged by the Emperor.

Meanwhile, Germany became full of disorders, amongst which the historical names of *Hapsburg* and *Hohenzollern* make their appearance; and it is interesting to note that they do so in opposition,

¹ See *ante*, p. 32.

² See *ante*, p. 24.

³ Niblot, the Slavonian chief (see *ante*, p. 31, note 3), having died, and his sons Pribislaw and Werterlaw having (after fruitless rebellion) become strict vassals of Henry the Lion, they, nevertheless, rebelled again and again, till at last Henry took the latter prisoner to Branich, and hanged him, and drove Pribislaw into Pomerania.

⁴ Sardinia and Corsica, after their deliverance from the Saracens, remained under the government of certain native hereditary Counts or "judges." Four such seem to have existed in Sardinia, even prior to the arrival of the Arabs. Corsica coming, in 1045, under the dominion of the Holy See, was granted by it, as a fief, to the Pisans. Sardinia was conquered from the Saracens by the combined efforts of the Genoese; and the Genoese (by agreement) contented themselves with booty; but the Pisans appointed the courts or "judges" of the island, holding it under the Great Countess, Pisa itself being part of the Duchy of Tuscany. To Sardinia, then, the Pope had a twofold claim: (1) as an island recovered from the Infidels, and (2) as part of the Countess Matilda's domains. At the time referred to in the text, the possession of the island was contested by the Genoese and Pisans—the powers repudiating their agreement to be contented with booty only. Now, the Emperor Barbarossa had acceded to the prayer of one of the Sardinian judges, named Barasone, and granted him the island as a tributary-vassal kingdom. The stipulated tribute, however, Barasone could not pay, and when he applied to the Genoese, they took him prisoner, at the same time making use of his name as a justification of their war with Pisa and their repudiation of the old agreement.

thus beginning that contentious rivalry which was (temporarily and permanently) put an end to in our own time on the bloody field of Sadowa.

It is in a dispute between the dukes of Spoleto and Zäringen that we find ranged in opposition the Count of Hapsburg on the one hand, and the Duke and Palsgrave of Swabia, assisted by the Count of Hohenzollern, on the other.

Having succeeded in calming these domestic broils, the Emperor hoped to secure the adherence of England to the cause of his Antipope. This hope was raised by the then raging quarrel between Henry II. and St. Thomas of Canterbury, in which the Holy See was in opposition to the English king. Hence, when Frederick, in 1165, summoned the diet of Würzburg, two English envoys appeared at it. At that diet the strength which Erastianism had obtained, even in this twelfth century, was conspicuously displayed. The Archbishop of Köln then and there demanded that oaths should be taken—and he himself took them—never to acknowledge Pope Alexander or any other Pope elected by his supporters, and never to elect an emperor who would not agree to maintain the same position. From this, however, the Archbishops of Mainz¹ and Salzburg² dissented, for which act they were deposed, and Christian Von Buch installed as Archbishop of the former see.³

But the Erastian spirit of the time, not content with seeking to subdue the Church Militant, aspired even to dominate in the Church Triumphant. Frederick's Antipope, Pascal, now proceeded to enrol the Emperor Charlemagne amongst the saints—a strange promotion, which the Church has never since confirmed.

The Pope and Emperor, as estranged as ever morally, began to approach each other geographically. For Alexander,—after visiting Sicily, where he had obtained the promise of support from King William—returned to Rome; while Frederick returned to Lombardy. He accomplished this, his fourth Italian expedition, at the head of a large army, and passed on to besiege Ancona. That city was a focus of Greek intrigue, the Eastern Emperor having even promised to reunite the Greek Church to the Latin communion, and to assist the Pope with money against the Antipope Pascal, in return for having the whole Holy Roman Empire bestowed upon him.

But it was a less dignified, though better and more efficient, succor which the Pope was destined to receive. The growing

¹ Conrad Van Wittelsbach, the Palsgrave, Otho's brother.

² The brother of Henry, Duke of Austria, and uncle of the Emperor.

³ A Prelate who is said to have enrolled the infamous women who followed his mercenary bands into a regiment of Amazons.

exasperation of the Lombard cities went on increasing until, on the 7th of April, 1167, there began to be formed that anti-imperial union amongst them which is known in history as the "Lombard League," and which was sanctioned by the Holy See. To this league belonged,¹ in the first place, rebuilt and refortified, Milan, with Bologna, Ferrara, Mantua, Parma, Piacenza, Modena, Brescia, Treviso, Vicenza, Verona, Padua and Venice, and also, ultimately, the two cities, hitherto imperial, of Lodi and Cremona. Amongst the names of the commanders appears, for the first time in history, that of Ezzelino de Romano. Meanwhile struggles were taking place between the disorderly and disobedient Romans and the towns of Tivoli, Albano, and Tusculum (now-a-days Frascati), and between the partisans of the Emperor and the Papal supporters, aided by Sicily. Frederick advanced upon the Eternal City, the Pontiff Alexander retreating to Beneventum. Thereupon the Antipope, Pascal, was solemnly installed by Barbarossa, who, with his Empress Beatrice, was crowned by him, the Antipope and Emperor reciprocally swearing fidelity each to the other. The imperial triumph thus seemed complete, but disaster trod fast upon the heels of success. A pestilence so fatally attacked the Emperor's troops that his army melted away like snow before the sun, and the German Sennacherib (as St. Thomas of Canterbury aptly termed him) fled with difficulty northwards to Pavia. Amongst the dead were Reginald, Archbishop of Köln, and the Emperor's two cousins, the Duke of Swabia and the younger Welf, with many bishops, earls and knights. But the Emperor could not maintain himself even at Pavia. Italy was practically lost to him, and in the Spring of 1168 he finally escaped into Germany, a fugitive, with but five followers to represent the magnificent army with which he had entered the Peninsula to master the spiritual sovereignty of the world. Nor would he even have escaped at all but for the devoted fidelity of a German knight, Herman von Sieben-eichen, who placed himself a willing victim in his master's bed at Susa, while that master secretly escaped—a plot to murder him having been formed to avenge certain Italian hostages whom he had hanged during his retreat.

More than six years now elapsed before he ventured again to cross the Alps; but if a practically dethroned Italian potentate, he was as much as ever King of Germany. That title, however, was also bestowed, in 1169, upon his son Henry, aged five years, who was crowned king at Aachen, by the new Archbishop of Köln, Philip von Heinsberg.

¹ The cities which favored the imperial cause were Pavia, Turin, Savona, Albenga, Tortona, Faenza, Ravenna, and Rimini. Cremona, Como, and Pisa were also generally favorable to it, as was sometimes Genoa.

The Emperor also provided for his four other sons,—Frederick, Conrad, Otho and Philip,—as (1st) Duke of Swabia; (2d) Duke of Franconia; (3d) Count of Burgundy,¹ and (4th) lord of certain fiefs, respectively. He maintained, generally, an external peace, though his persistent patronage of the Antipope was the occasion of much internal oppression. This led him to depose various abbots, and the Bishop of Passau; and he succeeded in forcing the Archbishop of Salzburg to renounce his allegiance to the Pope and adopt the schism. This prelate was Prince Adalbert of Bohemia, who had succeeded Archbishop Conrad (the Emperor's uncle), an unswerving partisan of Pope Alexander.

The Emperor successfully maintained his supremacy over the Poles and Bohemians, while the whole of that Slavonian district which is now Mecklenburg was incorporated with Saxony, Slavonian idolatry being rooted out from its last stronghold² by the joint efforts of Duke Henry the Lion and his daughter's³ father-in-law, Waldemar. Henry himself had now married the English Princess, Matilda, and was at the summit of his power and greatness. Meanwhile a very important event had taken place in Italy. This was the death of the Antipope, Pascal, which took place in September, 1168. His death did not, however, immediately heal the schism, which was destined to drag on almost nine years longer.

A fresh Antipope was elected,—namely, Abbot Giovanni di Strama, who took the title of Calixtus III. He was immediately recognized by the Emperor. This unhappy Antipope, however, never attained even such a measure of success as befel either of his predecessors. The King of England, who was now persistent for Becket's martyrdom, was hostile to him from the first; and the Emperor himself, in spite of the rash oath he had taken at Würzburg, secretly sent messengers to Alexander to propose terms, all of which, however, were refused, that Pontiff demanding absolute submission.

During the Emperor's absence from Italy the Archbishop of Mainz had vigorously upheld the imperial cause, and had perseveringly, though ineffectually, besieged Ancona. In September, 1174, however, the Emperor for a fifth time entered Italy. He

¹ Otho was the Son of Beatrice, Countess of Burgundy. He was also Count Palatine. He died in 1200, leaving a daughter Beatrix, who married a prince of the house of Andechs,—namely, Otho, Duke of Merania, in the Tyrol and Voithland. He was also Marquis of Istria, and Prince of Dalmatia. He died in 1234, and was succeeded by his son Otho.

² The island of Rugen.

³ This daughter was his eldest—the widowed Duchess of Swabia. The name of her husband (Waldemar's son) was Knut.

came with a German army, yet one which included no Saxons or Bavarians, their great duke having ungratefully refused to join the expedition.

After burning Susa (whence he had so narrowly escaped), he attacked a newly built city, erected as a bulwark against him by the Lombard League, and named *Alexandria*, after their great Papal patron. After blockading it for six months in vain, Frederick had to submit to the humiliation of a truce; which done, he committed the gross imprudence of disbanding his army. Hostilities recommencing, the Emperor hastily sought reinforcements; but Henry the Lion still refused his aid, although during an interview at Chiavenna Frederick even knelt to beg for it. It may be hoped that this ungracious refusal was partly, if not largely, due to Henry's fidelity to the Pope, Alexander, which he had generally, and especially of late, favored.

The Archbishops of Germany, however, brought help to their Emperor, but too late. Before they could join him, there took place the eventful battle of Legnano, where he was utterly defeated, and was even supposed to have lost his life. He made his way to his ever faithful Pavia, and then earnestly besought peace. The Pope refused him all terms which should not include his Lombard allies. After many efforts, however, and after the Emperor, having submitted, had been absolved by a nuncio, the Pope and Emperor met at Venice on the 25th of July, 1777. The Emperor knelt and received the kiss of peace, the Pope shedding tears of joy at this happy termination of so long a struggle. Although the Emperor submitted, the Pontiff also made concessions, going even so far as to ratify acts which had been approved by anti-popes. Thus he confirmed the previous imperial appointments to sees, including that of Von Buch to Mainz, the expelled Archbishop, Conrad, being translated to Salzburg. It was also agreed that the Emperor should retain the Matilda domains for fifteen years. The Antipope, Calixtus, afterwards submitted himself. He was most kindly received by Alexander, invited to sit at his table, and was well provided for in the Principality of Beneventum.

The Emperor and Empress then journeyed through Genoa to Arles, where they were crowned as king and queen; and then returned to Germany, to find Saxony a prey to civil war, through the misconduct of its duke. After having been in vain summoned to three successive diets, Henry the Lion was deprived of his duchies, though upon his submission (after many warlike efforts), he was allowed to retain the Duchy of Brunswick, with Luneburg; and being banished, sailed in 1152 with his duchess, Matilda, to her native country. The Lion's domains were divided amongst various

recipients. Otto of Wittelsbach¹ was made Duke of Bavaria—the provinces of Carinthia and Styria being separated from that duchy. The Christian Duke of the Obotrites was made Duke of Mecklenburg and an immediate vassal of the Emperor, as was also the Count of Holstein. Lübeck became a free imperial city. The Lion's Westphalian fiefs went to the Sec of Köln, and others of the fiefs were granted to the Landgrave of Thuringia, the Archbishops of Magdeburg and Bremen, and various bishops. The thus diminished and despoiled Duchy of Saxony was granted to Bernard, who was a son of Albert the Bear, and also brother to Otto, Margrave of Brandenburg.²

At a general council convoked by the Pope, which met in March, 1179, it was enacted that a majority of two-thirds of the electing Cardinals should thenceforth be necessary for a valid Papal election. Complaints were also laid before the assembly of the advance of heresy, both in Northern Italy and in Southern France.

In August, 1181, Alexander died and was succeeded by Lucius III. Nearly two years afterwards (January, 1183) the memorable peace of Constance was made, which insured the practical independence of the Italian cities. It was thereby agreed that these cities were to have self-jurisdiction, on the condition that the chief magistrate, or Podesta, of each city, should receive investiture from the imperial deputy, except when the Bishop had been in the habit of exercising that right. Each city was also bound to provide food for the Emperor when passing through Italy. Every ten years their oath of allegiance was to be renewed, but they were to have the right of raising troops and even of waging wars.

Ezzelino de Romano became at this time the Emperor's man, and henceforth continued a strong Ghibelline. Conrad of Wittelsbach, so recently translated to Salzburg, was now retranslated to Mainz to fill the chair left vacant by the death of Archbishop Christian.

The vast empire being now at peace, the Emperor celebrated the event by holding a great diet at Mainz upon the Whitsuntide of 1184. Upwards of 40,000 Knights are said to have been present at it, where the most gorgeous festivities took place, whereat the Rhine Palsgrave, the Duke of Saxony, the Marquis of Brandenburg, and the King of Bohemia acted as the Imperial server, marshal, chamberlain, and cupbearer respectively, and Casimir, King of Poland, did homage.

¹ The lineal ancestor of the Elector Palatine, husband of Elizabeth of England and ancestor of Queen Victoria. The Wittelsbach thus held the throne of Bavaria.

² Otto had succeeded his father, Albert the Bear, and was arch-chamberlain. The new Duke of Saxony, Bernard, became arch-marshal. In him Saxony returned to the ancient Billung line, his father's mother being the co-heiress, Elike (see *ante*, pp. 27 and 28).

The Emperor now returned to Italy for the sixth and last time, leaving Germany under the care of the young King, Henry. He met Pope Lucius at Verona, to whom, however, he was still inclined to be rebellious. He was warmly welcomed at Milan, whose inhabitants he freed from all feudal restrictions as to field-sports. He sought to obtain Constance, the heiress of the Sicilian crown, as a wife for his son Henry, but to this marriage the Pope, as was natural, was strongly opposed, as the effect of such a marriage would have been to inclose the Papacy within the embrace of one huge power. The Pope recollected how often the southern kingdom had given aid against the northern Kaiser and the northern Kaiser against a Sicilian foe. To have consented to the union of these persons would have been nothing less than suicidal.

Pope Lucius, however, died in November, 1185, and was succeeded by the Archbishop of Milan, who took the name of Urban III. He failed to maintain resistance, and so the Sicilian princess was carried in great state to Milan, and there married to Henry, King of the Romans, in January, 1186. The Pope, however, protested against the marriage, and also against various wrongful acts on the part of Frederick—his invasion of various episcopal and monastic privileges and his retention of the much-disputed Matilda heritage.

The Emperor now returned to Germany, leaving his son in conflict with the Pope, and the young King showed himself a true heir of his Hohenstaufen sires, by his antipapal actions. He blockaded the Pope in Verona, while his father was struggling with Philip, Archbishop of Köln. Urban excommunicated both father and son at Verona, for which act that city was placed under the ban of the Empire. At this moment of intestine disorder in the Latin empire came the startling and appalling news of the fall of Jerusalem. The keys of the Holy City had been given up to Saladin¹ on the 2d of October, 1187. Its fall was largely brought about by the excessive jealousies, divisions, and corruptions of the Christians of Palestine. This is partly shown by the following revolting facts: The Patriarch Heraclius was living in open adultery with a woman nicknamed "Patriarchissa." Prince Bohemond of Antioch was at open war with the Church and so worried the clergy and plundered the churches—in revenge for his excommunication for adultery—that his principality had to be laid under an interdict. The earlier Patriarch, Pulcher (the same who came to Italy in 1154), was violently interrupted while

¹ Guy de Lusignan, second husband of Sibylla, sister of Baldwin IV., had been crowned King the year before on the death of the infant King of Jerusalem, Baldwin V. King Guy was taken prisoner at the fall of the Holy City.

preaching, by the Knights of St. John—one entering the church with a bended bow. A crusading Bishop of Beauvais married Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat, and husband of Theodora, a living Greek Princess, to Isabel, who was another man's wife. For this all the parties were excommunicated by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Another noble, Renauld de Chatillon, had caused the aged Patriarch to be seized, had his bald head smeared with honey and exposed him in a broiling sun till the torment of insects forced him to yield up certain treasures. The Count of Tripoli, to save his domains, applied to Saladin and obtained a Saracen guard to act against his fellow-Christians. Such disorganization and disorder, together with the rapaciousness and insubordination of the Knights Templars, abundantly accounted for the fall of the Christian kingdom.

Efforts had not been wanting to avert the blow on the part of Rome. Alexander III. had vainly tried to unite Henry II. of England and Philip Augustus of France, for one grand crusade. Pope Urban died of the shock which the receipt of the news of the fall of Jerusalem gave him, and the Emperor, in spite of his age, assumed the Cross. He held his last diet at Mainz, where he confided Germany to his son, King Henry; and then in May, 1189, set forth, the German host passing by Regensburg to Belgrade. They were sadly harassed by the Bulgarians, and by the treachery of the Greek Emperor, Isaac, which so enraged the Emperor Frederick that he wrote to his son, King Henry, to get ready the fleets of the Italian States for an attack on Constantinople.

Early in 1190 he crossed the Bosphorus, and in spite of having made a treaty with the Sultan of Iconium had yet to fight his way in Asia Minor before he marched on to Seleucia. On the 10th of June, 1190, he was accidentally drowned in crossing the river Seleph, to the dismay and horror of his army. He was buried at Antioch by his gallant son, the Duke of Swabia. Many of his followers died of starvation, and the remnant joined the Christians at the siege of Acre. In these crusades England, France and Italy had joined, but Knut VI., King of Denmark, refused; that country, like Spain and Portugal, having a permanent crusade of its own.

At the siege of Acre died Frederick, Duke of Swabia, above-mentioned. It is noteworthy that, before his death, he founded in the Holy Land the order of Teutonic Knights. He was much struck by the charity of some owners of vessels from Lübeck and Bremen, who had erected a temporary tent hospital for the sick poor. They made it over to the Duke and his officers, and a hut and wooden chapel were added to the tent hospital.

Amongst the servers of this institution were members of a German hospital of St. Mary, which had existed in Jerusalem before

its fall. The Duke blended the whole into an order of German Knights Hospitallers, and Henry von Walpot was their first Grand Master. Each knight wore a white cloak with a black cross.¹

While this fatal crusade was proceeding, Henry, the young king of the Romans, had to contend with Henry the Lion, who, having revolted, was again put under the ban of the Empire. Being subdued, he had to yield up his son, Lothar, as a hostage and to send his younger son, Henry, to perform feudal service. The king then granted peace to the Lion, who for a time seemed to be really submissive. He was the more ready to grant this peace on account of news from Sicily, which called his wife to the throne of that kingdom, to which he hastily dispatched his chancellor, Diether, and whither he was hastening to follow when he received the news of his father's death.

In the autumn of 1190 Henry, now the Emperor Henry VI., set out for south Italy, having commanded an army to be raised in all speed for Tuscany, under his general Testa. An army was necessary because his wife, Constance, daughter of Roger, king of Sicily, and aunt of King William, just deceased, was denied possession of her rights by Tancred, her illegitimate relative (a bastard son of a son of King Roger), who had been chosen sovereign in her place.²

Testa entered Apulia, and ravaged in his turn a country previously ravaged by the emissaries of Tancred, especially by his brother-in-law, the Count of Acena, who cruelly and traitorously put to death an opponent who came on invitation to a conference, on the temporary retreat northwards of Testa. Tancred, thus successful on both island and mainland, had his son Roger crowned and married to Irene, daughter of Isaac, Emperor of the East. Meanwhile the Emperor Henry was joyfully received at Milan, when he attempted, more or less successfully, to reconcile the quarrelsome and disorderly cities of Lombardy, and obtained promises from both Geneva and Pisa³ of the aid of their fleets against Tancred, in return for which they were to enjoy a monopoly of the foreign trade of Sicily. Early in 1191 he proceeded to Rome, where the citizens were quarrelling with Pope Clement III., on account of his protection of Tusculum against their virulent hostility.

¹ This order must not be confounded with another military order, the knights of which also wore a white mantle. Their mantle, however, was ornamented with two red swords crossed obliquely, with the points downwards. This order was founded in 1209, and existed in Livonia and was called the order of "The Brothers of the Sword." They subsequently joined the Teutonic order.

² The history of Frederick the Second's maternal ancestry and relations will be treated under a separate heading.

³ The Pope had now divided Sardinia between these two cities—the son of "King" Barasone becoming a simple count and vassal of Genoa.

That Pope, dying on Lady Day of that year, was succeeded by Celestine III.

Henry VI. was well educated and accomplished, as well as vigorous and energetic, but he was also harsh, cruel and perfidious. The Hohenstaufens thus seemed to degenerate as they succeeded one another. He conciliated the Pontiff by certain small concessions, and, with his wife Constance, was crowned by him on the 15th of April. This ceremony accomplished, Henry, to please the Romans, withdrew his garrison from Tusculum, surrendering to their brutality its unfortunate inhabitants, who were slain or mutilated, while the town itself was totally destroyed, to be afterwards rebuilt under the name of Frascati.¹ At the end of the month the Emperor, disregarding Papal advice, descended into Apulia, the nobles of which province hastened to do homage to him and Constance. He then advanced and besieged Naples, which was defended by Count Accena, his Empress during the siege taking up her abode at her loyal town of Salerno. There she was seized and carried off to Sicily to Tancred, when sickness had compelled the northward retreat of the Imperial army, the Emperor himself being stricken down and a report of his death being spread about.

He was forced to abandon, for a time, any purpose of rescuing Constance, for a fresh rebellion of Henry the Lion imperatively called him back to Germany. That return was not fruitless, for the Lion not only submitted, but promised to follow the Emperor, and with all his power aid him in the conquest of Sicily—the hand of Agnes, daughter of the Rhine Palsgrave,² being granted to his son Henry.³ Meanwhile, Welf, Duke of Spoleto, having died, the Emperor invested his own brother, Conrad,⁴ with his domains and the Duchy of Swabia.

During the Emperor's enforced absence, the efforts and orders of Pope Celestine had caused Tancred to release the Empress; and now Henry prepared to enforce his claims on Sicily, being aided in his task by the ransom-money from King Richard of England, whom he disgracefully held in captivity till February, 1194.

A little before this date died Tancred's son Roger, who left no child by his wife Irene. Tancred himself followed his son to the grave, being succeeded by his second son, William, a mere child, who was crowned on the 20th of February, 1194. Tancred's widow, Sibylla, took up the government as regent for her young son.

In the June following, Henry VI. crossed the Alps with a pow-

¹ Said to have been so called from the boughs, or "frasche," of which the first huts of the new town were constructed.

² Brother of the late Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa.

³ His other son, Lothar, had died.

⁴ His brother, Frederick, having (as will be remembered) died at the siege of Acre.

erful army, and entering Apulia, again received the homage of its nobles. Salerno, however, was stormed, sacked and burned in revenge for its surrender of the Empress. Henry, having conquered the mainland, crossed to Messina, where the Pisans and Genoese had preceded him and fallen into deadly conflict, in spite of the efforts of Henry's esteemed officer, Markwald von Anweiler. He then advanced on Palermo, whence Sibylla with her children and adherents had flown to the fortress of Calatabellata; while the Emperor, as king of Sicily, took possession of the capital. At this time the Empress Constance was away at Jesi in the March of Ancona, expecting her confinement. Sibylla, her rival in Sicily, unable to hold out any longer, surrendered to Henry on receiving a promise that the principality of Tarentum should be granted to her son, and that her partisans should not be deprived of their possessions. Thereupon the Emperor Henry was crowned king of Sicily in the Cathedral of Palermo.

Genoa then put in her claim to grants, which had been expressly promised to her by the Emperor. These he now, however, not only refused, but he also revoked privileges which she had formerly enjoyed. To Pisa, on the other hand, he granted the mesne supremacy over Corsica, Elba and some smaller islands, with the right to establish factories in the two Sicilies. This singular inconsistency should be borne in mind, in order the better to understand the later conduct of these two republics.

The favorable terms promised to the Sicilians were far from being maintained. On Christmas day the Emperor declared that he had received evidence from a monk of a conspiracy against him of all the prominent persons in the state, including the Tancred family. Letters, authentic or not, were placed by the Emperor before certain judges, and the accused were sentenced by Peter, Count of Celano, their judge, to various frightful punishments—hanging, impaling, burning or burying alive, the loss of eyes, or long imprisonment. Sibylla was sentenced to imprisonment for life, and sent to an Alsatian convent, and the bodies of Tancred and of his son Roger were disinterred, and the crowns removed from their heads. The boy-king, William, is said to have been castrated, blinded, and sent to a dungeon in the Alps.

It was upon the very next day after the commencement of these horrors—the 26th of December, 1194—that the subject of this memoir, Frederick Roger, destined to become Frederick II., was born at Jesi, in the presence of many witnesses, including no less than fifteen ecclesiastics.

Thus our list of the Popes and our introductory account of the German Kingdom have been put before our readers. It remains next to notice the other portions of the Empire of Charlemagne,

certain other parts of Europe, and the Eastern Empire and its dependencies up to the same date—that is, up to the end of the year 1194.

The parts of Charlemagne's Empire hitherto briefly noticed by us have been Germany, Burgundy and Lotharingia. We have next yet more briefly to consider the Kingdoms of Italy and Karolingia, in order that we may understand the changes which took place in the Empire of Charlemagne between his days and the period of Frederick II.'s birth.

PRINCE BISMARCK'S CONFLICT WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

Juravi quoties *rediturum ad limina nunquam.*
Cum bene juravi, *pes tamen ipse redit.*

(Tibull.)

"L'HOMME absurde seul ne change pas," said Guizot, and the maxim has of late years been a favorite apology with Prince Bismarck when taunted by the Liberals and Progressists in the Reichstag for having betrayed them into participation in a political blunder. The Kultur-Kampf had not only checked and paralyzed their own schemes of progress, but what was immeasurably worse, had left the Catholic party far stronger and more triumphant than it had ever been since the granting of the constitution in 1850. And in reality this conflict had consumed the main activity of the Reichstag and both Houses of the Landtag. Few of the members remained idle. Some took up arms because they hated Rome, and this was a battle threatening to crush her. Some fought because they were hostile to every form of religion, and they felt that after all the Catholic Church was the only one still placing an effectual barrier against what they termed "modern culture." Many simply followed the Chancellor, trusting blindly in his strength. Had he not hitherto been successful beyond all count of hope in every scheme for the security and aggrandizement of Prussia? Could an intruder, a weak old man in bonds, whom when still free the youth Cavour had set himself to challenge long ago—could a pretentious priest supported by a small proscribed faction in the Imperial Parliament inspire any doubt as

to the loyalty of German citizens, Catholics though they be, and the mighty Chancellor be possibly worsted in the effort to crush him who thus offended in his sight? Impossible. And yet these trusty followers might have remembered the time when Napoleon I., in the midst of his victories, sent his legate to Pius VII. with this instruction: "Treat with His Holiness as if he had at his back 100,000 bayonets;" and how, when the French had seen the end, they said: "*Qui mange du pape en meurt.*"

Some men there were, calm and astute as the Premier himself, who knew that this battle against Rome was a perilous venture. But the Chancellor had never found the enemy as yet who would not yield, and he felt confident. When, however, the ancient Majesty of Rome bent forth from her retreat to prove that in her humiliation, as in her glory, she was impervious to blows from steel; when after seven years the iron Chancellor felt that his arm was wearying in beating the air, then he may have remembered how just 30 years before he had declared¹ himself attached to a certain tendency, then characterized as dark and mediæval. "I am of the opinion," he had said on that occasion, "that the idea of Christian supremacy is as ancient as the 'Ci-devant' Holy Roman Empire—that it is in fact the very soil in which the great family of European States have taken root. If we withdraw this basis from our state, its legislation could no longer recreate itself from the original fountain of eternal truth, but from the vague and mutable ideas of those who occupy the apex."

It would seem as if he had recalled these sentiments when in 1878 he first turned toward Canossa. His journey thither has in truth been slow and with reluctant air, somewhat in the graceful fashion that becomes a prince in modern times, and now and then incognito. Yet his destiny has led him there withal, and in no other sense than that in which he so indignantly repudiated the idea in 1872.

We propose to review this struggle, the end of which is manifestly drawing near. In it there is but little wholly new. It is the unvarying and everlasting repetition of Rome of the Cæsars against Rome of the Catacombs. But like the lessons of nature pointing to eternity, forever seen yet ever impressive, so are the phases of these struggles inexhaustible in what they teach the student of history and us who walk by his lights. Thus whilst the triumphs of our Holy Church give cause for gratitude, they whose duty it is to war with light against darkness, they who strive for freedom of conscience against the absolutism of a bigoted infidelity, find much to learn in her warfare with the powers of Hell.

¹ In the famous Jews Debate, 15th June, 1847. See *Life of Bismarck*, by G. L. Heseckiel, 1870.

The world is indeed very forgetful. And they that lead her movements can in the strength of their manhood or the pride of their knowing hardly realize that they are being led, sometimes at the hands of children or of fools, but always under the guiding providence of God. Success is rarely a measure of real progress, since the day on the Mount when the Kingdom of heaven was promised to the lowly. Yet who of us does not make success the gauge of our winnings, the base on which to rest our giant speculations, so sure to fall because in their construction we ignored the one great law of resistance.

When, therefore, Prince Bismarck, intoxicated with his success, ill advised by the signs of the times, which alone fail when applied to the Eternal Church, began to lay his iron rules upon the conscience of his Catholic subjects, he had no suspicion of what the end would be. There was, indeed, no misunderstanding about the fact that this was a fight against Rome.

About three years ago, when things had come to such a pass that the Chancellor felt he must give to the world some justification of his motives for the legislation of 1873-75, an official collection of the acts relative to the Kultur-Kampf was published¹ under the sanction of the Government. In this publication great stress was laid upon the fact that the Government had been forced into this conflict, and that there had throughout never been any intention to coerce the Catholic Church into a position unworthy of her importance. The *Civiltà Cattolica*, of whose relation to the curia the Prussian Government could have no doubt, had, some months before the beginning of the Vatican Council, announced that, besides the promulgation of the syllabus, the doctrine of Papal infallibility was to be declared as a dogma of faith, binding upon the consciences of Catholics. The ostensibly Catholic Governments of France, Austria, and Bavaria were the first to sound the alarm. The French Minister of State, Count Daru, thought it incumbent upon him to call the attention of the Holy Father to the fact that this declaration of Papal infallibility would prove subversive of all principles of the civil, political, and scientific order of things, and establish an undoubted antagonism between conscience and civil authority. How absurd this assumption was, even in theory, was soon shown, among others, by Cardinal Newman in his reply to Mr. Gladstone's Expostulations. Theology is indeed a subtle science requiring a fixed focus to see by. Looking over the whole range of controversy against Catholicity, we find that the bitterest of its antagonists began by making themselves a manikin of straw, then rightly termed it an untruth, an

¹ The Catholics pointed out at once the insincerities of this publication by publishing a counter-history, supplying all the intentional omissions in the official documents.

enemy to truth, and with Quixotic indignation set about to demolish it—the fools applauding.

Whether Prince Bismarck really feared the infallibility or not, it is difficult to say. The attitude of the so-called Catholic Governments did certainly not remain without its influence upon him. Nevertheless, we know that Count von Arnim, the then ambassador to the Holy See, assured the Chancellor in a dispatch, previous to the opening of the Council, that this declaration of the Papal infallibility was nothing more than a mere idle dispute in theology, without influence upon the allegiance of Catholics to their civil rulers.¹

It is not likely that Prince Bismarck entered into the real merits of the question at all. But he was jealous and suspicious of foreign influence, not only from beyond the Alps, but from conquered France. This fear was soon strengthened, as we see from official communications of that time, by the election of President McMahon to the Government of France. The latter's outspoken leaning in favor of the Holy See was quite sufficient of itself to kindle a hatred against Rome. If the Catholics in Germany could be induced to accept a sort of national church of their own, independent of Rome and under the protectorate of the Emperor, then he might rest in peace about the influence of France or even Austria. But Rome was the connecting link. The blow must then be struck at her.

When, therefore, Dr. Döllinger and the noisy protests of the so-called Old-Catholics justified the assumption that, if encouragement were given to the masses of German Catholics, they might resist the "new doctrine," and thus bring about a separation in sympathy from Rome, Prince Bismarck sounded the battle-cry.

His first step was to deprive the Roman Catholics of all moral support, and to strengthen, by every possible protection and material advantage, the position of the Old-Catholic party. As a preliminary measure, the Catholic Department in the Ministry of Public Worship was abolished; which meant that Roman Catholics should have no redress against the Old-Catholics, who claimed possession of the ecclesiastical property wherever they constituted a quorum, and did not hesitate to appeal to the civil courts in their own behalf.

Practical tests of such nature soon presented themselves as could easily be handled in a way to make Roman Catholics appear as the aggressive party. A priest and religious instructor at the Catholic Gymnasium in Braunsberg refused to accept, and therefore to teach, the dogma of Papal infallibility. His bishop found himself constrained to deprive him of his faculties, and when

¹ See *Geschichte des Kultur-Kampfes in Preussen*, Despatch, 9th April, 1869.

in spite of this the priest continued to exercise the functions of the *missio canonica*, the ordinary put him under censure of excommunication. It must be remembered here that clerical appointments at that time were made on presentation, on the part of the bishop, by the civil authorities. Catholic institutions of learning stood under state control, and the professors, though priests, or religious, were in a manner looked upon as state officers. As the government authorities ignored the excommunication in the above case, the silenced priest continued in office, with this effect, however, that the Catholic students refused to be present at his instructions. Now came the difficulty. The Minister of Public Instruction thought it his duty to uphold the authority of the civil officer by compelling the students to attend the religious doctrine class, which was an obligatory branch of study for all students matriculated under a certain denomination. Next the bishop was requested to make a public recantation of the censure. He replied that the institution was chartered as a Roman Catholic College, that the Catholic doctrine was expected to be taught there by its priests, and that it was for the ecclesiastical and not the civil authorities to determine what was Catholic doctrine.

Difficulties such as these soon brought a large number of the clergy and bishops under sentence *in contumaciam*. The new school-supervision law was the next paragraph of the coercive legislation. Meanwhile the old Minister of Public Worship had resigned, and Dr. Falk became the idol of the new regime. Whilst unavoidable difficulties were heightened by missteps and suspicions fostered by the anti-Catholic press and by the activity among Catholics, who felt the necessity of equipping themselves for greater struggles, an event occurred which threw the conflict directly into the camp of Rome.

The German Government proposed to appoint as nuncio to the Papal court Cardinal Prince Hohenlohe. The policy was an open secret. The Cardinal, at once a prince of the holy Roman Church and a liege of Germany, was suspected long ere now to be a creature of the state, and, therefore, the proper instrument of the intrigues of Prince Bismarck. Pius IX. simply refused to accept the new nuncio, and as the latter was under his own ecclesiastical jurisdiction, appointed him a domicile. It was on this occasion that Prince Bismarck uttered those memorable words: "To Canossa we shall never go, neither in spirit nor in body."¹

During all this time the action of the Catholics had naturally directed attention to the religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, who, as always on such occasions, were accounted the secret

¹ *Parlamentarische Denkwürdigkeiten*, 14th May, 1872.

springs of all the zeal and prudence in offering a passive resistance which proved far more effective than open opposition could have done. Accordingly, the following month brought the "expulsion law," directed nominally against the Jesuits, but subsequently interpreted as comprising, at the discretion of the Government, any religious community of men within the realm. It sounded like irony when Privy Counsellor Wagener arose to say, in behalf of the Crown, that the latter had no intention of identifying itself with those who, when they cry "Jesuits," mean in reality the Catholic Church.

The following year, 1873, brought the first instalment of what have been called the "May-laws," and to which we shall return presently. Again Prince Bismarck indignantly repudiated the assertion that he was persecuting his Catholic subjects. He was defending them, as he was all Germany, from the personal aggression of the Roman Pontiff.

But the Catholics understood it differently. This was a defence of principles, actual, on their side, and by which they were guarding their liberty of conscience; whilst on the part of the Government it was a case of imaginary injured rights. We have above alluded to the singular activity of the Catholics, who all this time had been preparing to meet the threatening storm. Truly, if ever there was a well-organized body of men that arose in defence of the rights of free citizens and in vindication of the privileges of conscience, it was that body of German Catholics during this time of iron, if not bloody, persecution. And yet can the Government point to a single outrage in all these years; to one disloyal act that denied to Cæsar that which is Cæsar's, whilst it claimed for God the things which are His own?

*Tu quantum ferro, tantum pietate potentes
Stamus.*

Such was their programme from the outset. Our weapons, said Windthorst,¹ when the last of the May-laws had been accepted, are those of passive resistance. We shall never yield to the temptation of violating by any act of ours the laws of social order. For we are convinced that in this alone lies our strength. And when you take from us paragraph after paragraph of the constitution that in former days guaranteed us liberty of conscience, yet one clause of our eternal constitution shall remain untouched: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

When the Catholic Episcopate, on their return from the Vatican Council, addressed their flocks, asking them to be united and to

¹ Parlament. Denkwürdigkeiten, 19th April, 1875.

pray, these with one accord rallied around the common standard. Those that would still pray, they too would be loyal. There was no vague war-cry; no misunderstanding as to the principles involved. The watchmen that held the towers of God's citadel saw that their time was short, that speculation was idle, that waiting for events to point a way might prove disastrous. Besides, the paths of our Holy Church have been marked out these eighteen hundred years. They are the ways of everlasting truth. So they put their hands at once to the plough. They worked and drilled. And how?

The Catholic press, already sufficiently strong to make men on the other side cautious, increased fourfold in number of exponents; increased a hundredfold in strength and efficiency by the tactics it adopted. There were the central organs—commanding voices of the party. These counted each a number of smaller organs in its immediate wake, sometimes published in the same office, and designed to reach separate classes of the Catholic population. Every able pen was pressed into service. The programme was marked out in definite lines for each, at public and private conventions. There were political sheets on a larger scale for the intelligent classes, foremost among them the *Berlin Germania*. From the same office issued the *Schwartze Blatt*, a small political sheet designed to interest the middle classes, to give them the keynote at the elections, to present the intricate movements of the Government in lucid, comprehensive form. In the same house was published the provincial paper meant for the family circle, to instruct the wife and children, and thus to utilize their influence for the common good. In fact, every element of the masses was provided for. They had comic and serio-comic publications with all sorts of captious titles. Then measures were taken for the effectual spread of these papers. In centres of the Catholic population, such as Düsseldorf, we find an organization to promulgate the sale of Catholic newspapers. Every member pledges himself to call for some Catholic paper at the public stands, in hotels, etc., thus creating a demand for the article. Besides this, numberless novels, romances and attractive periodicals dropped into the book-market, no one knew how. But all illustrated one phase or other of the lively struggle impending. Nor was this all. A systematic propaganda took place by means of cheap publications of pamphlets and tracts giving rules of combat, imparting principles of lawful resistance. Thus the serial "compass for the Catholic people," and similar publications in the shape of the *Broschüren-Cyclus*, came into existence. Pocket editions of the May-laws were published, so that every Catholic might be perfectly at home in the matter of his grievances. Add to this the number of pas-

toral instructions which appeared on every occasion from the bishops, even after they had been imprisoned or exiled, and we may form some idea of the services which the Catholic press was made to do in the Kultur-Kampf. The press-bureau became in truth the ticket-office "to Canossa."

Nor could the Government effectually hinder this activity. Opposition had of course been foreseen and was paralyzed ere it might take efficient shape. The Press-laws were very stringent, and the least obnoxious article might give sufficient ground for arrest. But, though the Government had probably increased its censors, there was too much of the offensive matter to cope with. Some things were said so bold that these at once became the norm by which to apply a law, the range of which was practically indefinite. But to the great mass of Catholic journalists these bold sallies were in reality the lightning-rods that kept the storm from hurting them, and thus allowed them to labor in the field unhindered. Moreover, when one publication had been suppressed, ten others would rise in its defence. The Government pursued the policy of gagging the leaders. So the Catholics began to shield these. Majunke, now member of the Reichstag, a priest, and principal editor of the *Germania*, was convicted of offence against the press-laws more than twenty times within three months. Such a man could not be spared to sit idly behind prison walls. So—we are told—the *Germania* Association appointed in his place a modest day-laborer. He had no objection to be responsible for all that might be written in the *Germania* office. He regularly went to prison, and the fines thus saved from the State went to support his poor family, and above all strengthened the courage of the Catholic masses, who admired such honest ingenuity in the interests of liberty of conscience. Thus the Government was defeated in a thousand ways, by the prudence and courage of the Catholic leaders, and by the turn of technicalities in law.

Similar tactics were observed among the Catholic body in Parliament. Not only was it understood that in all matters appertaining to the Church question there could be no division, but each member had, as it were, marked out his special field of defence. There were the members well versed in all questions of antecedents in the ecclesiastical polity of Germany, so as to combat present innovations. There were the experts in canon law, to determine the lines of contact between religious and civil jurisdiction. There were those who at a moment's warning, would cite page and paragraph in the law-code relating to economic and military regulations, where these affected the religious division. Were there any all-too-bold statisticians in the House—these men

at once arose to give them the lie. There was, moreover, a well-understood order in the manner in which each had to strengthen the position of his colleagues. All these men were, in fact, approved combatants, terse speakers, clear heads, and keen to detect in an instant the flaw in the opponent's arguments, men, too, who for the most part had held important posts in the public service where formerly merit had prevailed, and thus they commanded a respectful hearing. The Catholics had quickly learned to send their best men to the House of Representatives. Many a speaker had, during all these years, been listened to with keenest attention, but there was never any time—and this was said by the political enemies of the first leader of the Centre at his grave¹—when all the members kept their breath so completely as when Hermann von Mallinckrodt, who died in the midst of the struggle, would rise, and in his eloquent and altogether superior way, like a prince to the manor bred, leave his adversaries silent and thoughtful for a time. If his was the lofty tone of irresistible truth, swift, on the other hand, like the sword of the Machabee, struck the philippic of Windthorst, the present leader of the party, into the ranks of his opponents. "He is an antagonist," says of him a contemporary by no means friendly to his cause, "before whose wit the boldest deputies tremble, and under whose assaults even the great Chancellor loses his coolness and self-command." Before the annexation of Hanover, Windthorst had been Minister of State, the guiding eye to the blind king of that realm. Since then he has, at times, been accused of aiming at the Imperial portfolio; still, his adversaries hold, undoubtedly sincere and perhaps unconscious of his aim. How a man can aim at a thing without knowing it, must be left for answer to such deep-searching diplomatists as Count Vassili. The old philosophy has it: *nil volitum, etc.*

When, eventually, the May-laws were applied in all their rigor, doubly severe because of the petty intolerance of narrow-minded officials who, in a long military service, had learned to look upon the state as the concretion of all might, and upon its members as parts of a gigantic machinery, Catholics felt constrained to find the full length to which passive resistance, in the ethical sense of the word, might be carried. This made them as intelligently active to evade the force of the unlawful blows as to create in the Government the fear that the whole population, not excluding the religious women, had become Jesuits in disguise. Already the Redemptorist Fathers, the Priests of the Mission, and several other orders had been proscribed under the law of 1872. Now, at least, every Catholic priest had become a disciple of St. Ignatius, to all

¹ See In Memoriam of Mallinckrodt. Collection of comments of the universal press at his death.

intents and purposes of the Government. The gist of the new legislation was that no ecclesiastical jurisdiction could be exercised unless under the previously-obtained sanction of the civil authorities. Heretofore there had, indeed, been a recognized mode of reporting ecclesiastical appointments. But this was understood to be a measure designed merely to insure a right order of things in matters where the religious creed of a citizen came in contact with certain civil obligations. Such were baptisms and marriages, the registering of which before the state determined the rights and duties of school provision, army service, and such privileges as are comprehended under the general term of legal abilities. Catholics had never found difficulties in complying with those requirements. They stood to reason, nay, were in a measure desirable, where Catholics and Protestants lived under a common constitution. But when the state assumed the right to pronounce upon the fitness of a candidate for holy orders by overruling the judgment of an ecclesiastical court; when the Government attempted to force Catholics to accept as pastors men whom they abhorred as heretics and venal creatures of the state, then, indeed, the Catholic hierarchy began to see in state-license a violation of principle.

What was it, after all, that Catholics wanted? The right to pray in their own way, to worship in their own churches, to believe what they were convinced was the divinely-revealed truth; and all this without prejudice to their sworn fealty to the state. No man familiar with life among Catholics can be ignorant of what their faith is to them. With the great world besides, it is, perhaps, a luxury,—at best, a need, to fill some accidental void. But with the Catholic it is the very essence of his life. All else turns thitherward or grows out of it. His joys, his sorrows, nay, his very faults and worldliness receive the impress of that faith. So the last call, as the first, is for the bearer of that faith, his priest. And the latter, conscious of his sacred trust, takes solemn oath on the day when he assumes his holy office, rather to die than fail from earthly fear or love to feed his Master's flocks intrusted to his care. What wonder, then, that priests could not be exiled but by force; that they, whenever there remained an open way, returned to their children to feed them with the bread of life. Many interesting incidents are told in this connection, illustrating at once the individual courage and the thorough unity of the Catholics. In the diocese of Treves a young priest had been appointed to a parish without the consent of the Government. He assumed the charge, said mass, instructed his flock and assisted, as was his duty, the dying. Accordingly, he was successively fined, deprived of his salary, imprisoned, and, as he proved incorrigible, finally exiled. Our good

outlaw, who had forty-eight hours to leave the territory, bade good-bye to his people and went across the border. On the following Sunday the magistrate was startled by the report that the proscribed priest had been in the Church at six o'clock, had before the whole congregation celebrated a *missa cantata*, preached and—was off. The next Sunday the argus-eye of the police was open at five o'clock. Alas, the offender had been there at 2, and all the people had known it except the schoolmaster, who had purposely been kept in ignorance, lest, by being obliged to confess connivance, he might as a public officer be deprived of his salary. But every boy in his school was a sentinel as trusty as the Spartan boy of old. It may seem incredible, and yet the fact is well known, that this priest managed to elude the vigilance of the officials for many a Sunday, worshiping at different hours, now in one place, now in another, of his parish; that the people were always informed, and yet it never reached the ears of the magistrates in such a way as to frustrate these meetings. The priest himself had, of course, a difficult task,—traveling much on foot and at night; now in the guise of a farmer, now in the guise of a Parisian *commis voyageur*. Sometimes the ticket-agent at a distant office would suspect him, and telegraph to the authorities ahead; but our good priest might alight three or four stations before the ticket was due. I believe it was the same priest of whom they tell that on one occasion, when he had already become quite notorious by his frequent incursions, he saw two policemen awaiting him as he neared the station. He had noticed a Catholic gentleman and his lady in the car. So he quickly approached the former, exchanged a few words with him, and then, taking the arm of the lady, politely handed her out of the car, quietly walking away and leaving the eyes of the law to look for the single clerical offender, whom, whatever else they suspected him of, they could not have imagined to be walking in open company with a married lady—such doings were strictly confined to the Old-Catholic party.

All these things heightened the courage of the people and their love for their clergy, who seemed to spare themselves no sacrifice. And when such means as the above failed, when, as was sometimes the case, the aged priest whom the law had still spared, worn unto death with the weary work of traveling from place to place consoling the people, expired at length at the very altar; or when hearing the confessions of thousands that came from far and near at Eastertide, the minions of the law would lay their iron hold upon the hand still feebly lifted in unfinished absolution—then did these Christians gather alone on festive days, as their brethren had done in China and Japan after the martyrdom of Spinola, to sing and pray devoutly that the end might soon draw near—

"*Levantes tempore festo*

Corpus et ipsum animum spe finis dura ferentem."—*Hor.*

The end was sure to come. Hermann v. Mallinckrodt had in the beginning told his sister, foundress of the prosperous religious community of the Sisters of Christian Charity, that in this conflict they must lose all that was material, and that therefore she would do well to dispose of the property of the community as to the titles, and make likely provisions for her sisters in a foreign land. Yet these men, sure that an overwhelming force would come upon and crush them, never hesitated, looking with steady eye to that further assurance that in the fight for right, above all in the fight for the Catholic faith, the old facts would repeat themselves. That, as Schorlemer-Alst expressed it:¹ The day would surely come when they would lead Prince Bismarck to Canossa, and that with greater courtesy than he had shown to them. "As for us," the valiant officer said, "we are like steel. Strike, and the harder your blows the firmer we shall grow."

But before we come to this period, we should give the reader some brief outline of the legislation that has been characterized as barbarous in the midst of our nineteenth-century civilization.

All that had been done in the matter of legislative innovation previous to May, 1873, may be summed up thus: The Catholic Division in the Ministry had been abolished. A new school-supervision law had been provided. Two clauses had been inserted in the old Constitution, to the effect that the state claimed the right to regulate all matters of education, appointment and dismissal of the clergy, and to determine the limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. An imperial decree, moreover, had banished the Jesuits from German territory. As to the two aforesaid clauses, they were, of course, formidable weapons in the hands of a quasi-irresponsible power. Unfortunately, they affected the Protestant church to a far greater extent than had been anticipated or was desirable. Hence it became necessary to enter into details, and to deal separately with the various departments of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Dr. Falk, the new Minister of Public Worship, was intrusted with the preparation of laws able to meet the various emergencies, and to bind effectually the hands of the Catholic hierarchy and priesthood.

Wise according to his generation, he began with the education of the Clergy:

1. Every candidate for holy orders was to submit to a state-examination, including philosophy, history, and German literature. These qualifications had to be obtained in a three years' course at a German University. So far, the law was tolerable enough, but it was further ordained that—

¹ See *Parlament. Denkwürdigk.* 8th March, 1876.

2. No student attending the University could, at the same time, be a member of an Ecclesiastical Seminary. For the rest—

3. All seminaries, having students who had already completed their university course, were to be, both in matters of discipline and instruction, under the control of state-commissioners.

4. New seminaries could not be erected, nor fresh students received in those already in existence.

On the subject of clerical appointments, the new laws provided that—

1. No appointment could be made to any Ecclesiastical office, unless the candidate be a German citizen. In all cases of appointment, the Government had first to give its formal sanction, and this it might withdraw, even after the appointment had been legally made, within a specified time.

2. New parishes could not be erected without the consent of the state.

The following year brought fresh measures, regulating the confiscation of Church property.

Thus the ranks of the Clergy were soon thinned. Priests could not, as we have seen, refuse the request of dying Catholics for the holy oils or the Viaticum. So they went, and when sick and weary with fatigue and fasts—often unable to find a place where to consecrate the Holy of Holies ere the sun might set; oftener still exhausted by night-travel through unfrequented places—they, at length, pressed the holy unction on the brow of their dying brother-pilgrim, it was only to be seized by the law, to be branded as felons behind heavy bars, or to be sent away from home and kin, to seek in strangers' lands a field whereon to scatter the blessings which, in their own fatherland, men accounted crimes.

An offer was made to the people to elect their clergy. They would not listen to it. "If we have a king, 'by grace of God,'" they said, "surely we cannot make priests to ourselves by grace of man."

As the Jesuits were gone, the bishops were now made responsible for all the present mischief. Their income, and that of the Canonical Clergy, was withheld by what might aptly be called the starvation-law. It failed in its desired effect so far as it increased the zeal of the Catholics, who, whilst they had hitherto looked upon their clergy as heroes, now began to regard them in the light of martyrs, and their charity poured forth in undiminished flow. The bishops went one after another,—some into exile, some into prison, and some in sorrow to their graves. The remaining Clergy were old, and for the most part infirm, whilst hundreds of parishes were left destitute of pastors. Still, the Catholic Party in Parliament stood as boldly for the ancient prerogatives as they had done on that unforgotten 8th of July, four years

before, when the storm showed its first tokens. Of the religious orders there now only remained those of the Sisters of Charity, under different titles. The last day in May, 1875, brought a new law, ordering the expulsion of these inoffensive women from the German provinces. None were to remain, except such as had actual charge of the sick in hospitals and asylums, and these, too, the law provided, might be dissolved at any moment. Many of these angels of mercy went to distant lands, a loss to their own fatherland. Some, with that swift invention which charity inspires, turned their nurseries and schoolrooms into hospitals, and thus saved their charge from the cruel consequences to which their desertion would have exposed them. And what had these noble women done to become outcasts from their country? They had nursed the wounded soldier on the battlefield of Sadowa, and on the soil of France and Denmark. They had trained the children at home to become thrifty and modest maidens and faithful sons of their country. And now they were sent adrift, without thanks or protection. Verily, the grain has to be crushed ere it can come to resurrection from the earth. But ye, shrewd leaders of the nations, ye who devise with deep-laid policies unending schemes whereby to cast the human heart into the likeness of an iron wheel that turns by fixed, unalterable laws,—ye who take no account of aught in man but the wear and tear of daily friction,—have you never found the need of charity to lay a balm upon some smarting wound in your own hearts? Go, search the laws of our common universe, and learn to rule from Him by whose high grace you call yourselves men's kings and governors. Behold how perfect are the laws to which each plant or shrub yields in its separate realm, and yet how free all action and development! The hardy pine on northern mountain-height, the graceful southern palm—does not the royal sun light both into their full-grown bloom? So does the human heart of high and low, wherever it may beat, warm under charity's glad sun, and grow and ripen into noble powers. Without it, as without religion—its mother, and freedom—its sister, your nations will wither and grow dry, to be consumed at length by the fire that kindles spontaneously within—the flame of anarchy and revolt.

Early in 1878 Pope Pius IX., of blessed memory, died. His successor, our present illustrious Pontiff, Leo XIII., at once opened negotiations with the Emperor. He sincerely desired to secure peace for his Catholic children in Germany, yet the burden of making concessions did not lie with him; he could yield but very little. The Crown Prince replied to the letter of the Holy Father, instead of the Emperor, who was seriously sick. He frankly avowed that, whilst it was not in the power of his Government to solve the ancient difficulty of conflicting principles, the latter was

prepared to adopt all necessary measures in order to come to a peaceful understanding. But where was the basis of this settlement to be found? The Catholic representatives had more than three years before declared that there were but two ways of coming to an agreement. Either by an understanding with the Curia as to the boundary-lines of state jurisdiction, or else by a complete separation of Church and state, on the basis of the United States Constitution. To the former of these means it was objected that it would be going to Canossa; the latter was incompatible with such a system of government as Prussia had.

In the summer of 1879 Minister Falk, the man who had framed and given his name to the obnoxious laws, was removed from office. His successor, Puttkamer, was a man of mild type. In his first address to the deputies he eulogized the historic old Church, a tree of noble growth—still the Government could not compromise itself.

Meanwhile, Prince Bismarck had agreed upon a conference with the Papal nuncio, Masella, at Kissingen, and shortly afterwards with Cardinal Jacobini at Vienna. The result of these meetings was announced by the official organs to have been an agreement of certain concessions of a practical nature on both sides. Rome would recognize the duty of reporting to the Government all clerical appointments, leaving to the latter the right of veto. Germany, on the other hand, would restore her former diplomatic intercourse with Rome.

But the Pope was far too wise to yield so much to a vague promise. He demanded a guarantee of Prussia taking a step in advance of her promises. Prime ministers had proved unscrupulous ere this.

My bashful Huguet—we'll promise it!
And see, the king withholds—Ah, kings are oft
A great convenience to a minister!

Besides, what did the restoration of diplomatic intercourse import? A mere matter of honor; while the duty of reporting allowed the state a certain control in ecclesiastical affairs. Cardinal Jacobini, therefore, replied in a published note, that before Rome could contemplate making any concessions, she would have to insist upon a general revision of the May-laws, upon perfect freedom in the education of the clergy, and the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Government asked for a detailed explanation of these demands, and when these were given, suddenly, as if angry at the presumptuous terms, broke off the negotiations.

In 1880 several modifications of the May-laws were introduced purporting to alleviate the grievances of the Catholics. They were not carried into effect, however, partly because Rome did not make any advance by way of grateful acknowledgment, partly

because the Centre absolutely refused to vote in favor of them as involving an admission of former disloyalty on their part. This latter course was characterized by the Government as agitation. Whilst the Centre advocated a radical revision of the Falk laws, they, nevertheless, brought frequent measures into the House, by which specific paragraphs were to be eliminated. This was mainly done to force the Government to action, which, whatever it might be, lay necessarily in the direction of relieving its Catholic subjects. Gradually the correspondence between Germany and the Holy See was resumed. Rome had as yet yielded nothing.

Before the end of 1882 a regularly-accredited ambassador was sent to the Vatican. The same year brought the so-called ultimo law which proved a real alleviation, and was voted for by the Centre.

It did away with the requirement of state-examinations, as the May-laws had prescribed them. It provided with certain restrictions for the recall and maintenance of a number of the bishops and clergy; still it insisted upon the right of controlling ecclesiastical appointments. The action of this law was likewise suspended for a considerable period, since Rome remained still unyielding. Leo XIII. had expressed himself in a letter to the Archbishop of Cologne, that whilst he could not acknowledge the duty to "report in the sense of the May-laws, the Church might, without compromise of principle, permit the appointments of priests to canonical parishes to be registered before the civil authorities. This, it will be noted, would limit the duty of reporting to regular parish priests. The May-laws require the report of every appointment, together with the exercise of veto, and in case of dispute a settlement by the state-tribunal.

Another half year passed, during which the Centre, like the electors in the case of Henry IV., were urging the Chancellor's progress to Canossa.

Early in June, 1883, a new law proposed to limit the duty of reporting to canonical parish priests (6). The right of veto was still there, but difficulties between the ecclesiastical and civil authorities were no longer to be decided by a civil Court of Appeal, but by the Minister of Worship himself. This law provided, moreover, for the maintenance and liberties of a so-called auxiliary clergy. It was the most decided step in advance, yet still insufficient to meet the entire acquiescence of the Catholic Party.

The Holy Father now made his first concession, if so it can be called, in order to relieve the crying miseries of the German Catholics.

It will be remembered that since the beginning of the Kultur-

Kampf, the newly-ordained clergy were to be subject to the necessity of passing an examination in philosophy, history and German literature. The Government had, in one of the late changes, dispensed with this obligation in the case of the young priests who, during the last nine years, had been forced to study at foreign universities, provided they applied to the Government for a dispensation from said examination. The Holy See now permitted that the young clergy, on their return to Germany, might apply for this dispensation; in this one instance and with the distinct understanding that it did not in any sense imply an acknowledgment of the rights claimed by the May legislation.

At the end of last year, the hearts of the Catholics in the diocese of Limburg were gladdened by the recall from exile of their beloved bishop. It was the first application in this respect of the law of 1882. The world is familiar with the incidents of the visit of the German Crown-Prince to the Holy Father. It requires no comment to illustrate our purpose. It is under God's will a guarantee of what the future will bring to the Catholic Church in Germany.

“Hac ave sunt juncti—parentes
Hac ave sunt facti.”—*Ovid.*

The very last day of the old year brought the happy news of the removal of the “starvation law” for the three dioceses of Ermland, Culm and Hildesheim. Of the twelve Prussian dioceses there were now five which had become vacant since the beginning of the Kultur-Kampf. To these the Holy See had made new appointments, and the Government had acknowledged them. The three above-mentioned bishops had been permitted to remain in their Sees, but were deprived of their income, which now was restored to them. A few weeks ago the Bishop of Münster was likewise recalled. There are at present only the two archbishops, Cardinal Ledochowsky, of Posen, and Melchers, of Cologne, who remain still in exile.

Herr Von Gossler, the last Minister of Public Worship, has repeatedly stated that under no condition would the Government recall the two archbishops. It is understood that they are in an especial manner *personæ ingratae*.

In past days the Cardinal had been a most welcome guest to the Royal Court; he had studied with the Emperor at Bonn and enjoyed the highest esteem of His Majesty. Perhaps the Government had relied on the influence of this prelate in the beginning of the conflict. Nothing equals, however, the lofty disdain and princely firmness with which the Cardinal treated the assumptions of the Government. His defiance cost him dear. Within a very short time he was sentenced under various heads to 35,000 marks

fine and nearly seven years' imprisonment. As for the Archbishop of Cologne, who had at one time also been in high favor with the court, it is difficult to understand why he has not been recalled. All the bishops acted with one accord and on precisely the same principles, and should, therefore—as no less a man than Eugene Richter demanded the other day—be all treated alike under the law.

As it is, all the bishops have their hands still tied by numerous clauses in the May-laws, and hence the Centre party are as unyielding as ever in their demands for a thorough organic revision of the legislation since 1871.

Such are the present conditions of the conflict. The Holy See has, as we have seen, changed in no wise its original position. It still asks for a restoration of the *status quo ante*, without leaving aught that might be misconstrued into an acknowledgment of state-control over spiritual jurisdiction. Similar was the issue of the battle between Gregory VII. and Henry IV. Paschall II. not only denied the right of investiture to Henry's successor, but even that of the homagium, a right which, like that of "Report," did not of itself involve a sacrifice of principle on the part of the Church, but could, on account of the attitude of the secular rulers, easily have been construed into and abused as such.

What the issue of this strife in Prussia will be, none familiar with the history of the past can doubt. The present strength of the Catholic section in the Reichstag itself is a guarantee of eventual victory. They are by far the most numerous of any one party in the House, and have more than doubled since the beginning of their difficulties. In matters outside of the religious question they exercise a fairly controlling influence in all Government affairs. Prince Bismarck cannot well do without them now, so they lead him slowly, but no less surely, towards the South. Fifteen years is indeed a long time for so mature a statesman. He had expected to see a new generation grow up, less ultramontane than the one he put in chains. But the sons grew worthy of their sires, and will long remember their tales of courage and victory.

It took two Ministers of Worship to undo the work of one. And lately the cable reports that a cloud hangs over Herr Von Gossler. But even three such useful men shall not save the Premier's consistency, nor ever make the world forget the words of the Iron Chancellor:

"Seien sie ausser Sorge; nach Canossa gehen wir nicht—weder körperlich noch geistig."

THE COMING PLENARY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

Concilium Baltimoreense Provinciale Primum : habitum Baltimori Anno reparatæ salutis, 1829, Mense Octobri, Baltimori : Ex typis J. D. Toy, 1831. 8vo.

Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis II., in Ecclesia Metropolitana Baltimorensi, a die vii. ad diem xxi, Octobris. A.D. MDCCCLXVI., habiti. . . . Baltimori, MDCCCLXVIII. 8vo.

Concilios Provinciales, Primer, y Segundo celebrados en la muy noble, y muy leal ciudad de Mexico. . . . En los años de 1555 y. 1565, folio, Mexico, 1769.

Synodo Diocesana que de orden de S.M., celebró el illmo Senor Doctor Don Juan Garcia de Palacios, Obispo de Cuba en Junio de 1684. . . . Habana, 1844. 4to.

Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Conciliorum Recentiorum, Collectio Lacensis, vol. iii. . . . Friburgi Brisgovix, MDCCCLXXV. 4to.

Praxis Synodalis, Manuale Synodi Diocesane ac Provincialis celebrande. New York, 1883. 12mo.

Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore. By Rev. S. Smith, D.D. New York, 1872. 12mo.

THE trials, the labors, the hopes and the consolations of the Spouse of Christ are distinctly and authoritatively expressed in the synods and councils which have been held in provinces and countries, or in world-gatherings by the bishops of the Church of God. This has been the case from the first Council of Jerusalem, where the Church, rejoicing in the response of the gentile world to the call of the Apostles, solved the difficulties attending the reception of converts from heathenism into the body of the faithful, at first composed exclusively of children of the house of Israel. The decrees of that council bind, not because they were subsequently recorded under divine inspiration by a disciple of the Apostles, but because they were passed by the body of bishops, whom our Lord had appointed to rule His church, acting in concert and harmony with Peter, who then confirmed his brethren.

As the Church spread, local councils were held, and when the fierce fires of imperial persecution had burnt themselves out in the vain endeavor to crush Catholicity, its agents boasting most loudly of success on the eve of their terrible defeat ; then it became possible to hold councils representing not a mere province, nor even the widespread Roman empire, but all the then known habitable

world to which the preaching of the gospel had reached, and which were hence called œcumenical (*οικουμενός*).

The conversion of nations, the rise of religious orders, new devotions, consolations as well as trials, the propagation of erroneous doctrine, contempt of the Church's authority, the hostility of the State, a decline of piety and morality,—all these from time to time called for the action of local or general councils, and the defining of the ever held doctrines of the Church in terms too clear to admit of cavil; or the enactment of disciplinary statutes to maintain the virtue, sacred learning and piety of the clergy, and through them promote the salvation of the flock committed to their care. The dogmatic definition of a council shows not the introduction of a new doctrine, but the condemnation of a new error. Down to the sixteenth century errors of all kinds had been promulgated and condemned, but the personality and attributes of God had not been denied by even the wildest. It is not till the Council of the Vatican, in the nineteenth century, that the Church found it necessary to state authoritatively that there was a God, infinite in all His perfection. No one can pretend that, therefore, the Catholic Church did not believe in God before the nineteenth century; the definition merely proves that after the Council of Trent impiety became bolder than ever, and that errors as to the very existence and attributes of God were put forth, some so insidiously as to seduce, if it were possible, even the elect. So in earlier ages the councils, by their distinct definitions, tell us when errors arose that it was necessary to condemn authoritatively.

The decisions of the general councils, presided over by the Sovereign Pontiff, in person, or represented by his delegates, are irreformable and infallible; the decrees of local councils turn, generally, on discipline, and are of authority when approved by the Holy See. Yet, sometimes, great questions would come before a provincial council, and the decision there made by holy and learned men would be approved by the Sovereign Pontiff and accepted as authoritative by the Church throughout the world, in such a manner that no question in regard to it would arise for centuries. Thus a question as to the canonicity of certain books of Scripture came before a council at Carthage in Africa in 397, and its declaration of what books had always been received as canonical by the Church remained for centuries by tacit consent the official declaration of the Christian Church, eleven centuries confirming and retaining the tradition there expressed. Other particular councils in Africa and Spain, by the importance of their acts, exercised widespread influence. Yet, as a rule, these provincial councils have decided only on discipline, and local concerns of the Church. A Provincial Council is one composed of the bishops of a province,

and presided over by the archbishop; still more important is a Plenary Council, in which the archbishops and bishops of several provinces, and including generally all within the boundaries of a country, meet in session under the presidency of an archbishop or bishop specially commissioned for that purpose by the Pope.

Such councils were frequently held in earlier ages, but on the increase of arbitrary power in the monarchs of Europe, after the revolt of the sixteenth century, they became more and more rare, as the civil power prevented the free action of the Church.

Yet America had provincial councils at an early period. At the commencement of the seventeenth century St. Turibius, Archbishop of Lima, held provincial councils at Lima, the decrees of which were regarded as models even in Italy. In 1625 Peter de Oviedo, Archbishop of St. Domingo, celebrated a synod of this kind, the decrees of which were in force in parts of our present territory of the United States sixty years ago. Still earlier were the provincial councils of Mexico, the first having been celebrated in 1555 by Fr. Alonzo de Montufar, Archbishop of Mexico; the second by the same metropolitan ten years later; a third in 1589 by the Most Rev. Pedro de Moyas y Contreras. The legislation in these synods, duly approved by the Holy See, was in full vigor in Texas, New Mexico and California when those parts were acquired by the United States.

Provincial councils are, therefore, no novelty in the Church or in America, and if we find few celebrated anywhere in the difficult periods of the last century, the young Church of the United States, nursed in earlier days in oppression and penal laws, used the freedom which Providence afforded her to revive these useful and often necessary conventions for the well-being of the whole body. The first Provincial Council of Baltimore, held in 1829, was viewed as the harbinger of a new era, and now the acts of the provincial synods held in the United States and in the British Empire, that is, in lands which in the last century seemed to offer no hope for future extension of Catholicity, when collected, form a solid quarto volume of more than fourteen hundred pages, and are reprinted in Europe for the study and use of bishops in lands where the power and influence of the Church were once paramount. Thus the Church in the United States has led the way in the revival of Provincial and Plenary Councils, and during the last hundred years these assemblies have exerted an influence not discernible in the annals of the two centuries which preceded.

Dr. Carroll, on his elevation to the See of Baltimore, felt the necessity of some definite ecclesiastical regulations for the vast diocese imposed upon his care. It extended from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, from the St. Lawrence and the lakes to the borders

of Florida. In city and country were scattered Catholics, whose numbers no one knew, with only a few priests to meet their wants. The nucleus was the body of Catholics in Maryland and Kentucky, mainly born in the country, who with their ancestors had been for a century governed by the Vicar Apostolic of the London District in England. In that unhappy country there had been no Catholic metropolitan, no sees filled by Catholic bishops from the time of Queen Mary; and of course the enactments of early councils had become obsolete, and no new councils could be held. The Church there, with its branch in America, had been governed under the instructions issued from time to time by the Propaganda. Now that the American portion was separated, much of the temporary code thus formed became inapplicable here, where circumstances were entirely different, and many questions that had distracted the Church in England were unknown.

While the Church in England was homogeneous, made up of men of one race and country, the little Church in America had grown and was growing rapidly by accessions of Catholics from various lands,—from Ireland, from Germany, from France,—the Irish and German immigration coming with few priests, while the French, owing to the revolution which had levelled the throne and the altar, came with a large body of learned, zealous clergy who preferred exile to any compromise with infidelity. Where the Irish formed the bulk of a congregation they began to ask for priests from their own country, but they blended with the Catholics already in the country, and accepted cheerfully and lovingly the ministrations of priests whether Irish, American, English or French. Up to this time the German Catholics in Pennsylvania and elsewhere had mingled with Catholics of other extraction in the churches and missions, special instruction and catechism being given. As demand was made for a distinctly German church in Philadelphia, Bishop Carroll remonstrated in vain, showing the importance of having all Catholics meet in harmony before the same altar and growing up in brotherhood. He yielded reluctantly, and the Church of the Holy Trinity was begun. His forebodings were soon fulfilled. Led by a conventual friar named Reuter, this congregation denied his authority as bishop, claiming that he was bishop only for the English-speaking of the faithful, but had no jurisdiction over Germans. When he visited Philadelphia, in the hope of arresting this dangerous schism, he was arrested and compelled to sit in court and listen to the abuse on everything Catholic poured out by the lawyer of the rebellious church. His authority was ultimately recognized; but Reuter was undaunted and renewed the schismatic effort in Baltimore

itself, where the case came before the courts of Maryland, which upheld Catholic discipline.

But the great Archbishop Carroll looked to the future of Catholicity, and labored for it. His Catholicity was cramped by no narrow nationalism. On the twenty-seventh of October, 1791, twenty priests, English, Irish, American, German, French, met with the bishop in synod. Statutes were then adopted as to baptism under condition; the age for confirmation; the celebration of mass with proper respect and all possible neatness in the place; collections of money and their application; the wearing of the cassock; the catechizing of the young; the sacraments of penance; extreme unction and matrimony, adopting in regard to the last a decree of a Council of Lima; on the Divine Office and holidays of obligation; on the life of the clergy and their support, and on the refusal of Christian burial to all who had neglected to receive communion at Easter.

When the See of Baltimore became archiepiscopal, and the immense diocese was divided, New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Bardstown having been created, one of the earliest desires of the archbishop was to be able to convene his suffragans in a provincial council.

Obstacles arose. No council was held; but in 1810 the venerable Archbishop, with the Bishops of Philadelphia, Boston and Bardstown, and the Coadjutor of Baltimore drew up and signed ten articles of ecclesiastical discipline. These referred to the powers of priests on the borders of dioceses; to the removal of regulars by their superiors from charges having cure of souls, without the knowledge of the bishop; the Douay Bible; Parish Registers; baptism; sponsors; offerings for masses; on the necessity of celebrating masses in the church; theatres, balls, light reading; on the renunciation of freemasonry to be required before a member of a lodge can be admitted to the Sacraments.

As the Church grew, and new dioceses were formed, the desire for a Provincial Council was more and more felt. It engaged the attention of the Archbishop and Bishops here, and of the Sovereign Pontiffs, Pius VII. having issued a brief in regard to one, August 3d, 1823, and Leo XII. another in August, 1828. Archbishop Maréchal drew up the scheme for a council, which his successor, the Most Rev. James Whitfield, submitted to Pope Pius VIII. When this had been approved and authority given, Archbishop Whitfield, in the month of December, 1828, issued letters convoking the bishops of the province to meet in Provincial Council at Baltimore on the first of October, 1829.

The United States, as recognized by the Treaty of 1783, formed the original diocese of Baltimore, and the actual province of that

name; but the republic had subsequently acquired the Spanish colonies of Louisiana and the Floridas. These had formed part of the diocese of Santiago de Cuba, and as such were governed by a Bishop Auxiliary, until in 1793 they were constituted a distinct diocese. As the diocese and province of Baltimore had been guided by the Statutes of the Synod of 1791, so this diocese had its code of local ecclesiastical law in the acts of the Synod of Santiago de Cuba, held in June, 1684, by Dr. Juan Garcia de Palacios, Bishop of Santiago, which were renewed by successive bishops, and are in force to this day in Cuba, their wisdom being universally recognized. A portion of its enactments applies directly to Florida and to the Indian missions on the continent, a restricted list of holidays and fasts of obligation being framed for the Indians.

The original diocese of Louisiana had in time been divided, and there were sees at New Orleans, St. Louis and Mobile, originally suffragans of St. Domingo or of Santiago de Cuba, but subsequently made exempt. At the time of the summoning of the Council the see of New Orleans was vacant, but as it was eminently desirable that the bishops of the whole country should take part in the deliberations of the coming council, the bishops of St. Louis and Mobile were invited. Bishop Portier, of Mobile, was in Europe, but Dr. Rosati, Bishop of St. Louis and administrator of New Orleans, attended, "*salvis cæteroquin suis privilegiis.*" This first council was, therefore, if not in name, yet in fact plenary.

The first Council of Baltimore was composed of Archbishop Whitfield, and of Bishops Flaget, of Bardstown, England, of Charleston, Fenwick, of Cincinnati, Fenwick, of Boston, the Very Rev. William Matthews, Administrator of Philadelphia, and of Bishop Rosati. The sessions were held and the whole proceedings conducted in strict conformity to the rules and usage of provincial councils.

The decrees met difficulties that had arisen. The claim set up in several places by lay trustees that they had a right of patronatus was distinctly and positively condemned, and any priest favoring such usurpation was to be suspended. The duty of a priest to accept any mission assigned him by his bishop, where the income sufficed for a decent support, was inculcated. The power of the bishop to transfer clergymen from one mission to another was distinctly stated. Decrees directed the due administration of sacraments, and strict adhesion to the Roman Ritual was enjoined, as well as the becoming arrangement and care of churches, and altars for the decent offering of the Holy Sacrifice, and performance of the public offices of the Church.

The regulations of 1810, clearly pointed out the danger to be apprehended from secret societies; and condemned all Catholics

who entered lodges of Freemasons. So great, however, was the odium excited in the United States, about this time, against the Masonic body, growing out of the Morgan affair, that no distinct action on the point appeared necessary in 1829.

Decrees were passed for maintaining the use of the Douay Bible, and for prohibiting the using of prayer-books and catechisms except by due episcopal authority, and for the preparation of school books suited to Catholic schools, those then current in the country being to a very great extent so leavened with ignorant and malicious misrepresentations of Catholic doctrine and life as to be a standing insult to the faithful.

Steps were also taken for the establishment of a society for the diffusion of Catholic books. The necessity of Catholic schools for the preservation of the young, especially of the poorer members of the flock, from the insidious proselytism which seems to be the very life-breath of Protestants, is clearly laid down.

The regulations for the life, dress and conduct of the clergy were adapted to the condition of the Church at the time.

Some of the questions brought before the first Council of Baltimore are still in an unsettled state, and although a series of provincial councils was held at Baltimore, with several councils in New York, Cincinnati, New Orleans, St. Louis, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Oregon, will come before a future plenary council for decisive action.

The tenure of ecclesiastical property is one of great difficulty owing to the great number of States, each with a legislature constantly making changes in the statutes, and all subject to be swayed at times by the sudden evolution of anti-Catholic fanaticism. Thus in several States there are laws in force intended avowedly to hamper and cripple the action of the Catholic Church and molest as far as can be done the Catholic citizens in the enjoyment of the property which they have set apart for the worship of Almighty God. No other denomination has ever been made in this way a subject of state persecution.

The old trustee-system was an outcome of this spirit. It sought to force on the Catholic Church a Protestant method without any of the safeguards which Protestant churches enjoyed. With them the congregation does not control absolutely; the real power is in the hands of the church members, a comparatively small number, of persons of both sexes, whose correct life, zeal for religion, fidelity to the ordinances of the sect, assure their zeal and hearty interest in the well-being of the church. In the system forced on Catholics, women were excluded from voting even when owners of pews, while every man who could hire a seat the day of the election, who never attended the services or approached the sacraments,

could vote for trustees; and the trustees chosen by such men claimed the right to nominate the pastor, fix his salary, determine what was necessary for the due celebration of the mass; mortgage or sell the church as they chose. In such men the schismatic Reuter found ready tools, as did Hogan and others in Philadelphia, New York, Norfolk, Charleston, New Orleans.

Some points have been gained. The absurd claim of patronatus is absolutely settled; and the powers of trustees, where the bodies exist under the old form, are confined within due limits; but the tenure of church property itself is still to some extent unsettled. After boards of trustees had in some places plunged churches into bankruptcy, it became the rule in many dioceses to have all church property held in the name of the bishop individually. This was made the pretext for popular outcry, and lists were paraded of the immense property in the hands of Catholic bishops. Ere long acts were passed to prevent a Catholic bishop from being a corporation sole, or to vest in congregations any church property held by a bishop. This led to a course adopted in several States, under which each congregation is incorporated as a distinct body, the board of trustees being composed of the bishop, with some diocesan official, the pastor of the church, and some lay trustees selected for their piety, knowledge, and ability. The system is, perhaps, the best yet devised, yet in actual practice the bishop takes little active part, the lay trustees are treated as mere supernumeraries, and the pastor of the church acts without control; and cases are not wanting where, from lack of financial and business ability, a priest has plunged a congregation into a sea of debt from which it finds no means of emerging, while the one who incurred the debt, on being removed to some other mission, departs without concern, and leaves the victims of his errors to extricate themselves as they can.

When property, diocesan or parochial, is vested in the bishop solely, other questions arise. A State like Pennsylvania may declare that he shall never be deemed a corporation sole, yet where the rights, or supposed rights, of third parties are concerned, courts will, in the very teeth of statute law, hold him to be one, and to be responsible for contracts made with his predecessors. In Ohio, where the late Archbishop Purcell assumed the debts incurred by his brother and Vicar-general, who had taken immense sums of money on deposit, several questions came up as to the legal position of a Catholic bishop, and the property held by him. The court, after a long trial and serious deliberation, decided, with an equity that commands respect, that he must be considered as a trustee for diocesan property, and as a distinct trustee for each parish church of which he held the title, and that these different trusts could not

be confounded. As trustee for a specified church, he was liable to the extent of its property only, for debts incurred for its erection and maintenance, and not for any diocesan debt, or the debt of any other church; and that as trustee for the diocesan property, he was liable for all debts incurred by him as bishop, and that the diocesan property only was liable for such debts.

The long and keen discussion in the civil courts of the position of a Catholic bishop in regard to the property of the Church, evidently calls for decrees in a future plenary council, that will, as far as possible, give the position assigned to him by canon law, and the discipline of the Catholic Church, so clearly as to prevent much litigation that is now inevitable.

In the first Provincial Council of Baltimore, Roger B. Taney, John Scott, and William B. Read, eminent lawyers to whom several questions in regard to Church property had been submitted, were admitted to the council in the ninth public session and gave their opinion, with such explanations as were required. The wisdom of the course, both as a testimony to the people of the country at large, of the desire of the Catholic Church to be in harmony with all sound and just laws, and as a means of preventing many future appeals to the civil courts in such matters, will justify in the future the adoption of a similarly wise course.

Indeed, in view of the increasing litigation regarding the bishops, clergy, and property of the Church, it may not be unwise to arrange for the formation of a body of counsellors, eminent lawyers in different parts of the country, to whom, or some of whom, such cases should in the first instance be confided. It is more easy to have a sound decision in a lower court, affirmed on appeal, than to have an unsound one reversed.

While the First Council of Baltimore declared, once and for all, that trustees had no *jus patronatus*, rules for the execution of their duties in their just sphere were enacted in the Third Council of New York, decree 7; the second Plenary Council of Baltimore, Title 4; Third Council of Cincinnati, decree 4. The subject of the tenure of Church property was regulated by the First Council of Baltimore, decree 5; Third Baltimore, decree 4; Fourth Baltimore, decree 8; and by a decree of the Sacred Congregation *de Propaganda Fide*, Dec. 15, 1840.

The matter of debts incurred which are a charge on such property has been treated only incidentally; the First Council of Cincinnati, decree 11, discountenancing positively and forbidding the taking of money on deposit by any priest in the name of his parish without special sanction; but, as is too well known, it was precisely there where the neglect of this wise precaution led to most disastrous and irreparable evils. It will be for future Coun-

cils to limit by strict and precise rules or prohibit entirely this system of taking deposits of money on interest, by which a church or clergyman becomes to a certain extent a savings bank, without any guarantee of business and financial experience. As no reports of the condition of such quasi banks are made annually to any authority in Church or State, such as real banks are required to make yearly under oath, the affair goes on unchecked till a disastrous result spreads wide ruin and excites general comment.

The same state of affairs exists in regard to churches, and more especially to religious communities, which are under still less episcopal control, but which may be really and absolutely bankrupt, with no power to prevent their plunging deeper and deeper into financial ruin. Questions as to debts incurred or property held by priests arise, which need definite rules. A synod of San Francisco has taken a wise step in drawing the line between a priest's personal and official ownership and responsibility.

The great question of secret societies has, since the meeting of the First Council of Baltimore, taken a new form. Then the Morgan excitement had turned public opinion so strongly against the Freemasons, that many lodges disbanded, public display was abandoned for years, and everything was carried on in the most quiet and unobtrusive manner. Gradually, however, the odium died away, favor was regained, and Freemasonry not only from this country honeycombed all Spanish and Portuguese America, but regained an immense influence in the United States. Success in business, in politics, in army or navy, was to be won mainly by Masonic aid. Other bodies of a similar constitution arose, like the Odd Fellows. The Temperance movement ultimately took the shape of a secret society, The Sons of Temperance. Besides, by the general condemnation in the Fourth Council of Baltimore on account of secrecy, these have been specifically condemned (First New Orleans, decree 10; Second Plenary, Title 12, decree 511-514; First San Francisco, decree 10). And it was also especially provided that no member of a secret society should be allowed to become trustee of any Church (Third Council of New York, decree 7; Third Cincinnati, decree 4; Second Plenary, Title 4). Nor sponsor in baptism (First San Francisco, decree. 4). The rivalry excited led the Freemasons to new steps to make their sect more attractive. They assumed more directly the character of a religious sect; they had their forms of baptism, confirmation, marriage and burial, performing the ceremonies they instituted with great pomp, so as to win and impress the weak-minded. But a still more powerful attraction was the establishment in the lodges of a system of coöperative life insurance, by which in case of death assessments were made on all who joined the project, to pay the

amount insured. As the payment thus required was far less than the premiums demanded by ordinary life insurance companies, many became Freemasons in order to be able to insure with them. Other secret associations adopted the same system, and out of this grew mutual insurance coöperative associations which took the form of secret societies, but which, from the low rate at which insurance was given, became very popular.

The question arose whether Catholics could or could not avail themselves of the advantage thus afforded. Some regarded the oath of secrecy as only similar to that taken by directors of banks, etc., a mere pledge not to make known the private affairs of the organization, others as an element which brought the whole system within the condemnation of the Church. (Fourth Council of Baltimore, decree 7.)

The Ancient Order of Hibernians, as represented to the heads of some dioceses, seemed free from what entailed condemnation, while in adjacent dioceses it was deemed clearly unlawful for Catholics, and more or less implicated in deeds of violence. Secret political associations aiming at civil revolution, and employing criminal acts, were clearly condemned, but questions arose as to organizations like the Grand Army of the Republic.

The whole subject has thus, from its manifold ramifications, become one of increasing difficulty to treat with sound and impartial justice. A meeting of the Episcopate of the whole country will tend greatly to bring about some plan, by which in future a uniform decision as to these frequently recurring questions may be attained, such as that of a permanent committee of bishops and theologians, to whom it may be referred from time to time to investigate the facts in regard to each association, and give a decision, to be communicated to all the bishops in the country for their approval and acceptance.

The Constitution of the Church in this country is traced in the councils. The appointment of bishops in the United States is a peculiar one, adopted more from force of circumstances than from any general rule observed at any time in the Church. For the election of the first bishop of Baltimore, the clergy asked and obtained the power to make the selection of the candidate to be proposed to the Sovereign Pontiff. Providence guided their choice and the Rev. John Carroll, whom Pius VI. would have selected himself, felt all the strength imparted by the knowledge that he was the choice of the clergy in the country. When his diocese was divided, a claim that the interests of the Irish were neglected gave the Bishops of Ireland an influence in the nomination of candidates, and through their nomination Drs. Concanen and Connolly were appointed to New York, Conwell to Philadelphia, Kelly to Rich-

mond, and England to Charleston. The last shed lustre on the episcopate and Church in the United States, and exerted an influence which has not yet disappeared. But the other appointments drew on the Bishops themselves trials and crosses, and chilled the very life of the Church they were intended to foster. A decree of the Propaganda, March 18th, 1834, established a plan by which in case of a vacancy the bishops of the province were to nominate three priests to the Pope. This was to be done in a Provincial Council, in case one was to be held within three months after the death of the bishop of the vacant see. Each bishop was, moreover, to leave under seal the names of three priests whom he deemed most worthy to succeed him. This list was to be transmitted to the archbishop of the province after his death. Both lists were to be forwarded to Rome. By the 6th decree of the 1st Plenary Council, renewed in the 6th decree of the 8th Provincial Council of Baltimore, each bishop was urged to appoint ten or twelve councillors, not all to be consulted on every matter, but who all, in case of his death, were to forward to the Archbishop of the Province a list of those whom they deemed most worthy of the mitre. The decree of August 10th, 1850, required the archbishop or senior bishop of the province to notify the other archbishops of the country of every episcopal nomination forwarded to Rome.

In 1859 the Cardinal Prefect of the Propaganda consulted the Archbishops and Bishops of the United States in regard to any change that they might deem advisable in the mode of selecting nominees for vacant sees; and guided by their replies renewed the decrees of June 14th, 1834, and August 10th, 1850, but in addition required every bishop to send to Rome once in three years, the names of priests deemed fit for the episcopate; when a vacancy occurred the bishops of the province were to meet in synod or otherwise, and discuss the qualities of those to be recommended.

The system which obtains in Ireland, where the parish priests as well as the bishops of the province select three candidates, has found likewise advocates here, and is likely to be urged in the future.

The method of securing to bishops a due and equitable salary engaged the attention of fathers from all parts of the Union. In the first Council of Cincinnati a request was made for a uniform system throughout the whole country. In earlier times the bishop depended on the church selected as his cathedral, and was often at the mercy of a board of trustees who could and sometimes did deprive him of a salary. The prevailing system, by which a cathedraticum is paid to the archbishop or bishop of the diocese by each parish, seems to meet general approval.

Since the United States is still regarded as a missionary country,

no parishes have been canonically established, and those established under French or Spanish law, as at St. Augustine, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, St. Louis, Kaskaskia, Detroit, Vincennes, etc., seem to have lapsed in most cases. The clergy in charge of the missions are not, therefore, parish priests; they are ordained *sub titulo missionis*, and take an oath of obedience to the bishop, who appoints or removes them at his discretion. (First Council of Baltimore, decrees 1, 6; Fourth Baltimore, decree 2; Third New York, decree 7; Second Plenary, Title 3, ch. 4.)

The time is coming, as all feel, when regular parishes must be instituted, with parish priests unremovable except for cause and after trial. Yet in this country, where building of churches and schools, as well as their maintenance and the reduction of debts, devolves in a great measure on the pastor, the bishop must have power to remove a priest who is not able to manage affairs for the good of the parish. A priest may have learning and piety and be of unimpeached morality, and still be one who will bring the church to ruin. In a case which came into the civil courts in Pennsylvania, the priest had so mismanaged the finances that the bishop was forced to advance money in order to save the church from being sold; yet the priest contested the right of the bishop to remove him. In Michigan a priest, who had so little skill in managing affairs that he failed to obtain enough to meet his salary, where other priests had done so, sued the bishop. The Second Plenary Council, while reiterating the declaration that the bishop has the right to deprive any priest of his position or remove him to another, exhorts bishops not to exercise this right except for grave reasons and a full consideration of the incumbent's claims. There has been in recent years a great increase in the number of cases where priests, deeming themselves aggrieved, have appealed to Rome, or sought redress in the civil courts of the State, often resulting in long litigation and great expense.

Inferior tribunals and judges with more bias against the church than sound legal principle, have given the wildest decisions. In one case an appointment to a church was held to give a vested life interest in all the receipts from pew rents, collections, etc., of which the bishop could not deprive a priest; in another, a priest, absent for years from a diocese, was held entitled to a salary from a subsequently appointed bishop who had never known him as a priest of his diocese; in another case a priest who was so ill adapted for mission work that people grew indifferent, and the church dwindled away, sued his bishop for his salary, which, through his own incompetence, his parish no longer produced. The frequency of suspensions, of appeals to Rome, the number of priests no longer possessing faculties, but roaming from place to place, has caused

serious and earnest deliberation. An instruction from the Propaganda directed the appointment in each diocese of *Judices Causarum*, a body not exactly judicial, but which was intended to investigate charges against clergymen, and prepare the whole case for the bishop's decision. In practice it proved inadequate, and the interpretation of various clauses has been continually sought by the prelates in this country.¹

At the same time a step toward the real parish priest was made by the creation of the Missionary Rector, as in England.

Whenever cases have arisen, there seems a want of a clear code, defining rights, powers, duties, and obligations, with the distinctness of the Code Napoleon; with classification of the clergy in grades; regulations as to the appointment to each; a distinct statement of offences, and the punishment for each on conviction by a recognized tribunal, in suspension, loss of grade for a longer or shorter period, providing for appointment to inferior positions after a specified period spent in some religious house. If it were possible to lay down all this clearly and distinctly, much of the confusion, delay, and uncertainty which now environ every case that comes before the courts would disappear. At present nothing can be more confused or confusing than the opinions of those summoned as canonists to apply the canons of the Church, as understood in other times and countries, to the affairs of the Church in this country at the present time; canons based on a condition of affairs where churches were already built and endowed, the clergy paid by tithes, and the duties clear and limited, but which can apply here in many cases only by analogy.

Priests, as financial agents of the parishes, have often most reluctantly, against their better judgment, had recourse to fairs, picnics, excursions, and the like, in order to raise money to build churches or schools, or relieve them from debt. The Second Plenary (Tit. vii., ch. 2) shows the desire of the Church for their suppression; yet the steps taken have not hitherto checked the perils of soul and body which attend them.

Organizations for the production and diffusion of good books have from time to time engaged the serious thoughts of the hierarchy, and associations, like the Metropolitan Press, in Baltimore, the Catholic Publication Society, in New York, and a similar project in Cincinnati, were started, but did not meet with the anticipated success, and the concern in each case passed into private hands. Yet the necessity of some great Catholic book concern is deeply felt, as well as means to preserve youth, as far as possible,

¹ The first step towards a formal trial of charges against a priest appears in 1st Council of St. Louis, Dec. 6; this was followed by the action of the 2d Plenary and 10th Baltimore.

from the flood of demoralizing and destructive reading which is made so accessible and so tempting to them. (Second San Francisco, decree 4.)

The support and maintenance of Catholic schools is, of course, one means, but does not fully meet all the requirements of the want. The growth of the parochial schools has been great, and the expense thus assumed by Catholics, at the behest of conscience, is enormous; councils have constantly given this subject their care and encouragement (1st Council of Baltimore; 4th Baltimore; 2d Plenary; 1st New York; 2d Cincinnati). In some dioceses a step has been taken to give these schools uniformity in the method of teaching, the grading of classes, the text-books to be used. In the diocese of Fort Wayne a regular board of directors controls all the schools, producing uniformity in class-books, grades and mode of teaching, and some such system, with a superintendent, seems to be imperatively demanded everywhere, that the resources so nobly supplied by our people may effect the greatest possible good in training the young to be the soundly instructed Catholic population of the land.

The growing facility of divorce by State authority in the United States increases the danger of Catholics being drawn into a more frequent recourse to that shameful system. Hitherto, the cases among Catholics have been very rare. The Second Plenary Council of Baltimore distinctly condemned all who attempted to free themselves in this way from the bond of matrimony, and in case of either party re-marrying, the offender is declared excommunicated. (Fifth Council of Baltimore, decree 3.) The difficulty is increased by the fact that, in some states, a restoration of the matrimonial tie after a divorce is not allowed by law, so that no reconciliation is recognized by the State, and future children will be illegitimate. The repentant Catholic who, after a State divorce, re-marries, cannot, by law, discard the new partner, nor return to the one to whom he or she is still bound by the laws of God. Clearer and more definite instruction seems required to show the careless the manifold dangers which disobedience will entail.

The recruiting of the clergy by means of theological seminaries has been the constant care of the bishops from the day when Bishop Carroll, soon after his appointment, obtained the aid of the Sulpicians (see Second Council of Baltimore, Second Plenary, First Cincinnati); the American College at Rome, created by the Venerable Pope Pius IX., has been fostered (Eighth Baltimore, First New Orleans), and a movement is now made to create a university for still higher training of the clergy. This question is likely to be discussed by the bishops of the whole country.

Whoever looks back at the condition of the Church in the

United States when the first Provincial Council was held fifty-five years ago, can understand how much of the real progress of the Church is due to the decrees of the Councils. The decrees were not always peremptory laws, harsh and unyielding, they were expressions rather of the desire of the Sovereign Pontiff and the bishops to whom Providence had committed this portion of the vineyard of the Lord. Some might slight or overlook the paternal admonitions, but many endeavored in all sincerity to carry out the wise counsels, and every effort was a gain in the right direction. The nucleus of the Church in this country was a little body brought up in the days of penal laws amid a hostile population who viewed them with hereditary distrust and suspicion. Their churches, except in a few instances, were mere extensions of private houses. The services of the church were limited to low masses, even vespers and the benediction of the Blessed Sacrament were rare; without a bishop in the whole land, all the more imposing ceremonials, even the most common episcopal acts were unknown. The first great mass of immigrant Catholics came from Ireland, where, though there was a hierarchy, the weight of the penal laws still prevented much outward manifestation of Catholic life. Opportunities of approaching the sacraments were rare, and the frequentation of them uncommon. Sodalties, and other means of cultivating and maintaining piety, were few, and there was little diffusion of books from which people could understand and appreciate the sublime character of the Catholic liturgy, or the richness of grace of which the Church was the manifold channel. The First Council of Baltimore was held immediately after the schisms in the churches in Philadelphia, which in themselves showed that those who there raised the standard of rebellion were utterly unconcious and ignorant of the supernatural character of the church, and of her ministry, liturgy, and sacraments. Their principles were utterly Protestant, not Catholic; and they were unconsciously Protestants who supposed themselves Catholics. Their ideas never rose above the mere human level; in their unconsciousness of the supernatural, they wished a church conducted like a bank or any other mere human company. The First Council of Baltimore was in itself a vast stride forward, and each succeeding Council, as they followed in Baltimore, New York, Cincinnati, St. Louis, New Orleans, Oregon, and San Francisco, helped to develop Catholic life throughout the country. With the exception of religious processions in the street, the manifestations of the Catholic ritual and of Catholic piety are more free and open here than in most other parts of the world. Confessionals are thronged, the communion rails are filled, and piety is not left to women alone. Catholics feel and understand their religion; make sacrifices for it, labor to save the

weak and shelter those exposed to vices. The religious orders of men increased wonderfully in number, are auxiliaries of the parochial clergy, while those of women in education and works of mercy turn into treasures of heaven the liberal contributions of the Catholic liberality of the moderately well-to-do, who so freely give for Christ's sake. The visitations of the dioceses, now of more moderate size, have, as prompted by the Second Plenary Council, become fully what the law of the Church requires, and the churches for which sixty years ago the merest necessities were deemed sufficient are now filled up with all that the ecclesiastical regulations require, and maintained with a neatness and decency becoming the august character of the worship to which they are dedicated.

The music, formerly subject rather to caprice than rule, has steadily improved, and under the impulse of Councils (3d New York, Decree 3, 4; 1st San Francisco, Decree 7, 8), associations like the Cecilian are doing much to give the true ecclesiastical chanting and music, instead of the lighter and more frivolous.

The Councils hitherto held comprise—ten Provincial Councils of Baltimore, with two Plenary Councils; three Councils held in New York; two at New Orleans; two at St. Louis; four at Cincinnati; two at San Francisco, one at Philadelphia and one in Oregon.

To consolidate the work already done, and to carry out the plan of preparing the United States to pass from the condition of a missionary country, to that of one in full harmony with the general discipline of the Church, will be the great task of the next Plenary Council. It will be a most imposing gathering, with Archbishops and Bishops native to the soil, and others trained indeed in other lands where the old traditions of faith and discipline still prevail, but American by long missionary labors here, attended by theologians, not in name merely but in deep and serious study of every branch of theological science; heads of many religious orders, from the ancient order of St. Benedict to Congregations formed in this country to meet especial wants. The archbishops and bishops with mitred abbots will alone number nearly a hundred, and with their theologians and heads of orders, betoken in themselves, as compared with the first of Baltimore,—which men still living can remember,—what wondrous things God has accomplished in this land, where by His Providence men of all nations are in a few generations moulded into a homogeneous people, which opens a vast field for the conquests of the Church, and itself a token of the union of spirit which should prevail among the faithful.

In all previous Councils much preliminary work was done by

theologians under the guidance of the presiding Archbishop, but for the coming Plenary Council a still more careful preparation has been made. The Sovereign Pontiff invited to Rome the Archbishops of the United States: Archbishop Gibbons of Baltimore, and several others with representatives of those who were incapacitated by ill health, and of metropolitan sees that were vacant by death, proceeded to Rome. There, in a series of long and exhaustive sessions, the wants of the Church in its various relations were fully discussed, and the nature of the legislation to be proposed for general deliberation in the Council was finally settled.

The Council will also in all probability be attended by a special delegate of the Pope, and with the wishes of the Sovereign Pontiff clearly understood on the various points, the deliberations will be greatly facilitated, and the decrees adopted will readily be framed to meet the exigencies of the case, as the wants of the particular dioceses are made known and considered.

Of the great importance of the coming Council no doubt can be entertained; the two former Plenary Councils were but introductory to the third, which will combine the result of long experience, mature deliberation and earnest prayer.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.

IT is a well-established and undisputed fact that the Christian code of ethics wrought for all times to come a complete change in the reciprocal relations of human society. The great truths of Christianity, once proclaimed, not only were destined to live on to the end of time, but they were the means of bringing about a social revolution greater than any other of which we possess any historical record. It was a transformation complete, far-reaching, touching the very springs of life, and yet not an external, but internal change of society. The teachings of Christ were not seditious, did not counsel a general uprising against the old order of things; nor did they disturb directly the bonds of society of those times. Their character was peaceful throughout, yet the watchwords of the future were no longer the same. Freedom, equality, fraternity, these words, which in the course of ages have been so grossly misunderstood and tortured into meanings never inherent in them, were announced as the result of the adoption of Christ's teaching. The most concentrated expression of those great truths was probably that made by St. Paul when he wrote to the Corinthians: "And now there remain these three: Faith, Hope and Charity, but the greatest of these is Charity." For it was Christian Faith which taught mankind to perceive in God not only the Creator of all, but likewise the Father of all, and from this common paternity flows human freedom and that fraternal union becoming to children of the same Father. It was Christian Hope, again, which placed all men on an equality by bidding them to look forward beyond the earth's boundaries to that very self-same goal which now was placed within the reach of all alike. And it was Christian Charity, finally, which was given to the human race both as a birthright and as an inheritance, namely, as that central force which should level the inequalities of life, and at the same time as a perennial means of testifying by its practice to sincerity of faith and strength of hope. This being the most general aspect of the influence of Christianity upon society, it is self-evident that charity, inasmuch as it directly concerns not only the individual but others besides the "ego," is a sociological force in a proper sense.

Before going farther it may be well to call the reader's attention to the fact that charity itself is entirely a product of Chris-

tianity, that no vestige of it can be found in antiquity. In the sense in which, as a Christian virtue, this word is understood by people in this nineteenth century, it was altogether unknown in pre-Christian times. It is true, the records of pagan history tell us of many instances of gentleness and tenderness of heart and of commiseration and generosity, and even of self-sacrifice. But they were isolated, individual acts, and did not proceed from any deep, underlying and controlling principle. Cicero, for example, extolled charity in some eloquent passages; but what he eulogized was based rather upon dictates of justice, and hence more a question of right than a question of love. And Cæcilius wrote the winged sentence: "*Homo homini Deus est, si suum officium sciat.*" Yet the claims of the suffering part of humanity met with no practical recognition until the advent of Christianity. It was only after Christian civilization had taken firm root that the alleviation of poverty and of suffering was placed upon a higher plane and surrounded with that indefinable sacred halo which antiquity had been impotent to impart to it. From that time on, however, charity began to spread even beyond the precincts of true Christianity. Being confined neither to form of belief, nor to country, nor to nationality, its seed scattered far and wide; and of all Christian virtues, charity soon became the most Catholic in the true sense of this word. But it is with charity as with many other things. On its passage through space and time, and falling into the hands of many a stranger, the correct and clearly-defined original meaning became mutilated, so that much passes to-day by that name which has no title to it. For this reason it seems all-important that the steady and growing expansion of fellow-feeling, of which evidences abound on every side, should not be allowed, by the present loose way of calling things, to drift aimlessly hither and thither. Philanthropy, humanitarianism, benevolence, and what not, are frequently confounded with charity, as if an apparent similarity of object necessarily constituted identity of principle. Particularly in our own days there is a tendency observable of adopting, or rather returning to, measures for the relief of pauperism which bear a strong resemblance to those in existence under the Roman emperors in the first few centuries.

These provisions for the sustenance of the Roman poor, or, to speak more correctly, the political rabble steeped in idleness, which constituted at times a dangerous element of power, and at all times a potent incentive to corruption on the part of aspirants to power, were principally confined to Rome, the capital of the Empire. The cry, "*Panem et circenses,*" bespeaks loudest that a hungry mob conscious of its political power uttered it. The demand was satisfied, not from any desire of ameliorating their condition, but simply to

gain for the time being their influence and support. Such being the motives, these measures fall, of course, outside the category of charity. Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that in order to supply Rome with the immense quantities of grain required for such purposes, most exorbitant taxes were ruthlessly levied in the provinces, thus plunging whole districts into poverty and distress. The apparent relief of the indigent in the large capital was thus purchased by a much larger misery caused somewhere away from the place of the dispensation of these bounties. Again, the infirm, the aged, orphans and widows were never cared for by the state, and were even by the philosophers of those days not looked upon as worthy of pity. The non-citizens shared the same lot, and the slaves in their turn did not fare better. They were property, living property, to be sure, but if it pleased the whim of their proprietor to feed them to fish as food, they were fed. With these facts before us, it is, of course, impossible to talk of charity in those days.

All this the Christian dogma of life changed. The poor who had been abandoned, the sick and the destitute who had been despised, the helpless and the deformed who had been objects of human disregard, the aged who had been left to perish,—all these became, henceforth, not only objects of the tenderest solicitude, but the claimants of respect and veneration. They were cared for, not in spite of their infirmities, but because of their infirmities. Here, then, we have that phenomenal reconstruction of society upon a new basis to which allusion was made in the beginning. And how was this accomplished? Not by teaching man that he is first and foremost a citizen, but by teaching him that his origin is divine; by teaching him that the common paternity makes him a free-holder and not a slave; by teaching him that through this freedom, he as a social being, stands in fraternal union with all men. And into the man thus taught, addressing him as a human-divine being, was now instilled the principle of charity, that universal law of which a writer of the fourth century, St. Chrysostom, so well said: "Observe how many natural ties God established among us, and how, by giving us different aptitudes, He arranged it so that all should be in need of one another. Just as He has given different countries different kinds of products, that thereby might be established a continuous exchange of good offices, so He has in like manner given to men temporal and spiritual gifts in different measures, that the one might share them with the others." Or, as St. Basil more tersely expresses it: "The first commandment serves as the basis for the second, and by the second we fulfil the first, since God receives our charity in the poor." This, then, is the motive-power, the vivifying agency of true charity. The Creator

of all is likewise the Dispenser of all. He distributes to each what He pleases under certain conditions, and one of these conditions is to use what He has given in assisting those who have been given less. There is no question here of an obligation of human and positive right; it is an obligation purely moral and religious, based upon faith, prescribed by conscience, and yet free and voluntary.

This broad conception of Christian charity it was which rendered it at once constant, efficacious, compassionate, and universal. And it is the echo of this clear-cut, transparent, and luminous virtue which has reverberated from age to age. Nor has its repercussion died away in our days. Far from it. Contrary to all laws of acoustics, it increases in sound, in volume, in strength, in intensity.

In the first few centuries, when persecutions raged wildly and crystallized every virtue into shining typical forms, the practical application of charity solved, indeed, the social problem of how to adjust the unequal distribution of the goods of this world. No Communistic, or Socialistic, or Nihilistic doctrine, subversive of the right of property and the whole existing order of things, confronts us in those days, but only a proper spirit of looking at our possessions as so many privileges by means of which we should attest our faith by practicing the charity which it enjoins. During the reign of Constantine legislative measures were enacted whereby the state assumed, to a certain extent, the responsibility of aiding those in distress; in other words, charity became impressed upon the legislature. What were the effects? It created for the poor a right to be assisted, so that they no longer looked upon their misery as an affliction for the alleviation of which they incurred a debt of gratitude. Being dispensed, moreover, by that abstract and indefinite, though authoritative person, the state, and their lawful right to assistance being conceded, the classes falling under that category at once raised the most absurd pretensions. Assistance became, as it were, a class-privilege, an incentive to idleness and improvidence. On the other hand, it guaranteed a subsistence to the debauchee and the spendthrift. It blunted the finer sensibilities of human nature, and deprived the poor of that delicate shame which Christian charity so carefully preserved. Thus the engrafting of charity upon the state proved then an absolute failure. This remark, however, should not be understood as if it were intended to imply that the state, as such, had no right to mitigate suffering. Inasmuch as all governmental authority is derived from that self-same source from which life and all else flow, in so much the duty of the ruling powers to supplement what individual charity is unable to accomplish, is plain and logical. But if that point is

disputed, as is now so frequently the case, then state charity is apt to degenerate into political institutions, and bereft of that which gives it intrinsic value.

This will appear more clearly if we consider the work of some society representing the genuine principle of Christian charity, and compare it with that of some philanthropic institution outside of the Catholic Church. We will take the St. Vincent de Paul societies, founded by Frederic Ozanam, a highly gifted and enthusiastic young Frenchman, some fifty years ago. They are animated by the same spirit which animated him after whom they are named. St. Vincent de Paul remains forever the most conspicuous example among men of genuine charity.

It was he who founded in the first half of the Seventeenth Century the Sisters of Charity, whose silent figures and gentle manners are now so well known all over the civilized world. It was he who, a few years later, established the first foundling asylum; he also conceived and established the first homes for the aged and infirm, and asylums for the insane. Nor did his charity end there. It drove him to enter prison-gates, and to seek for its objects the criminal and the hardened sinner. More large-hearted sympathy with all forms of suffering, more generous compassion with affliction and misery in any form, than St. Vincent de Paul possessed, it is, indeed, difficult to conceive, save in Him whose life and whose teachings brought the angel of charity down from above, and left it here below as a perennial blessing to all mankind. In his conception, manifestly, charity did not end with the relief of physical suffering, but should, and ought to, address itself likewise to the relief of moral suffering. Now, this is, in a special manner, the object of the societies named after him. There is a vast amount of moral wretchedness in this world, which money is absolutely powerless to remove, and very frequently it goes hand in hand with physical privations. To lend a helping hand in relieving the poor is one thing; to visit the sick, to advise, console, encourage, and seek employment for the idle and despondent, to teach the ignorant and the weak how to help themselves,—this is another thing, the performance of which does not depend upon open purse-strings so much as it does upon labors, personal, responsible, fatiguing, and often thankless. Such work requires not only a large, generous, liberal amount of love for our fellow-beings, but, moreover, an ardent, energetic and patient desire to lighten their burdens and to bring a ray of sunshine into places where bleak despair shrouded existence itself into darkness. Cheerfulness, as is well known, generally departs when misery and affliction crowd upon us, and it is at such times that a few kind words of consolation meet with true appreciation, inspire new hopes, and lift the depressed spirit from the plane of desolation. Warm-felt sympathy

seldom fails to send vivifying emotions through the sufferer, and most efficiently assuages pain and despondency in the victims of misfortune. Men who receive no compensation for their services can only be influenced by unselfish motives in hunting up sorrow in its homes and trying to make it less bitter. The widowed and the orphaned, the outcast and the forsaken, are thus visited in their humble habitations by friends who endeavor by word and deed to mitigate the cares and troubles and afflictions of life. Individual zeal, individual energy, individual compassion, are thus sent forth to individual suffering. Only by trying to impart the strength to suffer can moral wretchedness itself be conquered. Charity, consequently, as practiced by the St. Vincent de Paul societies, is not only subventive, but also preventive in its character. And here lies the radical difference between charity dispensed as a religious virtue and charity dispensed by an abstract person as benevolence of a general character.

It is, indeed, a great thing to relieve the wants for the necessities of life by providing food and shelter, fuel and clothing for those in need of it. But, if, with the notions which now happily prevail so largely, a case of destitution is directly brought before our eyes, it is hardly more than obeying a natural impulse, a social instinct, to give from abundance, and thus evince some little compassion for fellow-man. And many philanthropic institutions and organizations are mainly intended to benefit the indigent by the disbursement of large sums for their wants through the hands of paid hirelings. It seems unnecessary to remark that we have no intention of belittling or reproaching such work, which is, indeed, most praiseworthy. But the fact remains all the same that, while state-charity and charity outside of the Catholic Church have made enormous strides, the full spirit has taken shape and form only in the Church of Rome's adherents. What we wish to emphasize is this, that if that self-same spirit which actuated the Christians of the first few centuries, and which still lives in the Catholic world, had obtained the same currency everywhere, and at all times, the social discontent which offers in so many countries dire threats to society itself, could not have made such headway. We desire merely to point out how true charity is the one sociological factor which, in the solution of many burning problems, should not be overlooked.

In all city-life the world over, the gulf that yawns between the rich and the poor is already too deep and too wide. True Christian charity, we contend, is the only force which can successfully bridge over this gulf by partly absorbing, partly neutralizing, the discontent, the ill humor, the jealousies, which distress is so apt to generate if not delicately cared for. The practice of that command from above, if general, would soon spread a healthy atmosphere of sympathy between man and man, and teach the poor

that they may with confidence rely upon the active help of the rich ; that they are not wholly forsaken in their misery, but that others of the great family of men are near them to give them sympathy and comfort. For preserving the peace of society, for fostering love of good order and obedience to law, and for strengthening mutual respect and good-will between class and class, man and man, nothing will prove more efficient than to infuse into the present generation a fresh instalment of those time-honored and twice-blessed notions of charity of which the St. Vincent de Paul societies are the living expressions.

Love for humanity is, indeed, becoming more and more a vitalizing power of modern civilization, and what is it but the remnant of the forgotten meaning of the charity inculcated by Christ? It is the force which propels human nature onward and forward; and from this consideration springs the necessity to turn it into a channel deep as the ocean, boundless as the sea, clear as the spring. Cæcilius's words, lately so well translated into English by a modern essayist in the lines—

“ If each to each be all he can,
A very God is man to man,”

should not remain unknown, but enter as a motive of action into each individual life. With a constant multiplication of the means of reaching all classes, with an active and hearty coöperation of all who desire good under whatsoever form, it should not be a hopeless task to revive charity into what it should be.

Nor should it be forgotten in this connection that the replacement of error by truth forms also one of the missions of charity, and falls hence legitimately within its sphere. Yet what do we witness almost every day? Here, a charity-organization society makes well-systematized efforts to prosecute all mendicants in the streets. There, another charitable institution carefully elaborates a plan to prevent its being imposed upon by undeserving applicants. Who can help smiling at so much waste of money and energy, when he contrasts such work with Don Bosco and his marvellous achievements in our days? No wonder Lord Palmerston, after an incognito visit to Valdocco, Don Bosco's headquarters at that time, after inquiring how he managed a thousand boys without any punishments, and seeing with his own eyes the affection they harbored for their benefactor, said on leaving, that he realized for the first time what “love” could do with those untaught, rough natures. On the other hand, what is the effect of surrounding philanthropy with safeguards which make it almost inaccessible? The effect is that those who have any pride or self-respect, and consequently shrink from a public avowal of how and why they got into the pitiable straits they are in, not only refuse to apply,

but actually refuse help as soon as it is conditioned upon a sort of detective investigation of their circumstances. Another effect of this mode of procedure is, that what originally is destined for the relief of suffering is spent in salaries of agents and clerical machinery for the detection of unworthiness. It would seem to be of much less moment if a trifling assistance is given to an undeserving recipient, who in nine cases out of ten is anyhow in very reduced circumstances, than to make one in dire misery wait for help until satisfactory reports can be received, running in the meanwhile the risk that help may come too late.

Charity should, no doubt, be tempered by wisdom. Yet charity is so generous, so noble, that it ignores difference of creed, difference of color, difference of language, and remains always the good Samaritan. It should not be crippled by too much, above all not by any superfluous, red-tape, while it should always practice wise economy and not lavishly bestow upon a few what the many can ill afford to do without. Were more known about the many charity-organizations in the Catholic Church; were their spirit, their principles, their modes of dispensing food, alms, fuel, shelter, etc., better understood, there would soon spring up a wholesome imitation among that large family which also believes in Christ as the Redeemer of all, and in His command: "What you do to the least one of these, you do also to Me." For the genuine ring of charity never fails to awaken a responsive chord in any heart not utterly devoid of gentle sentiments; and particularly in this country, which teems with large-hearted sympathy, a proper realization of what constitutes true charity would put out fresh and vigorous shoots in many directions. The sociological aspect of charity compels us to admit that from it alone can ultimately result not only a lasting and thorough and substantial improvement of the great mass of society, but also a permanent amelioration of the relationships between the different strata of society.

It is from *that* time that Lacordaire speaks, when he says in his inimitable eloquence: "A new age will then commence over which new treasures of riches will be poured out, and this wealth will consist neither of gold, nor silver, nor vessels brought from the uttermost ends of the earth and containing precious and costly things. It will be neither steam, nor railways, nor electricity, nor all that the genius of man shall be able to tear out of the bosom of nature. There is but one thing which we can truly call wealth, and that is love. It alone unites all things and fills all things. It is the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things. One drop of love weighed against the whole universe would tear it away as the tempest whirls away a fragment of straw."

BOOK NOTICES.

CLAVIS RERUM. Norwich: F. A. Robinson & Co., 1883.

The author of this work is unquestionably a person of much more than ordinary intellectual ability and of extensive learning. He has compressed into the small space of one hundred and forty-two pages thoughts lucidly and beautifully expressed, which might easily be expanded into a large volume. His style is a model of pure, pellucid English. In his address "to the reader" he says (and a perusal of his work will incline the reader to accept the statement as true) that the propositions he lays down "are the result of many years of study, observation, and reflection." "Early in life," he continues, he "became convinced that the universe is not a group of independent systems, visible and invisible,¹ but is a perfect and inseparable whole, formed on a single plan, and destined to fulfil a single purpose. To discover this purpose and unfold this plan, so far as human research might accomplish either of those objects, he has since devoted a great portion of his time and labor, and having now arrived at certain definite conclusions, he ventures to submit them to the judgment of his fellow-workers in the same exhaustless field." Taken as a whole the work is one of the most important philosophical treatises on the plan and purpose of the universe which has recently been given to the public. Its every page bears evidence of close thought and profound reflection, so as not only to engage the reader's attention, but also to set his mind to work in developing other thoughts which those of the author suggest. It sparkles with rich gems of truth placed in a fit setting of simple, beautiful, and often really sublime, language. Yet, along with this, are grave errors, which seriously impair, though they do not destroy, the value of the work.

On the first page of his address "to the reader," he specifies four sources from which he has gathered the data upon which his conclusions are based, and then says that he has carefully explored them for clues "whereby he might be led to that central point, from which alone the labyrinth of created nature could at once be seen and understood." The divine purpose and plan can be learned, it is true, from the sources of information indicated by the author, yet only in part and in a general way. Our knowledge is and must be imperfect; for man cannot, at least in this life, place himself at "that central point" from which the whole creation can be seen and understood. This belongs to God alone.

Respecting the creation of animals lower than man, the author says: "This is the unsolved problem of the visible creation. . . . Reason has reached intelligible conclusions in regard to every other division of the universe, but here its keenest scrutiny is baffled, and it has been compelled to either seek for its deliverance in an hypothesis which negatives the immateriality and immortality of man, or to acknowledge that the riddle is beyond its power to solve!"

To this we object. The proofs of man's immortality and of the im-

¹ The universe certainly is "not a group of independent systems," and both the "visible" and the "invisible" are parts of one whole, but the visible is surrounded and penetrated by the invisible.

materiality of his soul are not at all dependent on our solving by reason the problem of the animal creation. Whether or not it is beyond the power of reason to "solve the riddle" of that creation, we are not by any means compelled to adopt the alternative stated by the author.

Again, in his introductory chapter, the author, referring to the individual dispositions of men, says, that "these dispositions must be either natural or acquired." He then argues that "they cannot be natural, for if they were, they must be of the essence of the individual nature, and therefore unchangeable; a supposition which is contrary to experience."

Here we object: (1.) That individual dispositions are both natural and acquired; natural as derived from our parents, acquired inasmuch as they are the product of our own actions.

(2.) It does not at all follow that because they are not natural they are of the "*essence*" of our nature, individual or otherwise. Our nature includes all that belongs to it, accidental as well as essential.

The author then insinuates that "granting that all the differences of individual disposition are acquired (which we not only do not grant, but deny), the period of individual existence is too short for their acquisition," and also that the fact that they manifest themselves from earliest infancy proves that they must have been acquired by the soul of the individual in some previous "state of its existence." What this previous state was, according to the author, may be inferred from his query: "Does no light fall on this question from the fact that every phase of human disposition finds its counterpart in that of some of the species of the animal creation?"

The fact (which observation incontestably proves) that children do inherit certain natural dispositions from their progenitors, accounts for these varieties of individual dispositions manifesting themselves in infancy. Nor is a long individual experience required, because man has the faculty of understanding signs and language, and, consequently, can appropriate the results of the experience of other persons.

Again, in his introductory chapter, the author seems to hold that abstract ideas are the "universal archetypes of things as entities subsisting, not in the individuals of the concrete, but in the infinite life of Him Whose works overshadow His interior being."

But abstract ideas are not archetypes of things, but copies. The concrete things themselves are copies of the archetypes in the mind of God, who knew from all eternity what manner of things He would create. The archetypal idea or plan of things is not by any means abstract; nor should it be confounded with the ideas we possess.

Still following the author in his introductory chapter—address "to the reader"—we controvert his statement that "the four great faiths" of ancient paganism were either "universal" or "primeval." Their origin is disclosed in the *Book of Wisdom* (chapter xiii.). The nature worship of the ancients was not so much a worship of nature in our modern sense of the term, as of various forces and forms of nature which they regarded as so many distinct deities whose names and attributes varied according to locality, so that what was worshiped as a god in one region, was abhorred as a demon in another.

The Incarnation of the Deity, which the author thinks was one of the "four fundamental faiths of ancient paganism," is a doctrine peculiar to Christianity. The avatars of Brahminism (the word '*avatar*' simply means descent) were merely descents or manifestations by which Vishnu appeared in the form of a fish, tortoise, boar, dwarf, etc. He

did not *assume*, in the Christian sense, their natures or permanently occupy their forms.

The author's idea of secondary causes and their relation to God (pages 4 and 5), though expressed in very forcible and beautiful language, seems, when closely examined, to be self-contradictory. Admitting the existence of secondary causes, he yet so closely identifies them with God, the Cause of Causes, as, in effect, to destroy their existence, or at least deprive them of any operative power. He says that "their power or mode of operation" is not "anything distinct from Him;" that "their force is entirely both of and *from* Him;" and that "He works not by them but *in* them." Previously, too, the author says that of God "no secondary cause is predicable."

What does the author mean by this last-quoted declaration? He certainly does admit secondary causes, though with qualifications which to us seem to involve confusion and self-contradiction of ideas. The power of secondary causes though most certainly *from* God, yet is not *of* Him, in the sense of the author. Inasmuch, too, as secondary causes are created, they certainly are truly distinct from Him, their Creator. It is true, He does not need them as "instruments," yet He chooses to use them as such, having first given to them all the power they possess, and He works *by* them as well as *in* them. Whatever power secondary causes have (which the author seems to deny), so far from detracting from Divine Omnipotence, exhibits it all the more fully, since all their force is from Him and has been given by Him. The author quotes approvingly the very important and true dicta of "the ancients," meaning (we suppose) the Scholastics, that "*Createdness is a perpetual dependence upon God*," and that "*Creation and preservation are not two acts, but one act*," yet in his chapter on "Creation," page 86, he seems to hold an opposite idea, else he would scarcely speak of "creative acts ceasing to operate" while their effects continue to exist.

The author's chapter on "*Elements*" sets forth many sublime truths lucidly and beautifully, yet here, too, there is room for adverse criticism. The author very improperly speaks of God as one of the "six elements," which are "found everywhere combined with one another," and "in which the Universe subsists." The common division of the sum of existence into God and creatures is the true one; it is philosophical and exhaustive. Besides, the word "universe" may very well be reserved in philosophical as well as in every-day language for the sum of created existence; nor should the Creator be placed in the same category with the created. The classification of the latter, also, adopted by the author we regard as very objectionable. "Force," for instance, should not be considered a distinct element; it is an attribute of both matter and spirit; neither can exist without some degree of force. Even inertia is a force.

Again, God is not a "mode of being;" He is Being itself.

It seems scarcely correct to speak of the spirit's "*consciousness*" of God. It would be better to call it knowledge of God, or the faculty of knowing God. Man has the faculty of knowing God, and does know Him both by faith and reason, but this knowledge is not immediate nor intuitive. The existence of God is indeed implied in all our knowledge and in our very existence; but an implicit knowledge of which we are unconscious can scarcely be called knowledge and certainly not "*consciousness*." The existence of innate ideas—assumed by the author—has yet to be proved. The human mind possesses the faculty of forming ideas in accordance with the nature of things and its own essentially ra-

tional nature, which admits of development, not arbitrarily, but only in the manner designed by its Creator.

The author's statement of the doctrine of the Trinity is defective and erroneous. The term "*person*," to which he objects, in this following Whately, far from leading to "extreme confusion of thought," or indeed to any confusion of thought, is necessary to guard against erroneous thought. It may be difficult to define, yet everyone can understand that the term "*person*" designates not a thing, but one to whom the personal pronoun "*He*" can properly and literally be applied.

The Trinity is far more than three "distinct attitudes" or aspects which the Divine Being assumes toward Itself. This would be pure Sabellianism. Were it true, every man would be a trinity.

Again, if the author's theory were correct, it would seem that the Son were the Third Person of the Trinity proceeding from the Father through the Holy Ghost or from the Father and the Holy Ghost; the Holy Ghost would then, too, be the Second Person. Then, too, if we try to form to ourselves a conception of the manner in which the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father (which, however, is hardly possible), we had better follow St. Thomas's idea, that the Son proceeds from the Father *per intellectum*—being His perfect expression and image in which He eternally sees Himself. From this mutual beholding each other proceeds *per voluntatem*, the Holy Ghost.

"Creation is synonymous with change." Then change is synonymous with creation. If this be so, annihilation also is creation; for certainly annihilation is a change. "Creation is also synonymous with variety!" This rhetorical mode of statement in a philosophical work is entirely out of place and cannot but lead to confused and erroneous thinking.

"Between creation and the incarnation there is with God no relation of priority or subsequence; both are alike eternal." With God the design and purpose of the creation and incarnation are eternal, but not the creation nor the incarnation itself.

Moreover, that after the resurrection there shall be a new heaven and a new earth, and that all things, with the exception of the lost angels and men, shall be more intimately united with God than now, is a truth of revelation. That they shall be "assumed into God" is not only nowhere told us, but no Christian can hold.

The author is a believer in "evolution," but in a different sense, in many respects, from that which is now commonly attached to the word.

The great objection to the work is the author's theory of metempsychosis and his revival of Origen's notion of the pre-existence of spirits, which, after a long course of ages, enter as component parts into the nature of man. The distinction between soul and spirit might perhaps be admitted or, at least, endured. Indeed, if we are to give the name of *soul* to the animating principle of animals, it would be an advantage to have a distinct term for the higher principle which exists in and characterizes man. But to say that the soul, after a long period of transmigration through various animals, is at length united in man with a spirit which existed from the beginning of creation, to form a portion of human nature, is intolerable; yet the whole work, though containing a rich store of important and even of Catholic truth, is constructed with a view to support and recommend this fantastic theory.

As regards the author's general idea of the scope and intention of the Mosaic record of creation, and at the same time as a specimen of the author's transparent, glowing style, we quote the following:

"The first part of this record includes the first verse, and reads as follows: 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.'

Here is the simple allegation of the universal Creatorship of God. There are no data given by which the time or the duration of that creative act can be ascertained. There is no hint as to the manner of its operation. . . . By these words He has placed Himself behind and underneath the Universe, as its Origin and Master. He has left the rest to human research, as a problem worthy of its highest thought, and no solution can contradict His Word, unless it denies or depreciates the Creatorship He claims."

"The second part of this record embraces the remainder of the first chapter to the twenty-sixth verse. It describes the earth as without form and void, shrouded in darkness, and brooded over by the Spirit of God. Then follows the creation of light; of the firmament which divided waters from waters; of the sun and moon, as visible sources of light and heat; of fowls and fishes; and finally of reptiles and the beasts of the field. Here, also, apart from the word *Day*, by which the periods of these creative acts are numbered, there is no record of date, or of duration, nor is there a suggestion of the modes by which these vast divisions of the material world were brought into existence. Whether light was created between the evening and the morning of that primeval day; or then, for the first time, penetrated through the darkness in which the earth was buried, we know nothing. Whether the waters were separated from the dry land, by one sweep of the omnipotent hand, or were gathered into their places by the gradual formation of the earth's surface into hills and valleys, through ages of volcanic action, we know nothing. . . . Whether the first-born giants of the field woke into perfect maturity upon the morning of the sixth day, and took possession of the virgin earth; or whether, through the races that preceded them, they drew their ancient origin from God, we know nothing. Upon these questions God has shed no light (in the Mosaic record). His Fatherhood stands out in all its simple glory, to be adored and loved; but He has neither ministered to human curiosity, nor given support or contradiction to a single physical hypothesis. Through the vast body of the earth, and over all the orbits of the stars, He leaves us free to roam; to seek, conjecture, and, if possible, to find the truth; and binds us by but one commandment, that we recognize Him as the Maker of them all."

With reference to the Mosaic account of the creation of man, the author says:

"The third part of this record embraces the remainder of the first chapter and several verses of the second. Here again there is no note of time, or method, or duration. We read the simple statement, that God created man by forming his body out of the dust of the earth, and breathing into it the breath of life, and that man became a living soul. But whether He created him in his material and spiritual parts at the same moment; or whether his material body had been formed in obedience to that law of development, through which successive races of the lower animals received their being, and was now, at last, united with a soul; or whether the soul and body of both had come out of those lower orders, by the same development, and, for the first time, now became the home of a celestial spirit, He has revealed nothing. God has said in His Word that He has made us in His own image and likeness, and thus has told us all that we need know, in order to secure to Him our obedience and love. But He permits us to trace our origin, immediately or intermediately, from Him as best we may, putting no limits on our speculations, or our inquiries; and certain that, if we always act on what we *know*, His right in us, and over us, can never be denied."

The author holds that the incarnation is the end of all creation, and thus expresses his idea:

... "The fullness of creation's hour had come, and nothing now remained except for the Creator to enter and unite the Creature to Himself."

"This is the twofold nature of that Person, Who has thereby become known to the Universe as both the Son of Man and Son of God. He died, in Bethlehem of Juda, now nearly nineteen centuries ago. In that one Person, all Finiteness became endowed with the divine Infinity. His body, seen in its true purity and splendor only upon the Mount of the Transfiguration, and in the hour of His Ascension into heaven, held all the powers of Matter, Force, and Life in ultimate perfection. His intellect and will attained the limit of the possibilities of Soul. His Spirit stood forever face to face with God, to Whom it was eternally united, and saw in Him the boundless fullness of His moral beauty, the glory of His inconceivable simplicity and power."

"This was the End of the creation. It was the true and necessary termination of those vast, successive Epochs, whereby the way had been prepared for this last endless Epoch, in which their wonderful productions might be gathered into Him, Who, having in His own humanity achieved perfection, bestowed upon all other men the means of reaching it themselves, through their own voluntary unity with Him. The method He provided for accomplishing this union with Himself was no less simple than it was efficient. He founded a perpetual society—His Church. To this Church He committed certain truths, by contemplating which the human intellect ascends the loftiest heights of wisdom, possible to man; and in it He established certain practices, whereby the human will is brought into submission to the will of God. To those who by the use of these means become fitted to receive Him, He then gives Himself in that mysterious Eucharist, by which the Body, Soul, and Spirit of the individual man are united to His Body, Soul, and Spirit, and through these, to His eternal and inseparable Godhead, and thus are made partakers of the infinite and uncreated Life of God."

A CATHOLIC DICTIONARY. By *William E. Addis*, Secular Priest, sometime Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland; and *Thomas Arnold*, M.A., Fellow of the same University. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1884.

Rarely have we felt such pleasure in opening a book as we did on receiving this, and it is but the simple truth to say that our pleasure was increased, rather than diminished, by its careful perusal. Its learned authors undertook a task of no ordinary difficulty when they united their labors in producing a Catholic dictionary,—in fact a compendious Catholic encyclopædia. No one who has not had experience in getting up such a work can estimate the amount of toil, often of drudgery, which must be gone through in order to obtain and to put into a condensed form such articles, for instance, as those under the titles of ENGLISH CATHOLICS, EUCHARIST, GALILEO, IRISH CHURCH, JESUITS, LITURGIES, MARRIAGE, MARY, MISSIONS, PENANCE, POPE, and others we need not mention.

We were curious to examine closely such articles as those treating of the Irish Church, English and Scotch Catholics, and were charmed with the large-minded impartiality of the writer, Mr. Arnold,—for to him belong the articles on mediæval and modern history. Mr. Arnold adopts the opinion of Most Rev. Dr. Moran, that St. Patrick was born at Kilpatrick on the Clyde. He says nothing of his being related to

St. Martin, but makes him, and very justly, the disciple of St. Germanus after having studied at Marmontiers and Lerins. "The Irish people received the Gospel with extraordinary readiness. . . . Within a century after St. Patrick, St. Columbanus, the great Irish missionary of the sixth century, said to the Pope, "*The Catholic faith is held unshaken by us, as it was delivered to us by you, the successor of the holy Apostles.*" Again, quoting the testimony of Beda, Mr. Arnold says: "With respect to Beda, although it is true that he does not mention St. Patrick in his Ecclesiastical History, the circumstance—singular as it must be admitted to be—may perhaps be explained on the ground that he chose to confine himself strictly to the religious concerns of the Angles and Saxons. . . . But the fact is that in both his *Martyrologies* Beda does give the name of St. Patrick. In the prose one, under March 17th, he says, '*In Scotia, the birthday of the holy Patricius, bishop and confessor, who first in that country preached the Gospel of Christ.*'"

The articles on English and Scotch Catholics are full of information, all the more precious that they are of the greatest accuracy and condensed into the smallest space compatible with a pleasing and connected narrative.

Most striking is the article on FREEMASONRY, which we recommend all serious-minded readers to peruse carefully. The origin of Freemasonry is traced from the mediæval guild of stonemasons, "who were popularly called by the very name of Freemasons. . . . It was a migratory guild, its members traveling under their masters in organized bodies through all parts of Europe, wherever their services were required in building. . . . The south of France, where a large Jewish and Saracenic element remained, was a hotbed of heresies, and that region was also a favorite one with the guild of Masons. It is asserted, too, that as far back as the twelfth century, the lodges of the guild enjoyed the special protection of the Knights Templars. It is easy in this way to understand how the symbolical allusions to Solomon and his Temple might have passed from the Knights into the Masonic formulary. In this way, too, might be explained how, after the suppression of the order of the Temple, some of the recalcitrant Knights, maintaining their influence over the Freemasons, would be able to pervert what hitherto had been a harmless ceremony into an elaborate ritual that should impart some of the errors of the Templars to the initiated. A document was long ago published which purports to be a charter granted to a lodge of Freemasons in England in the time of Henry VII., and it bears the marks in its religious indifference of a suspicious likeness between Freemasonry then and now."

Then came the radical changes in the spirit of this once praiseworthy organization. In 1535 we see that the Cologne Charter, drawn up by a gathering of Masons at the opening of the Cathedral, "is signed by Melanchthon, Coligny, and other similar ill-omened names." They now became "a sect." Elias Ashmole, in 1646, founded the Rosicrucians (Order of Rose Croix) or Hierarchic Freemasons, which became affiliated to some of the Masonic lodges in Germany, "where from the time of the Reformation there was a constant founding of societies, secret or open, which undertook to formulate a philosophy or a religion of their own."

In 1745, the Jacobite Lord Derwentwater introduced Freemasonry into France; this formed the basis of the Scotch Rite. The new degree of *Cohen* or priest was introduced into the French lodges by a Portuguese Jew. Next came Adam Weishaupt with his Illuminism, degrees of which he engrafted on the order. "The avowed object of the

Illuminati was to bring back mankind—beginning with the Illuminated—to their primitive liberty by destroying religion, for which this newest philosophical invention was to be substituted.” “Freemasonry in Continental Europe has been the hatching-ground of most of the revolutionary societies, many of which were affiliated to the higher Masonic degrees. In France . . . an avowed belief in God was required for initiation, but this requirement, through the efforts of M. Mace, of the University, was finally abolished in the convention of Freemasons, held at Paris, September 14th, 1877. A recent French writer maintains that Freemasonry is—unknown to the craft—managed by five or six Jews, who bend its influence in every possible way to the furtherance of the anti-Christian movement that passes under the name of Liberalism. . . . The war against the Catholic Church in Germany had no more bitter supporter than Freemasonry. . . . In France and Belgium the lodges have officially commanded their members to assist the *Ligue de l'Enseignement*—a league intended to bring about the complete secularization of the primary public schools. . . . English-speaking Freemasons usually disown for their order any aims but those of a mutual benefit and convivial society. . . . But the constant influx into the English-speaking countries of Jews and Continental Freemasons must necessarily impregnate the order with the poison of the Continental sect.”

This admirable article is a fair specimen of the thorough manner in which important subjects are treated. The Inquisition is dealt with in the same spirit and with the same conscientiousness; so are the Liturgies, in which Mr. Addis has accumulated all that is of the greatest interest to churchmen and scholars. Passing over the equally interesting articles, “Mary,” “Mass,” “Marriage,” the reader will find in that on “Mental Reservation,” brief as it is, a synopsis of the soundest doctrine on this much-vexed question. Glancing, however, at that on “Military Orders,” we were rather startled to find this statement: “The *Glorious Virgin Mary*.—founded at Vicenza in 1233, etc.” The Knights of the Glorious Virgin Mary were founded in Bologna, some thirty years later, by Loderingo d’Andalo and Catalano Catalani, as stated in a previous volume of this REVIEW. The entire paragraph, brief as it is, is not only incorrect and misleading, but absolutely unjust to these Knights. It is not true that “in course of time they became rich, and thought more of enjoying themselves than of anything else; whence the people called them in derision the *Frères Joyeux*, ‘Jolly Brethren.’” Count Gozzadini, of Bologna, himself a descendant of Dante, has vindicated the reputation of this Order from the slur cast upon it by his great ancestor. He proved that the name of *Frati Gaudenti* was given to these Knights from the beginning, and when their glorious services caused them to be called to the help of all the cities of Italy. The name probably came from their white raiment and the many privileges and exemptions conferred on them by the State and the Church. The Knights of *Santiago* deserved at least a brief mention.

To the article “Missions” we can accord unmixed praise, as well as to “Pope.” In the latter, as indeed in most of the longer articles, one finds, in a very brief space, such information as cannot be obtained in any similar work in the English language. Hence it is that we welcome this *Dictionary* as a God-send to every Catholic family and every Catholic school, college, and scholar in the country.

The one little blemish we have pointed out, together with the omission of all mention of the pilgrimage to Compostella in speaking of “Pilgrimages,” and a few other oversights, are of very trifling moment

compared with the safe, solid, and satisfactory instruction priest and layman can find in this truly *Catholic Treasury of Knowledge*. As such we recommend it most heartily, promising our readers that they will derive from its pages the same profit and pleasure we have found in them. The Catholic Publication Society Company have conferred on the public a lasting benefit by giving them this *Dictionary*; and the learned authors deserve higher praise than we can bestow, and a more liberal pecuniary reward for their labors than, we fear, they are likely to obtain. What we, in the meanwhile, wish is that this invaluable treasury should be found in every Catholic home in the land.

CREATION; OR, THE BIBLICAL COSMOGONY IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE. By *Arnold Guyot, LL.D.*, Blair Professor of Geology and Physical Geography in the College of New Jersey, etc., etc., etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884.

Writers of works like the one before us encounter at the outset of their undertaking two difficulties that have never yet been overcome, before they can hope that their ideas will obtain general acceptance. One of these difficulties is the fact that what the "Biblical Cosmogony" is, has never as yet been determined. The exact scope and meaning of the references in the first chapters of the Old Testament to the genesis of the universe are still in dispute and likely to long remain so. Apart from the truth that all created things owe their existence to the omnipotent and omniscient *fiat* of God, show forth His infinite perfections, and have their purpose and end in Him, the Church has never spoken authoritatively on the subject. Thus to Catholics as well as to non-Catholics the precise meaning of particular words and phrases in the Mosaic account of creation, is the subject of individual opinion, and not of faith. Many passages of the sacred record continue to be differently interpreted by the most profound scholars, whether Catholics, Protestants, or rationalists. Nor is it probable that the Church soon will—it is almost certain that for a long time to come, if ever, indeed, the Church will not—pronounce authoritatively upon the meaning of those passages as regards their bearing upon merely scientific questions.

The Church, by divine appointment, is the authoritative, infallible teacher of faith and morals. All questions which affect them, in her own good and opportune time, she resolves and infallibly teaches, guided by wisdom divinely promised and given to her. The Church is also the promoter of human science and of every pursuit which tends to increase the knowledge and unfold and develop the intellectual faculties of man. But she is not, nor has she ever claimed, nor will she ever claim to be the authoritative, infallible teacher of human science, or the solver of the riddles which purely scientific subjects propound. Them she leaves the human mind perfectly free to investigate and study.

The second difficulty which writers upon the harmony of the "Biblical Cosmogony" and human science encounter, is the fact that it is extremely difficult to determine what settled convictions or conclusions science has at any time attained, now or in the past. There is a constant tendency of human thought, except as guided and directed by divine authority and wisdom, to move in various and divergent lines, and to entertain different opinions. All the facts and phenomena of physical nature which are necessary to knowing and understanding all that can be known and understood respecting the modes, processes, and periods through which the heavens and the earth, water and land, plants, animals and man were brought into existence have not, by any means, been fully dis-

covered, investigated and understood. Until this shall have been done, human science, instead of reading with certainty and positive connection all that may be learned by the natural reason of man of the natural world by the study of its phenomena, must be regarded as only spelling its way towards such knowledge, with many a blunder meanwhile and misunderstanding both of its words and meaning; and many a dispute, too, and opposition of opinion among the learners, as to whose spelling is correct, and what the true, scientific definition of the word so laboriously spelled really is.

Under these circumstances, to undertake to exhibit "Biblical Cosmogony in the light of modern science" seems to us very much like trying to illustrate a difficult and obscure subject by references to one that is equally obscure. As for "harmonizing" "Biblical Cosmogony" with modern science—which is really the design of the volume before us—it strikes us as very like to attempting to determine the proportionate value to each other of two unknown quantities, the relation of each to all known quantities being as yet unascertained.

We do not mean by these remarks that works like the one before us are valueless or unimportant, but that their value and importance are speculative rather than positive. And this is a fact which at this day, it seems to us, it is specially important to bear in mind. Self-constituted dogmatizers of science, as well as of religion, abound, and by their constant setting up of opinions as if they were final conclusions, and of theories as if they were indisputable verities, they do infinite harm both to science and to religion. Speculative study of what is known only in part is not, by any means, valueless. Properly directed, and confined within its proper limits, it is of immense importance, and effectively promotes the advance of science, physical, metaphysical, and theological. But, as we have just intimated, it must be strictly confined within legitimate limits and never be allowed to become dogmatical, nor assert as positive finalities what, at most, can only be claimed as probable conclusions.

This value the work before us has on some of the points it discusses. And from this point of view it is an important contribution to existing literature on the subject of "Biblical Cosmogony" and of the light which modern science at present throws upon it. To persons fond of such studies it will be interesting. The writer has evidently given to his subject long and careful study, and in his discussions of various unsettled questions evinces extensive learning and research.

Yet in these very discussions he furnishes proofs of the justness and opportuneness of our previous remarks. For, not satisfied with either the Catholic or the Protestant translation of the first chapters of Genesis, he presents his own version of them, and puts his own interpretation upon them, and also gives explanations of what are commonly accepted as ascertained facts of physical science which many scientists will object to.

"*Evolution*," the author declares, is still an open question, yet an open question only within certain strict limitations. It may or may not be that "lifeless matter developed into various forms of lifeless matter; life into various forms of life;" and "mankind into all its varieties." But from one to another of these he holds there is no evidence whatever of even possibility of evolution.

In this Professor Guyot has stated, with unquestionable accuracy and truth, the exact point which science has as yet reached. Whatever conclusions it may or may not hereafter arrive at, and however, in their impatient enthusiasm, certain scientists may endeavor to project thought beyond the limits of what *is* known, and speculate upon what the unknown will teach when, if ever, it *becomes* known, there is as yet no

evidence of even the possibility of evolution of lifeless matter into the various forms of animal life, nor of these into man. On the contrary, the evidence, truly read, is all in the other direction. Theorists who maintain the opposite uniformly substitute *speculations* for *facts* in the chasms they are attempting to bridge over.

With reference to this point he says of the Mosaic record: "Though the narrative is, on the whole, singularly non-committal in regard to any specific scientific doctrine, there are a few points on which it is positive. It teaches that:

"1. The primordial creation of matter, the creation of the system of life, and the creation of man are three distinct creations.

"2. They are not simultaneous, but successive.

"3. God's action in the creation is constant."

As regards evolution in the Darwinian sense, the author's ideas may be inferred from the following statements:

"Besides the primordial creation of matter, that few will deny, the creation of life must be acknowledged, since, as we have seen, science has thus far been unable to derive it from dead matter by any process whatever. Scientific inquiries are far from having demonstrated that all the archetypes of the invertebrates which appear simultaneously in the Silurian are derived from one another. Science fails to discover traces of a direct descent of the vertebrate from invertebrate, whose plan of structure is entirely unlike; of the large fishes of the Devonian from any preceding animal form; of the huge reptiles of the middle ages of life from the fishes of the Devonian. It cannot be proved that the great pachyderms which suddenly come upon the stage in the Tertiary epoch are the offspring of the reptiles of the preceding age. The bond which unites them is of an immaterial nature; the marvellous unity of plan which we observe is in the mind of the Creator."

As regards the theory that man is an evolution from lower animals, he says:

"Man, made by the Creator in His own image could not be confounded with the animals. With his advent a still higher plane is introduced which comprises not only animal but spiritual life, which has its own laws, its own character, and for which the body is but an instrument.

"That spiritual element which constitutes man as a distinct creation can no more be derived from the physiological functions of the animal than life can be evolved from dead matter. There is between the two planes an impassable abyss.

"We often hear of palæontologists looking sedulously for the missing link between man and the animal. They forget that in the sense of which they speak there can be no link wanting. The figure and the structure of the ape is as near as need be to be called a link between man and the animal; the difference between the two beings is in the moral nature.

"The invisible world of ideas is the true domain of man, the scene of his activity. For this reason language has been vouchsafed to him, while it is denied to the animal, whose functions are limited to the procuring of food, to self-defence, and to reproduction."

EXERCITIA SPIRITUALIA S. IGNATII DE LOYOLA : Meditationibus Illustrata ad Usum Cleri tam Regularis quam Sæcularis. Auctore F. X. Wenninger. S. J., S. S., Theologiæ Doctore. Cum Permissu Superiorum. Moguntiae: Sumptibus Francisci Kircheim, MDCCCLXXXIII. Neo-Eboraci et Cincinntii: Fr. Pustet & Co.

The spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius, now so familiar to all Catholic clergymen, are contained within a small volume, and are not simply

meditations or prayers, but, as their name imports, *exercises*, designed to excite and direct the mind and heart to earnest, profound and devout reflection upon the subjects which those exercises comprise. Their spirituality is of such exalted order that Louis de Ponte does not hesitate to declare that St. Ignatius wrote them by special revelation and inspiration of God, as the Holy Spirit interiorly dictated to him, and taught him by these same exercises. They were approved by Pope Paul III., in a bull granted in the year 1548. Pious experience has fully confirmed the wisdom of this approbation by the marvellous effects which God has wrought, and which He daily works in those who seriously meditate upon the truths which St. Ignatius sets forth.

The exercises were designed to extend over four weeks or more. Now they are often condensed into one. At their commencement St. Ignatius has placed these few lines, which he meant to be the foundation and summary of the whole work :

“Man is created to praise, honor and serve God, and thus to save his own soul. All other things are created for the sake of man, and to aid him in the attainment of his destined end ; therefore, he should use them only with this object, and avoid them when they would lead him away from it. We must make ourselves indifferent to all created things, where a choice is left us ; so that we should not desire health more than sickness, riches than poverty, honor than comfort, a long life than a short one, and so of all the rest ; desiring and choosing only what will conduce most surely to the end for which we were made.”

This first thoroughly examined and applied, the mind is solicited to resolve, henceforth, to use all creatures only as the means of salvation. We consider, therefore, the danger of any other course ; we survey our past life with all its errors ; we meditate on the enormity of sin ; the punishment of hell ; the angels eternally condemned ; the offence of Adam ; the long train of his descendents who have been justly sentenced to banishment from God. Then, with some beginning of detachment from the world and our own evil properties, we enter on the second week, and consider the sovereignty that Christ claims in our souls ; the appeal he makes to us, as a king to his subjects, to engage us in his service ; inducements with which he invites us, differing far from and infinitely exalted above those of any temporal monarch. For He promises to treat His servants as Himself, and that He will call upon them to do and to suffer only as He Himself has set them an example.

St. Ignatius then places before us the alternative of heaven or hell, in the admirable meditation entitled, “The Two Standards,” which is said to have peopled so many monasteries. In this Meditation, with allusions to military life he represents Christ as a royal warrior seeking to enlist all men in His service, and Lucifer as His rebellious enemy, craftily striving to attract us to himself. Then when we have seen the emptiness of all the temptations offered us by the devil, we are led to contemplate the mysteries of our Saviour’s life, and thence on to what St. Ignatius calls “the three degrees of humility.” Of these the first is simply such piety, as is indispensable to salvation ; the second brings us nearer to God in our intercourse with the world, so that the soul dreads even the smallest and most venial sin ; the third implies an absolute renunciation of all that is not God, and the closest union with Him that may be vouchsafed to man. This meditation, which, according to the scheme of St. Ignatius, extends ever twelve days, leads us to make our deliberate election of the way of life in which we believe ourselves called on to serve God.

The third week, occupied with the Passion of our Lord, confirms and

extends what has gone before. The fourth week, presenting to our minds His glorious resurrection, His ascension, and His unbounded love for man, suggests to us how to attain the highest eminence of charity which has no choice and no affection but in and for God, and which leads us to do all things for His greater honor and glory.

The "Exercises" were originated by St. Ignatius at Manresa, and were perfected by his experience when he began to teach. Whoever diligently uses them will own that only divine inspiration could have shown their holy author so clearly and fully the secrets of the human heart, could have made known to him such effectual remedies for its weakness and propensity to sin, and such stimulants and aids to detachment from all created things, and fixing itself upon God.

The reason which moved Rev. Father Wenninger to the preparation of the volume before us he has stated in his Preface. He states, as the result of his own examination, that very many of the works which are professedly founded on the "Exercises" and designed to be expansions of them, retain but little of their real spirit; that though they may be excellent as pious reading, and as aids for clergymen on the mission, they leave little room for the exercise of mind and heart in real *meditation*. In confirmation of this, he quotes the eminent Very Rev. Father Roothaan, S.J., who, in one of his letters to the members of the Society of Jesus, laments that through the use of such publications persons are led to follow the thoughts of others, instead of exercising themselves in reflection upon the very words of St. Ignatius, thus not only failing to *meditate* in the strict sense of the word, but also failing to drink in the real meaning and spirit of the holy author of the "Exercises." Such persons, he says, really engage in reading and not in meditation.

Impressed with these considerations, Rev. Father Wenninger believed that he would be doing a work which would be fruitful in good results, by publishing the genuine actual text of the "Exercises," according to Very Rev. Father Roothaan's approved version, and expanding and applying the "Exercises" in strict conformity with their very words and with the very spirit of their holy author.

Two great advantages would thus be gained. First, the danger would be avoided of substituting one's own thoughts for those of St. Ignatius, and the very marrow, as it were, of his meditations would be preserved, and in his own words. Secondly, he who uses the work, either for the purpose of spiritual reading or as a preparation and aid to meditation in the strict sense of the word, will not be hindered, but greatly helped and excited in his devout work by dwelling upon the exact words of the holy author.

In the volume before us, Father Wenninger has constantly kept these excellent ideas in mind and has adhered faithfully to them. His work, though primarily intended for members of the Society of Jesus, will be highly profitable, if devoutly used, to others also, who desire to advance towards spiritual perfection.

MARTIN LUTHER: A STUDY OF REFORMATION. By *Edwin D. Mead*. Boston: George H. Ellis, 1884.

The writer of this book is an infidel of the Theodore Parker type, and an intense admirer of Luther. Lutherans, however, and other "Evangelical" Protestants will not thank him for the picture he has drawn of Luther. He not only brings to view Luther's coarseness, vulgarity, and intolerable arrogance, obstinacy and pride, but parades them as virtues and as proofs that he was a veritable prophet, possessed of plenary inspiration, as Rationalists understand those words. He

quotes as preface to his book Luther's own words: "I say . . . that I have taught right and wholesome doctrine. . . . Many accuse me of being too violent and severe in writing against papists and factious spirits . . . I have, indeed, been very violent at times, and have severely attacked my opponents, and yet in such manner that I never regretted it."

With reference to Luther's claims to "inspiration and infallibility," he quotes Luther as saying in his *Table-Talk*: "I merely know that the doctrine I teach is God's Word. I know for certain that what I teach is the only Word of the high majesty of God in heaven, His final conclusion and everlasting and unchangeable truth; and whatsoever concurs and agrees not with this doctrine is altogether false and spun by the devil When a man has this certainty he has overcome the serpent." Thus Luther "bases his inspiration on . . . the ground of the true soul's immediate communion with God."

But the "inspired," the "prophet," Luther had "no doctrine of the infallibility of the Apostles or Prophets which forbade his criticising them in the same frank and free manner in which he criticises Melancthon or Justus Jonas." "The Apostles," Luther says, "did not sufficiently extol or explain Abraham's faith. I marvel much that Moses so slightly remembers him. . . . I will have none of Moses and his law, for he is an enemy of Christ." So with Macchabees and Esther. "The history of Elijah is almost incredible." "The history of the prophet Jonah sounds more strange than any poet's fable." "The Second Book of Esdras I would throw into the Elbe." "The Epistle to the Hebrews was certainly not written by an Apostle." It was "put together out of many pieces." The Apocalypse "I hold to be neither apostolic nor prophetic." St. James' Epistle is "an epistle of straw." It is "directly contrary to St. Paul and to all the rest of the Scripture." "St. John's Gospel and St. Paul's Epistles. . . . and St. Peter's first Epistle teach all which it is needful to know."

Commenting on these and other evidences of Luther's "free," "critical" spirit, the author correctly says: "There was no Bibliolatry or mere mechanical submission to Biblical authority in Luther." "The ground on which he denies the inspiration of a book is always simply his individual opinion as to its doctrine or its style; and certainly no Tübingen professor of our own time ever proceeded with greater boldness or freedom in the matter." "Such words as these serve chiefly to show the deeply *rational* grounds of Luther's faith, as opposed to the grounds of the common churchmen, and how far removed he was from what men call the Protestant principle of authority." It "would be arbitrary and ridiculous to make him appear in the garb of an 'Evangelical' preacher of the present day, which Canon Mozeley so properly makes sport of." "I boldly assert, it does not need great boldness, that coming into the science of our time with the same spirit with which he came into the science of four centuries ago, Martin Luther would have been—Theodore Parker." "Luther stands for *Rationalism*. He stands also for *intellectualism* in religion." "The Lutheran movement differs from the Wesleyan movement, and, in a very great degree, from Christianity." "'If any man will *do* God's will,' said Jesus, 'he shall know of the doctrine.' 'If any man hath the pure doctrine,' said Luther, 'his life will be pure also.' I do not make the antithesis for the sake of condemning Luther."

Luther could not endure Aristotle. The author tells the reason. Aristotle taught that "good works make the habit or principle—that a man becomes just by doing just acts." Luther said: "We must

first be just and then we shall do just actions. . . . It grieves me to the heart that the damned, arrogant, rascally heathen with his false words has seduced and befooled so many Christians."

The author's idea as to what Luther's movement really was, and its chief effects, will appear from the following :

"The very common idea of the Reformation as a universal revival of religion is a very superficial and untrue idea." Then after drawing a picture of Europe as "honeycombed with skepticism, and cynicism, and uncleanness," he says, "into this comes Luther with bolder and more outspoken unbelief in the old church, than the boldest skeptic of them all, but with a new truth (freedom of individual opinion), which they knew not of. To the great multitudes Luther was welcome, because he spoke out their antagonism and unbelief so much better than they could ever do it; and multitudes caught up his doctrine of private judgment and free thought as the instrument and sanction of abominations. Where the new gospel made one religious man, it simply unsettled ten."

The "abominations" into which the adherents to Luther's new gospel of free thought fell, the author treats as mere accidents of the movement; the unsettling of religious convictions and the destruction of faith in Christianity he regards as salutary results.

As regards the attitude of the author's book towards the Catholic Church, it is beneath criticism. Like Luther himself, it is unable to refer to the Papacy or the Church without exhibiting a degree of malice and a spirit of falsehood that are simply Satanic. He gathers together all the scandals of the sixteenth century and scandalous tales, actual or mythical, and revels in their filthiness. In this respect he recalls the saying of Carlyle respecting Swynburn, that "he reminded him of a person immersed in the filth of a cesspool, eagerly endeavoring to add to its foulness by his own personal contributions."

THE BAPTISM OF THE KING: Considerations on the Sacred Passion. By *Henry James Coleridge*, of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. 1884.

This volume consists of meditations upon the Passion of our Blessed Redeemer. The New Testament Scriptures contain two different series of considerations on this subject. First we have there the narratives of that wonderful history given by the Evangelists. But in addition to these are a number of considerations and contemplations of the Sacred Passion in the Epistles, especially in those of St. Paul. It seems to have been a part of the office of this Apostle to present to the Church the causes, the significance, the divine reasons of the great sacrifice of the Cross, its results in Heaven and on earth, and below the earth, in time and in eternity, the place which it occupies in the counsels of God, rather than the details of the history, though these, too, clearly, constantly occupied his mind. In this, however, St. Paul is not singular among the Apostles. We find the same line of thought in St. Peter and St. John. But their Epistles are comparatively brief, and the great development of the subject was left to the Apostle of the Gentiles, who had been the disciple of Gamaliel and whose mind was stored with all the traditional learning of the Jewish schools, while he was, at the same time, familiar with the philosophy of the ancient world outside the chosen people of God.

The Apostolic commentaries upon the Sacred Passion have furnished Father Coleridge with the chief matter for his work. He says, very modestly: "A Passion, according to St. Paul, would be one of the

most instructive books of theology that could be written. The considerations contained in the following pages cannot claim to be anything of the sort. But they aim at treating the Sacred Passion in the light of general truths, rather than by the way of meditating on the details of the history one after another, and any one who deals with the subject in this manner cannot fail to have large recourse to the doctrine scattered so profusely over the Epistles, as well as to the direct statements of the Gospels."

This manner of treatment of the Sacred Passion is especially useful in the present day, when so many persons look upon that sublime and inexpressible dolorous mystery, yet so fraught with blessings to all who are united to it, chiefly as a pathetic tragedy. Yet our Divine Lord desired to turn the thoughts of those who were lamenting Him and compassionating His suffering rather to considering the interior meaning and purpose of His Passion. On His way to Calvary He bade the daughters of Jerusalem to think of the great chastisements which the crime, then being perpetrated, would bring upon their own nation and city. His words to St. Peter in the Garden, after the wounding of Malchus, pointed to the faithfulness of God in the fulfilment of His predictions and promises. His promise to the good Thief referred to the great work of general deliverance which was to be accomplished by His Passion.

These statements will give the reader a general idea of the design and purpose of Father Coleridge's work. It consists of forty meditations. They are necessarily brief, but it is needless to say to those who are acquainted with other productions of the learned and devout writer, they are replete with profound, suggestive and edifying thoughts, clearly and beautifully expressed, though compressed into the smallest possible space. As regards their general arrangement, they begin with the eternal truths comprehended in the Sacred Passion, go on to the example of our Divine Lord, and conclude with the perfections of God.

In composing his work, Father Coleridge says he has freely used the writings of older authors, particularly of Father Gaspar Druzicki of the Society of Jesus. But, it is easy also to see, that, however much of material Father Coleridge has derived from other distinguished writers, he has transfused it all with his own profoundly devout spirit.

THE NEW PARISH PRIEST'S PRACTICAL MANUAL: A Work Useful also for other Ecclesiastics, especially for Confessors and for Teachers. By *Joseph Frassinetti*, Prior of S. Sabina, Genoa. Translated from the Italian by William Hutch, D.D., President of St. Colman's College, Fermoy; author of "Nano Nagle, her Life, her Labors and their Fruits;" of "Mrs. Ball, a Biography;" translator of Bellecio's "Spiritual Exercises, According to the Method of St. Ignatius," etc. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1883.

This work, which has passed through nine editions in Italy, now appears for the first time in English. The following commendation of it in Father Ballerini's edition of Gury's *Moral Theology* is a sufficient guarantee of its merits. In his chapter, "De Obligationibus Parochorum," Father Ballerini says:

"De hoc argumento dignissimum est quod legatur, imo quod diu noctuque manibus teratur opusculum, cui titulus '*Manuale pratico pel Parocco novello*, per Guiseppe Frassinetti, Priore di S. Sabina in Genova: *operetta utile anche agli altri Ecclesiastici, specialmente Confessori e Predicatori*. Quidquid enim ad quælibet Parochi munia pertinere quavis in re potest, in sacramentorum nimirum administratione, in functionibus sacris, in administrandis bonis tum quæ ad parochiale beneficium,

tum-quæ ad fabricam Ecclesiæ spectant, in templi decore, ac domus etiam parochialis decentia servanda, in pauperum, infirmorum, scholarumque cura gerenda, in piis congregationibus instituendis aut fovendis, in divini verbi pabulo tum per prædicationem tum etiam per utilem librorum lectionem plebi suppeditando, in subditis. ubi opus sit, corrigendis, in scandalis, sive contra fidem sive contra bonos mores amovendis, etc., *id omne in egregio hoc opusculo attingitur.*"

Father Ballerini then goes on to still further praise the work, speaking in terms of high praise of the conciseness and clearness of its directions and advice, which he characterizes as "replete with prudence, wisdom, solid learning, and large experience," combined with moderation, gentleness, and charity.

The scope of the work and the subjects it treats upon are given so fully in the above quotation, that it is needless to particularize them. The *Manual* is divided into three parts. In the first part the duties of a parish priest, excepting those which refer to the administration of the Sacraments, are dwelt upon under fifteen different heads. In the second part the duties of a parish priest with reference to the Sacraments are treated with like particularity and detail. The third part treats of the "Practice of the Virtues which are most necessary to a Parish Priest."

A COMPANION TO THE GREEK TESTAMENT AND THE ENGLISH VERSION. By Philip Schaff, D.D., President of the American Committee on Revision With Facsimile Illustrations of MSS. and Standard Editions of the New Testament. New York: Harper & Bros. 1883.

As a compiler and skilful appropriator of the scholarly labors of others, without being always specially scrupulous to acknowledge his obligations to them, Dr. Schaff is *facile princeps*. The work before us forms no exception to this remark. It is a collection under a number of specified topics of what has been written and published by others in separate and detached form, and in this whatever merit it has consists. It makes at first glance an immense show of bibliographic knowledge, yet, on closer examination, this knowledge is that of a compiler rather than of an original investigator. As for original criticism it is worthless, Dr. Schaff's own criticisms bearing plain marks of superficiality, narrowness and prejudice. So, too, his historical references. With regard to this latter point the following quotations will serve as sufficient proof:

"The Bible was originally intended for all the people who could hear and read, and was multiplied in the early centuries by translations into the Greek, Syriac, Coptic, Latin, Gothic, and other languages, as the demand arose. But, during the Middle Ages, the ruling hierarchy, fearing abuse and loss of power, withheld the book from the people, except the lessons and texts in the public service. Vernacular versions were discouraged or even forbidden. The result was the spread of ignorance and superstition."

"The Reformers of the sixteenth century kindled an incredible enthusiasm for the Word of the living God. They first fully appreciated its universal destination. . . . They went to the fountain-head of truth, and removed obstructions which prevent a direct access of the believer to the Word of God and the grace of Christ. They reconquered the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and more martyrs died for the cause of evangelical freedom in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than for the Christian faith in the first three centuries."

The person who could deliberately pen these lines, it need not be said,

is capable of any falsification which malice, bigotry, or self-interest may impel him to utter.

ΔΙΔΑΧΗ ΤΩΝ ΔΩΔΕΚΑ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΩΝ.

TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES. Recently Discovered and Published by Philotheos Bryennios, Metropolitan of Nicomedia. Edited with a Translation and Notes by *Boswell D. Hitchcock* and *Francis Brown*, Professors in Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

The manuscript of which this document forms a part, is said to have been discovered in the Library of the Most Holy Sepulchre in Constantinople, by Philotheos Bryennios, then Metropolitan of Serres, and now Metropolitan of Nicomedia, in ancient Mesopotamia. The date of the manuscript is A.D. 1056. It is described as "an octavo volume, written on parchment in cursive characters, and consists of 120 leaves." It contains "first St. Chrysostom's Synopsis of the Books of the Old and New Testaments; then the Epistle of Barnabas; then the two Epistles of St. Clement; then the teaching of the Twelve Apostles; then the Epistle of Mary of Cassobelæ to Ignatius; followed by eight Epistles of Ignatius (the current seven and one to the Virgin Mary)." "The *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*" occupies leaves 76-80 of the manuscript. This part of the manuscript was published by Philotheos Bryennios at Constantinople in 1883.

That such a document existed in very ancient times there is scarcely room to doubt, but whether, in the lapse of time between the probable time of its composition (the second century), and the date of the only copy yet discovered, many changes, omissions, or additions were or were not made in the process of re-copying, it is not easy to determine. Specialists in this branch of antiquarian study will doubtless closely examine it, and their investigations, it may be expected, will throw additional light upon the question of the faithfulness of the copy of the original manuscript, and its value, if any it has, as a relic of remote Christian antiquity.

KADESH-BARNEA: Its Importance and Probable Site. With a Story of a Hunt for it, including Studies of the Route of the Exodus, and the Southern Boundary of the Holy Land. By *H. Clay Trumbull, D.D.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

From the introduction to this large volume of nearly five hundred 8vo pages, we learn that the occasion for its preparation and publication was the "unexpected discovery" by the author "of the long-lost site of Kadesh-Barnea, which has been a matter of much doubt and discussion among Jewish and Christian scholars." After Dr. Trumbull's return from the East, in 1881, he made a mere announcement of his supposed discovery, and set himself to study the facts connected with it. He found "the linkings" of Kadesh-Barnea more numerous and varied than he anticipated, and the possibility of gain from farther investigation in the fields of ancient and modern scholarship more promising than he had supposed. The results of this investigation, and "the story" of his "hunt," he has embodied in the volume before us. Along with the location of Kadesh-Barnea, he thinks that his work furnishes "the material for determining the route of the Exodus, the main outline of the wanderings of the Israelites in the desert during their forty years sojourn, and also for ascertaining every landmark on the line of the southern boundary of the land of promise."

These are large expectations, and, if realized, would certainly justify

the publication of as large a volume as that before us. We think, however, that the author is over-sanguine. From the examination we have been able to give the work, we incline to regard it as another of the almost countless volumes that have been issued upon antiquarian questions connected with the geography of Egypt, Arabia, and Palestine, which it is doubtful will ever be settled. The author seems to have consulted an immense number of previous publications, and his references and notes to them are valuable, but we are unable to discover that he has settled or determined any question of real importance heretofore disputed.

THE PAROCHIAL HYMN BOOK. Words and Melodies. Containing Prayers and Devotions for all the Faithful. Including Vespers, Compline, and all the Liturgical Hymns for the Year. Both in Latin and English. *Permissu Superiorum.* London: Burns & Oates. 1883.

Beyond all question, this is the most complete and comprehensive work of the kind that has been published in the English language; so comprehensive, indeed, that we fear the size of the work, rendered necessary by its very comprehensiveness, will prevent it from coming into general use. It is a volume of 668 closely printed 8vo. pages, containing the matter common to extensive manuals of devotion, along with 632 hymns and chants, all set to appropriate music, followed by special devotions and prayers, recommended to be used by members respectively of the Arch-Confraternity of the Holy Family, of the Confraternities of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, of the Most Blessed Sacrament, of the Servants of the Holy Ghost, of the Most Holy Rosary, of the Brown Scapular of our Lady of Mount Carmel, of the Blue Scapular of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of the Association of the Holy and Immaculate Heart of Mary, of the Confraternities of St. Joseph and of St. Michael the Archangel, of the Temperance Society of the Cross, and of the Association of Prayer in Honor of the Sacred Thirst and Agony of Jesus, to Repress Intemperance, together with a number of other special devotions and prayers, the forms for reception into the above-mentioned Confraternities and Associations, for investiture with the different Scapulars, etc.

As may be inferred from their very large number, the volume contains all the most approved English hymns and chants, or translations into English from the Latin (together with the original Latin), that are used in Catholic devotions in America, together with many that are not known, or not in common use, in this country. The music, adapted to the hymns and chants, consists of the most popular tunes of the Oratory Hymn Book, of the Holy Family Hymn Book, of Hymns for the Year, together with a large number of very beautiful Italian, French and German melodies.

The general excellence of the contents of the volume is evident from the fact that it is published with the express warm approvals of sixteen of the most eminent bishops and ecclesiastics of England, Ireland and Scotland, among them those of Cardinal Manning and Archbishop Croke.

THE CLOCK OF THE PASSION OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST: With Considerations on the Passion. Translated from the Italian of St. Alphonsus Liguori, by a *Catholic Clergyman*. To which is added the "Stations of the Cross," the "Stations of the Passion as they are performed in Jerusalem," etc., etc. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co.

The subject of this little volume as given above, together with the name of the holy author, sufficiently indicates both its scope and the excellence of its contents. No more deeply devout and edifying treatise on the subjects it comprises, could well be placed in the hands of Christians.

